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 ABSTRACT
Regulatory Compliance in Multi-tier Supplier Networks 
Over the years, avionics systems have increased in complexity to the point where 1st tier suppliers to an 
aircraft OEM find it financially beneficial to outsource designs of subsystems to 2nd tier and at times to 
3rd tier suppliers.  Combined with challenging schedule and budgetary pressures, the environment in 
which safety-critical systems are being developed introduces new hurdles for regulatory agencies and 
industry.  This new environment of both complex systems and tiered development has raised concerns 
in the ability of the designers to ensure safety considerations are fully addressed throughout the tier 
levels.  This has also raised questions about the sufficiency of current regulatory guidance to ensure: 
proper flow down of safety awareness, avionics application understanding at the lower tiers, OEM and 
1st tier oversight practices, and capabilities of lower tier suppliers.  Therefore, NASA established a 
research project to address Regulatory Compliance in a Multi-tier Supplier Network. 
This research was divided into three major study efforts: 
1. Describe Modern Multi-tier Avionics Development 
2. Identify Current Issues in Achieving Safety and Regulatory Compliance 
3. Short-term/Long-term Recommendations Toward Higher Assurance Confidence 
This report presents our findings of the risks, weaknesses, and our recommendations.  It also includes a 
collection of industry-identified risks, an assessment of guideline weaknesses related to multi-tier 
development of complex avionics systems, and a postulation of potential modifications to guidelines to 
close the identified risks and weaknesses. 
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Objective:  Assess risks and guideline weaknesses in 
successful multi-tier development of increasingly complex 
avionics systems, and provide recommended adjustments 
to guidelines. 
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 1 Purpose 
Over the years, avionics systems have continued to increase in complexity to the point where 1st tier 
suppliers to an aircraft OEM have found it financially beneficial to outsource designs of subsystems to 
2nd tier and at times to 3rd tier suppliers.  Combined with challenging schedule and budgetary pressures, 
the environment in which safety-critical systems are being developed introduces new hurdles for 
regulatory agencies and industry.  This new environment of both complex systems and tiered 
development has raised concerns in the ability of the designers to ensure safety considerations are fully 
addressed throughout the tier levels.  This has also raised questions about the sufficiency of current 
regulatory guidance to ensure: proper flow down of safety awareness, avionics application 
understanding at the lower tiers, OEM and 1st tier oversight practices, and capabilities of lower tier 
suppliers.  Therefore, NASA established a research project to address Regulatory Compliance in a Multi-
tier Supplier Network. 
 
1.1 Abbreviations and Acronyms 
AIR  Aircraft Certification Service 
ARC  Aviation Rule Making Committee 
ASA  Aircraft Safety Assessment 
C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, 
Reconnaissance 
CCA  Common Cause Analysis 
CI   Configuration Item 
CMA  Common Mode Analysis 
DAR  Designated Airworthiness Representative 
DER  Designated Engineering Representative 
DoDAF  Department of Defense Architecture Framework 
DMIR  Designated Manufacturing Inspection Representative 
EUA  Early User Assessment 
FCSR  Flight Critical Systems Research 
F-FMEA  Functional Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
FFPA  Functional Failure Path Analysis 
FHA  Functional Hazard Assessment 
FMEA  Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
FSDO  Flight Services District Office 
FTA  Fault Tree Analysis 
HCMP  Hardware Configuration Management Plan 
HDVP  Hardware Verification Plan 
HHA  Health Hazard Analysis 
HQAP  Hardware Quality Assurance Plan 
HRD  Hardware Requirements Document 
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 HW  Hardware 
ICD  Interface Control Document 
KPP  Key Performance Parameter 
MBD  Model Based Design 
MIDO  Manufacturing Inspection District Offices 
ODA  Organization Designation Authorization 
O&SHA  Operating and Support Hazard Analysis 
OEM  Original Equipment Manufacturer 
OMT  Organization Management Team 
PAH  Production Approval Holder 
PASA  Preliminary Aircraft Safety Assessment 
PHA  Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
PHAC  Plan for Hardware Aspects of Certification 
PHL  Preliminary Hazard List 
PRA  Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
PSAC  Plan for Software Aspects of Certification 
PSCP  Project Specific Certification Plan 
PSP  Partnership For Safety Plan 
PSSA  Preliminary System Safety Assessment 
PSyAC  Plan for Systems Aspects of Certification 
RAA  Responsibility, Accountability, Authority 
RHA  Requirements Hazard Analysis 
SCD  Specification Control Drawing 
SCMP  Software Configuration Management Plan 
SDP  Software Development Plan 
SE-CMMI Systems Engineering Capability Maturity Model Integration 
SHA  System Hazard Analysis 
SPP  Safety Program Plan 
SQAP  Software Quality Assurance Plan 
SSHA  Subsystem Hazard Analysis 
SVP  Software Verification Plan 
SW  Software 
TRL  Technology Readiness Level 
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 1.2 Definitions 
COMPLEXITY: A reflection of the difficulty and effort required to understand, implement, and verify a 
system.  It is not measured in the number of components or in the number of source lines of code, but 
in the difficulty in understanding and development of the system. 
CONTRACTOR: The Corporation executing the development of a system or component. 
ESCAPES:  Errors in the system which escape verification and validation to appear at the next higher tier 
or aircraft integration level. 
ITEM: A hardware or software element having bounded and well-defined interfaces. 
LEGACY:  Systems, architectures, and technology from previously fielded products. 
MASTERY OF COMPLEXITY: The ability to constrain the growth of complexity or to define and describe it 
so that it can be simply understood and shown to meet safety objectives. 
MULTI-PEER:  A group of suppliers at the same tier that participate in the development of a system as 
subcontractors to the same contractor or applicant. 
MULTI-TIER SUPPLIER NETWORK:  A tiered set of suppliers that together construct individual subsystem 
components and integrate those subsystems into the desired top tier system. 
OUTSOURCING TRANSITION: The decision: to move, the activity of movement, and the oversight of the 
development activities for a subsystem or item. 
OVERSIGHT VISIBILITY: The level of visibility into: design details and development processes throughout 
all tiers of a development network. 
PRIME: The top level OEM contractor 
SUPPLIER: A subsystem or component developer 
SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT CANVAS: A virtual space in which all the activities of a design interact. 
TIER: Levels of contracted corporations in which a contracting corporation has let a contract to a 
developer for a subsystem component or item. 
TRANSLATION LAYER:  Any point in a development activity in which information from one domain, one 
discipline, one corporation, or one individual is transferred to another. 
WORLDVIEW: The sum of experiences, training, and cultural influences that form a foundation for 
behavior 
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2 Structure of This Report 
Figure 1 below shows the steps and tasks we performed for the study. 
 
Figure 1. Study steps and tasks 
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 The majority of the information, risks, and recommendations came from two steps – an analysis of the 
safety standards (regulations and guidelines), and interviews with industry experts regarding current 
practices and experiences.  See Appendix A for the regulatory guidelines assessment.  See Appendix B 
for the risks and recommendations from industry. 
Appendices C, D, and E capture other material we produced in the course of the study:  how well do 
ARP4754A and DO-331 address model-based design (MBD); current trends in avionics that will affect the 
guidelines; and an overview of the certification process with a bias towards avionics and suppliers. 
As we executed the tasks, we formed a mind map that captures the flow leading to the findings of the 
study.  See Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2. Map of Study Findings 
We first extracted two major categories of risks to safe multi-tier avionics development – management 
of suppliers and lack of a systems emphasis.  Then we looked at how the existing regulations and 
guidelines do or don’t address the risks.  We finished with regulatory and guideline actions that would 
lead to greater safety in multi-tier developments. 
As you go through the sections in this report, you will see expansions of this map. 
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 3 Summary of Findings and Recommendations 
The findings and recommendations are grouped under the categories of: 
x Risks to multi-tier supplier management 
x Risks to multi-tier systems development 
x Guideline weaknesses 
x Recommendations 
 
3.1 Risks to Multi-tier Supplier Management 
Good multi-tier supplier management is as important to developing safe systems as are the technical 
processes because it establishes the responsibilities, the resources, and the means of accomplishing the 
work.   
Failure to Understand Outsourcing Risks:  Industry contributors to this study identified outsourcing 
failures as a major safety area.  Seemingly unmanageable growth in complexity and the associated 
development costs has prompted industry to seek specialized suppliers that are less expensive than 
internal organizations.    Companies often assume (for the hope of reducing cost) that suppliers’ 
knowledge is equal to internal experienced personnel and their “across-the-hallway” day-to-day 
discussions. There are some resulting failures: 
x Suppliers are not accurately assessed regarding their system integration capability and 
experience in design for safety.  Companies accept suppliers’ claim of experience from similar 
past efforts, and accept suppliers’ self-assessments.   
x Suppliers fail to correctly interpret requirements because they lack application experience or 
knowledge about systems’ higher level functions. 
x Technical solutions that boast of cost reductions and competitive advantages are often 
overrated for sales, and end up adding to complexity.   
x Companies using suppliers do not understand the level of internal expertise that must be 
maintained to provide proper oversight of suppliers.  Experienced personnel are dropped as 
suppliers are brought on, and then companies cannot perform oversight properly. 
x When outsourcing, especially to another country, there are cultural differences that are not 
recognized.  First-time expectations between a company and its supplier are wrong because 
their cultures are different.   
Inadequate Contracting:  The most obvious result of the missed risks above is inadequate contracting 
between companies and their suppliers.  The contracts lack assignments of system functions and safety 
responsibilities, do not establish processes for passing clear specifications, and lack oversight focused on 
safety. 
Responsibilities and boundaries that are not defined and funded will not be worked on.  Further, 
boundaries that are not defined from a system perspective will let functional and safety requirements 
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 slip through.  A contract should clearly assign responsibility, authority, and accountability (RAA) at the 
company’s level to provide the context a supplier needs. 
For companies and suppliers that are not effective at multi-tier work, oversight is often viewed 
incorrectly.  Companies view it as increasing the cost of execution, or use oversight as a tool to reduce 
the costs of suppliers.  Suppliers view oversight as additional regulatory burdens and another checkbox 
to fill before shipping a product.  In these cases, companies expect design and safety oversight to take 
place through requirements flow down and a few design reviews. 
With multiple tiers of suppliers, there is a question about how much visibility should be available to the 
company at the top through all the tiers, and how that can be accomplished without compromising 
intellectual property.  Often, visibility is provided only after a supplier fails to perform. 
In the course of this study, we did not find any guidelines to industry that provided a clear contracting 
approach to: outsourcing decisions, supplier assessments, supplier management and oversight, and 
proper contracting of these activities. 
 
3.2 Risks to Multi-tier Systems Development 
Struggles towards Mastery of Complexity:  Design of safe avionics requires that there be clarity in 
understanding the system.  Complexity makes understanding harder.  Einstein had a great quote, “If you 
can’t explain it simply, you simply don’t understand it.”  Unfortunately, there is a common tendency to 
consider complexity as admirable in customers’ eyes and an indicator of a supplier’s accomplishments. 
Outsourcing makes complexity worse in terms of safety by adding multi-tier “translation layers”.  
Translating system knowledge across company boundaries abstracts developers further from the 
systems architects who are supposed to understand the system. 
Product complexity can be put into two buckets – essential and nonessential being further categorized 
as clearly explained and poorly described.  A company and its suppliers must understand the essential 
complexities.  They should consider eliminating or segregating nonessential complexity for cost and 
safety reasons.  There are risks that a developer will not properly manage its product complexity 
because: 
x The developer lacks a clear system view of what functions are essential and nonessential. 
x The developer does not maintain the system view through development, allowing boundaries 
and high-level requirements to drift. 
x The developer’s teams and suppliers begin work before system definitions are known.   
x The developer’s design tools do not handle complexity well. 
x There are regulatory processes that have some promise to illuminate complexity, but the 
processes are unnecessarily constrained. 
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 Incomplete/Inadequate Requirements Development and Translation:  All of the study participants 
agreed that the major source of design and safety error was in the requirements translation, 
interpretation, and flow-down.  Guidelines and processes have worked quite well for implementation of 
designs.  However, attention and processes are needed at the system decomposition boundaries to 
transfer the requirements and system intent to multi-tier suppliers.  These boundary risks include: 
x Level of understanding the system and its application by developers on both sides of a multi-tier 
boundary. 
x Availability and use of design tools and industry standards that are sufficient for conveying 
design requirements. 
x Clear and concise requirements that prevent interpretation error, particularly in higher level 
system intent. 
x Carefully defined interfaces.  Companies should not rely on “compliance” with industry 
standards to properly define interfaces. 
Inadequate Systems Processes:  Both industry and regulatory experts raised the concern of a decay in 
the fundamental systems responsibilities in the avionics industry.  The risk sources are: 
x System interface definition, system level testing, and unintended function testing have been 
starved of resources due to the regulatory and industry focus on software and lower level 
processes.  System-level assessment is traded for an assumption that extensive low level testing 
prescribed by the guidelines will provide adequate coverage.  This fails particularly at system 
boundaries and boundaries between tiers of suppliers.   
x Multi-tier oversight is dependent on the strength of a company’s safety organization.  When 
additional tiers are added, the demands on that safety organization increase without the 
resources to match – funding, technically savvy personnel, and personnel with subcontractor 
oversight experience. 
x Low-level items begin to define system objectives.  Systems objectives should be the source 
from which requirements are decomposed and allocated.  With a process emphasizing software 
over systems, the lower level implementers have few boundaries and “discover the design”. 
 
3.3 Guideline weaknesses 
Appendix A, Regulatory Guideline Assessment, holds our assessment of how well the current regulatory 
guidelines address avionics development in a network of multi-tiered developers.   We looked at 
documents from ARP, RTCA, FAA Orders, Advisory Circulars, and a few other peripheral documents. 
It is difficult to grasp the available resources, content, and applicability of the current guidelines.  
Newcomers to the avionics industry must get a significant amount of tribal knowledge from experienced 
companies.  Even the experienced DER’s and safety process experts we spoke with hesitated to say they 
had a full picture of the safety processes outlined in the many guidelines. 
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 Fragmented Guidelines:  The regulatory guidelines can be likened to a collection of roadmaps generated 
by various cartographers, each with partial terrain information and each with their own particular region 
and destination in mind.  A newcomer in the multi-tier development environment will typically be told 
to start with the fundamental documents of ARP4754A, DO-178C, and DO-254.  After that, a newcomer 
will labor for some time before being made aware of the existence and applicability of Advisory Circulars 
and FAA Orders.  Then, time is required to wade through the guidelines figuring out how they apply to 
the newcomer’s work.   
The issue of fragmentation was pointed out by a previous Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) 
assessment of FAA initiatives to improve aircraft certification and approval processes (online ARC 
Recommendation Report dated May 22, 2012).  Their study pointed out that many initiatives to improve 
certification efficiency have been implemented; however the initiatives are not cohesive. 
Guideline Inadequacies:  This study identified 8 guideline weaknesses related to multi-tier, newcomer, 
and even experienced industry developers as follows: 
1. Hidden Guidance Methods:  The reader of the guidelines is not likely to stumble on to all the 
useful material scattered throughout the RTCA, ARP, Advisory Circulars, FAA Orders, SAE papers, 
IEEE papers, etc. that could be useful to the developer.  What appears to be missing is a top 
level view of the guidelines themselves with an organized structure around a clearly defined 
roadmap to the objectives.   
2. Inadequate Systems Guidance:  Industry experts indicate the current safety escapes are at the 
systems design and testing levels rather than at the low level implementation.  ARP4754A was 
only recently (2011) recognized by the FAA as an acceptable means of compliance, even though 
ARP4754 was published in 1996.  This document, however, remains in conflict with the Industry 
Guide to Product Certification.  System safety is given lip service, but the focus on software and 
its processes has caused industry to devalue systems design.   
3. Inadequate Multi-tier Oversight Methodology:  Out of the most heavily used regulatory 
documents (ARP4754A, DO-178C, and DO-254), only DO-178C calls out areas for supplier 
oversight and control.  FAA Order 8110.49 speaks to multi-tier development and the need for 
oversight, but this document is not widely recognized and used by industry.  The guidelines do 
not promote effective oversight.  Most companies implement oversight as periodic “fly-by” 
assessments of suppliers’ work at reviews.  The required oversight does not promote tiers 
working towards the same system intent. 
4. Weak Multi-tier Requirements Development Guidance:  Flow-down of clear and complete 
requirements is critical when each company tier adds a requirement translation layer.  Some of 
the documents promote graphical descriptions for requirements in addition to text because 
they are clearer.  The guidelines should be updated to describe how to use graphical 
requirements for multi-tier tasks.  
5. Missing Model-Based Design (MBD) Guidance:  MBD can be used from upper systems level 
down through software and hardware component levels.  Currently, DO-331 is the primary 
guide for MBD because ARP4754A recognizes it.  However, DO-331 was written as a software 
document under DO-178C, so its guidance for MBD is directed at software.  The reader is left 
with a lack of clarity as to what is permitted in systems vs software modeling.   See Appendix D, 
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 ARP4754A and DO-331 Model Based Design Guideline Adequacy, for further discussion on the 
issues of MBD. 
6. Missing/Weak Tiered Supplier Management Guidance:  As we mentioned in Section 3.1 above 
(multi-tier supplier management), strong contracts are necessary for safety.  The issue is not the 
legalese in contracts, but the behaviors and partnerships in the development effort.  The 
guidelines do not say anything to industry about evaluating suppliers’ capabilities, defining 
methods and means of transferring information (both directions), establishing Responsibility, 
Accountability and Authority. 
7. Weak Guidance for Handling Translation Layers:  Translation layers are the places in the design 
process where technical and management information is transferred from one organization to 
another.  Any time information jumps from one company to another, there is a risk that it will 
not be complete.  These translations should be minimized and/or managed to assure accuracy in 
the translation.  The guidelines are weak in their recognition of these high risk points and in 
guidance as to how to manage proper translation.  ARP4754A acknowledges the requirements 
allocation and includes a verification loop but not much more than that. 
8. Inadequate Guidance on System Complexity Minimization:  Growing complexity is the prime 
driver of multi-tier development teams, and it is the primary reason for increased risk in multi-
tier development.  Increased risk comes with complexity in the form of: a lack of full system 
understanding, increased information translation boundaries, and the entry of inexperienced 
developers into the avionics arena.  Complexity issues are recognized in at least one document, 
Order 8110.49, which actually does a nice job of outlining the concerns.  However the guidelines 
could provide additional assistance in complexity minimization or in the design of necessarily 
complex systems in a safe manner. 
 
Guideline Complexity:  Guidelines provide considerable tutorial material but are not clearly organized 
towards a goal or series of accomplishments the developer should follow.  Without the tutorial of an 
experienced safety specialist or a DER, a multi-tier newcomer would not quickly grasp the intended 
objectives outlined within the guideline.  Take for example the Plan for Software Aspects of Certification 
(PSAC) and Plan for Hardware Aspects of Certification (PHAC) – there is an outline of each of these 
mandatory documents in the respective guidelines, but the guidelines themselves are not organized 
with a focus towards the development of a PSAC and PHAC. 
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 3.4 Summary of Recommendations 
We addressed the risks identified above from the perspective of the overall purpose and intent of 
regulatory guidelines.  Potential enhancements to the collection of guidelines were then postulated as 
illustrated in Figure 3.  
The result is five recommendations that fall into the categories of multi-tier supplier management and 
multi-tier system development.   
The five recommendations are: 
1. Development of a Multi-tier Contracting Guideline 
2. Development of a Hierarchal Guide to the Guidelines 
3. Product-Driven Guideline Structure Modifications for DO-178C and DO-254 
4. Specification of a Systems Plan for Certification 
5. Development of a System MBD Guideline 
 
 
Figure 3. Guideline Intent and Recommended Enhancements 
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 Recommendation 1:  Multi-tier Contracting Guideline 
Several weaknesses were identified in the guidelines relating to management of multi-tiered suppliers:  
assessing suppliers, defining multi-tier responsibilities in contracts, day-to-day management practices, 
and inadequate oversight of suppliers.  There are resources for multi-tier management in some FAA 
internal orders (to FAA AIR), but these are not widely recognized by industry. 
To address these issues, we propose a new guideline with three sections: 
a) A guide for management of outsourcing:  guidance for assessing potential supplier 
capabilities; guidance in the transition to outsourcing in terms of requirements rigor and skill 
retention; and awareness of potential impacts from corporate and cultural differences and 
how do deal with them. 
b) A guide for multi-tier supplier contracting: a model contract with the basic elements; guidance 
for establishing boundaries in Responsibility Accountability and Authority (RAA); flow-down 
of system, software, and hardware prescriptive plans. 
c) A guide for multi-tier supplier oversight: oversight agreements established prior to contract 
authorization; agreements on oversight visibility throughout the tier levels; and a continual 
focus on technical oversight. 
 
Recommendation 2:  Hierarchical Guide to the Guidelines 
Help developers find the appropriate regulatory guidance, and provide resource awareness through a 
hierarchical guideline document. 
We recommend the development of a hierarchical guide to the guidelines showing interrelationships 
and dependencies between Advisory Circulars, FAA Orders, ARP guidelines, RTCA guidelines and key 
industry guidelines.   
During this process there should also be an effort to close the missing cross reference holes found in the 
various guidelines.    
 
Recommendation 3:  Product Driven Guideline Structure 
We recommend a restructure of DO-178C and DO-254 to match the section outlines of the PSAC and 
PHAC which the developer must generate.  There is a PSAC outline (DO-178C Section 11.1) and PHAC 
outline (DO-254 Section 10.1.1) in the two guidelines.  However, the explanatory material in the RTCA 
documents defining the content of the PSAC and PHAC is not organized according to the outlines of 
the PSAC or PHAC.   
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Recommendation 4:  Systems Plan for Certification 
Strengthen the system role in complex multi-tier developments. 
We recommend a Plan for Systems Aspects of Certification (PSyAC) be established along with the 
PSAC and PHAC.   
The PSyAC would replace the SPP and PSCP.  The benefits would include: 
x Resolving discrepancies between the FAA and Industry Guide to Product Certification (PSCP) and 
the ARP4754A System Safety Program Plan (SPP).  See Figure 20, page 48 for a comparison of 
the two differing outlines. 
x Maintaining focus on system objectives, overall system safety, architectural changes, system 
requirements, and design clarity. 
x Addressing the entire life-cycle of the system (hardware and software developers generally 
focus on the implementation phase of the V-diagram). 
x Provide oversight over all of the tiered supplier networks. 
x A single plan defining the system safety analyses and assessments. 
 
Recommendation 5:  System Model-Based Design (MBD) Guideline 
We believe MBD is a way to reduce the number of translation layers and the impact of any remaining 
translation layers.  MBD is much more than the application of a graphical compiler to generate code 
from a clearly understood picture of a function or process.  MBD applies from the concept through the 
validation stage of a development where virtual execution of models as they develop direct their 
requirements specification within the MBD environment and their Early User Assessment (EUA) 
validation of the developing system. 
MBD over the entire life-cycle must be addressed by the guidelines. 
It is important that MBD be understood as: 
Model-Based Design (MBD) is a mathematical and visual method of addressing problems 
associated with designing complex control, signal processing and communication systems.  
Rather than relying on physical prototypes and textual specifications, model based design uses a 
system model as an analyzable specification throughout development.  It supports system- and 
component-level design and simulation, automatic code generation, and continuous test and 
verification.  In Model-Based Design, a system model is at the center of the development 
process, from requirements development, through design, implementation, and testing 
We recommend a System MBD Guideline to address the full life-cycle of the development effort and 
to provide a system perspective of MBD.   
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First, the guideline should address “translation layer management”.  The objectives of translation 
layer management are the reduction of the number of layers and the clarity by which information 
transitions the translation layer. 
This is the jump of a concept, requirement, or design to another tier or group.  Figure 4 illustrates the 
addition of translation layers in a single sub-tier development.  A part of addressing translations is 
modeling standards that can be exchanged across tier boundaries. 
 
 
Figure 4. V-Diagram Translation Layers 
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Second, the MBD guideline should address the full development life-cycle, concept to delivery, from a 
system perspective which DO-331 does not provide (it only maps DO-178 into a MBD context).  
Figure 5 below modifies the traditional V-Diagram illustration to identify the MBD activities over the full 
life-cycle of a program.  It is also drawn to show interactions between a primary developer and the 1st 
supplier tier.   
During development, there must be a continual sharing and open model exchange between the specifier 
and the developer.  This iterative process is another form of EUA that validates interpretations of 
application intent, performance, and behavior. 
 
 
Figure 5. System Model Based Design 
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 3.5 Final Observations 
Multi-tier development in an environment of increasing avionics complexity and cost-cutting increases 
the risk to safe systems developments.  However, approaching each aspect of the overall development 
from a systems perspective will relieve most of the concerns through: 
x Organizing the guidelines from an overall systems perspective.  This includes how the 
documents address each other, and the outlines in the documents themselves. 
x Application of systems analysis to contracting mechanisms.  Contracting mechanisms and 
approaches that implement agreements on processes, techniques, and oversight to address all 
tasks and information flow from a multi-tier network model. 
x Application of a systems driven design.  Application of MBD principles throughout the system 
development life-cycle through all tiers.  Oversight and management of all tiered systems, 
software, and hardware activities. 
We would prioritize the recommendations as follows: 
1. Major impact, significant effort: PSyAC and Systems MBD Guideline  (Recommendations 4 & 5) 
2. Medium impact, low effort: Hierarchical Resource Guideline, DO-178C/DO-254 restructure 
directed towards the PSAC/PHAC outline  (Recommendations 2 & 3) 
3. Medium impact with significant effort: Multitier Contracting Guideline  (Recommendation 1) 
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4 Risks or Impediments to Safe Successful Multi-tier Development 
Figure 6 breaks out the risks to multi-tier supplier development and safe system development identified 
by industry.  Sections 4.1 and 4.2 provide an explanation of these items.  
This collection of multi-tier risks was developed through a review of the regulatory and industry 
guidelines, and on industry comments identifying weak mechanisms in the safety development 
processes. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Risks to Multi-tier Development 
Regulatory Compliance in Multitier Supplier Networks 17 
 4.1 Risks to Multi-tier Supplier Management 
Table 1 lists those risks collected during this research associated with management of multiple tiers, and 
provides a short description of that risk. 
 
Table 1. Multi-tier Risks from Inadequate Management 
Risks to Multi-tier Supplier Mgt 
Inadequately Planned Outsourcing Transition:  Companies outsource development for two primary 
reasons – reduce their own internal costs (requested by management), and deal with complexity by 
dividing the work.  Shifting the work externally can add safety risks if the technical aspects of the 
transition are not carefully planned and the potential issues addressed prior to the transition.  The 
outsourcing transition adds another tier and the associated translation layers in the technical, 
process, and management areas.  Along with this comes the added effort to ensure that information 
is clearly transferred to the multi-tier supplier. 
 
Risk Source Description 
 Supplier Selection Dependent on Self 
Advertised Capabilities  
Contractor accepts suppliers’ marketing of their 
capabilities and suppliers’ self evaluations of capability.  As 
a result, the contractor skips their independent 
evaluations of potential suppliers. 
 Supplier Lack of Application 
Experience  
Common causes:  1) a supplier is knowledgeable in his 
functional area, but has little understanding of next level 
application; 2) the contractor assumes the supplier is 
qualified for different area of avionics development based 
on demonstrated capability in a specific application.  Gaps 
in the supplier’s understanding are not filled because the 
contractor assumes the supplier knows the application. 
Inadequate Evaluation of 
Architectural and Technical Impacts 
Contractors may accept solutions that sound good to save 
time and risk. Program risks may actually increase with the 
decision to outsource when coupled with unawareness of 
the complexity consequences and the safety implications. 
Weak Internal Resource Maintenance 
and External Resource Management 
Outsourcing for financial or partnership reasons will 
usually include a reduction of internal resources at the 
contractor level.  An inadequate understanding of the level 
of internal technical skills needed by contractor to 
maintain oversight of the subtier developer may result. 
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 Risk Source Description 
Inadequate Requirements Rigor 
Stemming from Assumptions on 
Internal History 
Transition of contractor’s formerly internal technical work 
to supplier may be based on contractor’s historical internal 
operations and specification rigor.  Assumptions of 
previously highly coupled teams, common processes, and 
levels of experience are applied to requirements and 
process flow down as if they were still within the 
contractor’s facility and organization.  Failure to complete 
early user assessment closure on design progress does not 
catch the potential gaps. 
Inadequate Cross Cultural Process 
Translation  
There may be a tiered failure to clarify and train cross-
cultural methods and processes to attain a common 
ground.  Design behavior norms and design freedoms 
stemming from assumptions of the foreign (and even US) 
contractor’s cultural norms if not addressed with the 
developer can result in gaps and errors. 
 
Inadequate Contracting:  The contractual management of tiered developments is an important 
aspect of safe system development in defining boundaries and responsibilities while giving the prime 
contractor necessary oversight and insight throughout the development.  It also assists the tiered 
developer in application clarity. 
 
Risk Source Description 
Insufficient Supplier Oversight 
Planning  
Insufficient oversight agreements and planning during the 
establishment of supplier contract.  Subsequent unfilled 
expectations result in weak oversight, disputes, and cost 
increases. 
 Inadequate Boundaries and Supplier 
Responsibility, Accountability, and 
Authority (RAA) in the Contract 
Inadequate description of supplier RAA in the contract 
results in uncertainties, assumed responsibilities, and gaps 
in the design process. 
 Improper Motivation for Oversight 
Contractor mindset towards oversight goals of continual 
reduction of the oversight burden resulting from a cost 
reduction objective and technical dislike for executing the 
oversight management activities.  Results in oversight 
through metrics measuring supplier, design “escapes” and 
errors not detected by supplier quality assurance and 
testing, and completed task performance rather than 
personal involvement in the design during the 
development effort. 
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 Risk Source Description 
Assumption that Oversight takes 
place through Requirements Flow 
Down  
Contracting assumption that written flow-down of 
processes and requirements provides sufficient oversight.  
Overreliance on written procedures and periodic design 
reviews without frequent technical and management 
guidance to clarify and correct the suppliers design 
directions.  An aloof attitude towards accomplishing the 
design objective without real design participation by the 
contractor. 
 Inadequate Specification of 
Processes and Common Toolsets  
Inadequate agreements on processes, requirements flow-
down methodologies, and common toolsets at contract 
initiation.  Disparate processes and toolsets force 
contractors and suppliers to translate, and this is where 
specification errors are most likely to occur. 
 Lack of Oversight Crossing all Tiers  
Failure to contract visibility and oversight through all levels 
of tiers from the top can lead to application and 
requirements divergence at the lower tiers. 
 
4.2 Risks to Multi-tier Systems Development 
Table 2 lists those risks collected during this research associated with systems development in a multi-
tier environment, and provides a short description of that risk. 
 
Table 2. Multi-tier Risks from Weak System Development 
Risks to Multi-tier Systems Development 
Struggles toward Mastery of Complexity:  Complexity is the primary driver of outsourcing and multi-
tier network development.  However, the added tiers introduce additional complexity that must now 
also be managed.  So, complexity must be described in a humanly understandable fashion that 
provides clarity and control of the system.  This requires an understanding of the difference between 
necessary complexity and unnecessary complexity, which can only be found at a top level view of the 
system’s application and requirements, and must be followed with an oversight mindset towards 
simplification that overcomes the natural tendencies towards unnecessary complexity.   
 
Risk Source Description 
Improper Performance Measures 
Contractors and suppliers find rewards in developing 
systems that perform over and above what is sufficient. 
They readily accept and promote more complex systems 
with functionality beyond the intended function. 
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 Risk Source Description 
Lack of Systems Level Mindset  
Contractors lack experience in clearly describing systems.  
The lack comes from a long trend of dropping systems 
design in deference to strong software design - software 
design does not capture system priorities and behavior.  
Results in weak boundary definitions, incomplete or 
inaccurate requirements, added translation layers, 
weakened verification, and loosely contained designs at 
each subsequent tier.  
Siloed Resistance to Systems Control  
Development teams tend to stay with familiar local 
methods, and do not want to spend additional time and 
money considering overall project benefits. 
 
Incomplete/Inadequate Requirements Development and Translation:  Clear simple understandable 
requirements development comes from a full understanding of the application. The translation from 
the composer to the reader is hampered by differences in interpretation, differing experiences 
between the two developers, assumptions regarding guidelines, specifications, and differing “world 
views”.  Multi-tier networks compound this risk by jumping across company boundaries, adding to 
the risk of missed interpretation, and further distancing the developer from the top level system 
designer. 
 
Risk Source Description 
Inadequate Application Information  
Suppliers are given limited information about the higher 
tier system purpose and operational characteristics.  Can 
result in improperly implemented requirements and 
erroneous derived requirements. 
Dependency on Manual Translation 
Layers  
Manual translation of requirements driven by specification 
methodologies that require human interpretations.   
Inadequate Interface Control and 
Completeness  
Lack of focus on the criticality of accurate and 
unambiguous interface specifications. 
Incomplete Requirements Clarity and 
Rigor  
Textual driven requirements that have not been validated 
for completeness and accuracy, or Design Specifications 
that have not been validated. 
Overreliance on Industry Interface 
Standards 
Companies assume interface standards suffice as complete 
interface definitions in a system.  This is particularly a 
problem for standards that set the format of data 
exchanged, but not the content. 
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 Inadequate Systems Processes:  System level validation and verification is not completely covered by 
V&V of components such as software routines . 
 
Risk Source Description 
 Insufficient System Level Testing  
A prime contractor assumes testing by lower tiers capture 
the behavior of the avionics system.  However, suppliers 
do not have enough information on other suppliers’ 
components to create system-level tests.  System failures 
are not noted until experimental flight tests.  
Inadequate "Unintended Function" 
and Boundary Condition Testing  
Causes:  1) industry avoids these tests because the tests 
are hard to define or take too much effort; 2) contractors 
lose systems level application expertise over time to 
outsourcing. 
Improper Interpretation of Guidelines 
Leading to Wasted Effort  
Individual erroneous perception and interpretation of 
guidelines leading to unnecessary efforts or complexity in 
compliance. 
Shift of Development, Verification, 
and Integration to Sub-tier Suppliers  
Management in contractors wants to reduce their 
infrastructure costs, so they shift systems and integration 
work to suppliers.  However, contractors do a poor job of 
describing their system processes to suppliers.  This is 
aggravated again by the suppliers’ lack of system 
knowledge. 
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5 Guideline Weaknesses 
An examination of the guidelines, see Appendix A, was performed to assess their adequacy in providing 
guidance to complex avionics development in a multi-tier developer environment.  Incomplete closure 
of an identified multi-tier risk is a weakness in the regulatory guidelines.  Figure 7 groups the findings of 
the guideline assessment into three categories: 
1. Fragmented Guidelines 
2. Guideline Inadequacies 
3. Guideline Complexity 
The paragraphs below will dive into more detail on these groups and where the safety risks of execution 
of a development in a multi-tier network of suppliers may be propagated through the existing guidelines 
and industry practices.  Any weaknesses in the guidelines are exacerbated by multi-tier suppliers as they 
add another dimension to oversight and information clarity management. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Guideline Weaknesses 
 
 
 
 
 
Regulatory Compliance in Multitier Supplier Networks 23 
 5.1 Fragmented Guidelines 
 
Table 3. Fragmented Guideline Weaknesses 
Fragmented Guidelines 
Guideline Weakness Description 
Hard to Find Applicable 
Guidelines 
We found no organized system or hierarchical view of the Advisory 
Circulars, Orders, RTCA guidelines, ARP guidelines, or industry 
guidelines.  A multi-tier newcomer will have difficulty in finding 
applicable guidelines, wading through them, and assimilating an 
understanding of applicable content. 
Inadequate Clarity of 
Guideline Authority 
There is no top level guidance providing means or sequences of 
design and artifact development that the regulatory agencies will 
be looking for.  A few key guidelines are recognized by an FAA 
Order giving approval to that guideline’s methods as an acceptable 
means of complying with safety objectives. 
Fragmented ACO 
Interpretations 
Regional offices differ in their interpretations of guidelines and 
acceptable approaches. 
 
5.2 Guideline Inadequacies 
 
Table 4. Guideline Inadequacies Weaknesses 
Guideline Inadequacies 
Guideline Weakness Description 
Hidden Guidance Methods 
Certain potentially useful guidance material (such as supplier 
capability evaluation and oversight recommendations found in 
Order 8110.105 and FAA and Industry Guide to Product 
Certification) is hidden in documents that have been defined as 
relevant only to the FAA AIR.  Most suppliers will focus on the key 
guidance documents DO-178C and DO-254 and are likely to miss 
these resources. 
Inadequate Systems 
Guidance 
ARP4754A is virtually the only document giving systems guidance, 
and that document was only officially recognized in 2011 by FAA 
AC20-174.  The FAA and Industry Guide to Product Certification 
PSCP and the ARP4754A PSP are in conflict as to content and that 
content is weak on the technical aspects of systems engineering.  
The use of systems level modeling and boundaries with lower level 
modeling is unclear. 
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 Guideline Inadequacies 
Guideline Weakness Description 
Inadequate Multi-tier 
Oversight Methodology 
FAA Order 8110.49 nicely expresses the concerns with multi-tier 
developments and focuses on initial supplier capability assessment 
and oversight but is targeted only to the AIR/DER audience.  DO-
178C addresses supplier oversight and control in a few sections for 
the developer of software.  With these two exceptions, the 
remainder of the guidelines do not address oversight.  Oversight 
reliance is therefore solely based on the contractor’s integrity.   
Multi-tier technical oversight is generally limited to reviews and 
audits throughout all the guidelines.  Therefore the quality of the 
oversight is constrained by the frequency and depth of the review 
and audit.  The FAA has its own internal guidelines for oversight 
determination. 
Weak Multi-tier 
Requirements Development 
Guidance 
Thorough, complete and clear requirements development is as 
much about safety as it is about the functional design.  Unclear 
requirements and their flow-down will hamper safety assessments 
and safety design.  The guidelines have weaknesses in addressing 
the requirements and application understanding flow down to the 
lower tiered developer.  Although there is excellent guidance on 
how to develop requirements in FAA DOT AR-08-32 Requirements 
Engineering Management Handbook, none of the industry RTCA or 
ARP documents reference it. 
Siloed Guidelines Written 
from Low Level Perspective 
Guidelines for the individual disciplines silo themselves from 
systems.  With a weak systems guideline and this lower level 
perspective, discipline and functional boundaries can become gaps 
with no recognition of the systems aspects that each discipline 
developer should be responsible for to insure the gaps are bridged. 
Missing/Weak Tiered 
Supplier Management 
Guidance 
Contracting issues with multi-tier suppliers can have equal impact 
as a weak technical management process.  Guidance for supplier 
contracting is weak or missing.  Identification of items to address 
and contracting templates don’t exist.  There is no beginning point 
from which a contractor can obtain guidance that points to and 
references other relevant resources.  Any materials associated with 
supplier capability assessments or oversight are scattered and do 
not complete the overall contracting practices that should be 
followed for multi-tier networks of suppliers.  This leads to a 
dependency on OEM or contractor tribal knowledge. 
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 Guideline Inadequacies 
Guideline Weakness Description 
Weak Guidance for Handling 
Translation Layers  
 
Translation layers where understanding is intended to be 
transferred between individuals are a major risk area that becomes 
more critical in multi-tier environments.  The guidelines are weak in 
identifying translation areas as high risk areas and do not provide 
sufficient guidance on how to manage the risk areas.  In some cases 
there is a sense that the guidelines do the opposite by apparently 
imposing additional manual translation layers. 
Inadequate Guidance on 
Complexity Minimization 
Concerns over growing complexity are expressed in documents 
such as Order 8110.49 but minimization activities recommended 
are limited to measuring complexity and establishing a level of 
oversight.  No guidance is given to generate a mindset for 
identifying nonessential complexity and then how do deal with it. 
 
5.3 Guideline Complexity 
 
Table 5. Guideline Complexity Weaknesses 
Guideline Complexity 
Guideline Weakness Description 
Expected Output not 
Reflected in Guideline 
Outline 
Guideline content is organized such that the reader must wade 
through all of the material before he begins to understand the 
compliance process.  There is no clear guidance pointing to the 
objective for the developer to create a prescriptive process 
document that the FAA approves.  The expected output of the 
documents, PSAC/PHAC, are treated as appendices as opposed to 
being the primary focus. 
Content not Easily 
Assimilated 
There are instances where the reader is left with uncertainties on 
what the guideline objective is thus leading to misinterpretations.  
Coupled with cases where guidelines contain material with 
questionable relevance while missing the core objectives the reader 
must spend extra effort to extract what is important.   There is 
limited use of good systems practices utilizing graphics within the 
guidelines to aid understanding. 
 
Regulatory Compliance in Multitier Supplier Networks 26 
 
 6 Recommendations  
The intent of the regulatory guidelines is to inspire a safety mindset within the development community 
while doing so in an effective and simply understood manner.  They are the means by which industry 
develops their plans for approval from the regulatory agencies.  Our recommendations focus on 
enhancements to the regulatory documents, and hence industry plans, that alleviate the multi-tier risks 
identified earlier.  
 
Figure 3 above illustrates how we selected the recommendations given the risks identified above plus 
key performance parameters (KPP) extracted from the guidelines.  These three KPPs addressed the risks 
and weaknesses associated with this study. 
Roughly half of the recommendations concern clarity in the guidelines.  The other half adds to a systems 
perspective across multiple tiers. 
After speaking with a number of industry experts, we extracted five recommendations which we believe 
are practical: 
1) Add a guide for multi-tier contracting to help contractors establish good contracts and oversight. 
2) Add a “guide to the guidelines”, mapping the hierarchy and relationships between the 
regulations. 
3) Re-arrange the outlines of DO-178C and DO-254 to the desired outlines for PSAC’s and PHAC’s. 
4) Add a Plan for System Aspects of Certification (PSyAC) to go along with PSAC’s and PHAC’s. 
5) Add a Systems MBD guideline to address the full development life-cycle. 
 
The guidelines provide carefully thought tutorials and guidance, but tend to do so in silos, excluding 
themselves from other domains.  There was a temptation to recommend that we throw away the bulk 
of the guidelines and just maintain an example PSAC, PHAC, and add a Plan for Systems Aspects of 
Certification (PSyAC).   These three documents would have reflected the contents of DO-178C, DO-254, 
and ARP4754 respectively.  All important and relevant material from all the other documents would 
have been collected into these three.  Any developer could then extract the relevant content for his 
effort to create his executable document.  However, the recommendations are towards a reorganization 
of the document outlines directed toward the products they expect to be generated. 
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The inputs and guideline weaknesses were broken out with high level content in the groups as 
illustrated in Figure 8 below. 
 
Figure 8.  Enablers for Safe Multi-tier Development 
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6.1 Context for the Recommendations 
A simple view of the major activities and influences on an avionics development is reflected in Figure 9.  
The major drivers are the system requirements, safety and security regulations, and the design.  All 
three merge and interact with each other in the “system development canvas”.  There are three other 
outside influences that have indirect effects on the activities within the canvas: technology 
advancements, legacy systems foundations, and business drivers. 
 
Figure 9.  Simple “one company” development effort 
 
This relatively simple diagram becomes complicated quickly when the development effort is spread 
across tiers of contractors and suppliers.   
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Figure 10 below shows how the primary flow down of information occurs through the functional 
requirements and safety requirements.  The figure also shows the points where the recommendations 
apply. 
 
 
 
Figure 10.  Development efforts spread across tiers, and where the recommendations apply 
 
Regulatory Compliance in Multitier Supplier Networks 30 
The regulatory activities that are expected to take place within the system development canvas over the 
life-cycle of the development are illustrated in Figure 11 below.  The key regulatory guidelines and key 
artifact outputs are overlaid on the traditional V-diagram. 
 
 
Figure 11. Guideline Expressed Regulatory Activities 
 
 
6.2 Recommendation #1 – Guide for Multi-tier Contracting 
Recommendation 1:  To address these three issues a new guideline is proposed with three sections: 
x A guide for management of outsourcing 
x A guide for multi-tier supplier contracting 
x A guide for multi-tier supplier oversight  
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 Three primary weaknesses were identified in the guidelines relating to management of multi-tiered 
suppliers: 
1. Weak multi-tiered supplier management guidance material that would assist in: pre-contract 
assessments, contractual agreements on multi-tier operations, and good day-to-day 
management practices.  What is available is not clearly assembled to aid in the establishment of 
an effective network of multi-tier suppliers. 
2. There is an inadequate level of multi-tier oversight methodology that would educate those new 
to multi-tier outsourcing and would streamline good contracting.  Oversight methods are 
mentioned in a number of guidelines but implementation of good oversight practices is not 
thoroughly taught.   
3. There are some resources to multi-tier management and contracting buried in documents such 
as FAA orders that are generally meant for the FAA AIR. 
 
6.2.1 Guide topic: Management of Outsourcing 
Table 6 lists the key enablers to address weaknesses noted during this study regarding industry 
comments and guideline content in the preparation for outsourcing a system design and development 
to multi-tier suppliers. 
Table 6. Guide for Management of Outsourcing 
Category Description 
Supplier Capability 
Assessment  
Develop guidelines to assist a contractor in the assessment of 
potential supplier capabilities that press beyond contractor 
advertized capabilities and look at specific system application 
knowledge and experience.  Leverage Order 8110.49 and 8110.105 
for supplier capability assessments. 
Outsourcing Spec and 
Requirements Rigor  
Provide guidance to transitioning formerly internally developed 
systems or items to an external developer.  Address the rigor 
necessary and internal skills that must be retained to transition to 
external design and development.  Assist in identifying historical but 
unrecognized internal working relationships and assumptions that 
must be retained or replaced in a tiered relationship.
Cultural Difference 
Awareness  
Provide awareness alerting the candidate contractor to ask the right 
questions and perform the right assessments that will illuminate 
potential cultural design process difference that can impact a 
development.  Cultural differences affecting design approaches and 
norms are not just across national or language boundaries but across 
corporate boundaries as well.
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 Supplier Capability Assessment:  All stakeholders of the fielded system development and its 
performance, from the prime down through the multi-tier contractor and to the multi-tier supplier, 
including the certification agencies desire an assurance at the onset that a multi-tier supplier is capable 
of developing the product to the proper design assurance levels.  A potential supplier must exhibit: 
x Functional application experience 
x Airborne avionics design and development familiarity 
x Functional safety assessment background 
x Verification and integration experience 
These go beyond the normal evaluations of: 
x Quality control systems 
x Software development processes 
x Financial and progress reporting processes 
x Etc. 
All of these are necessary attributes of a potential multi-tier suppler.  The guideline should outline all 
the necessary attributes and suggested means of assessing the potential supplier.  FAA Order 8110.49 
and 8110.105 are resources that can be used to launch the content of a guideline for industry. 
 
Outsourcing Specification and Requirements Rigor:  The purpose of this section is to make the 
contractor aware of the pitfalls with multi-tier outsourcing in regards to specification and requirements 
and to provide guidance for management of the outsourcing activities.  Guidance to assist management 
of technical aspects of development in the following areas would be helpful: 
x Awareness of the investment issues associated with transitioning formerly internally developed 
items to a supplier.  Management must be aware that the systems role must be stepped up and 
maintained to achieve the rigor necessary to transmit requirements externally.  Management 
must be aware of what levels of internal staffing will be required to be maintained throughout 
the development to manage requirements and specification accuracy and clarity. 
x Recommended approaches and activities in anticipation of an outsourcing activity that will 
illuminate general and technical issues with multi-tier outsourcing as well as unique 
organizational issues that may arise.  Alternative suggestions to counter the potential risks that 
may arise should be provided. 
x Fewer and fewer management personnel have come up through the ranks today.  As a result 
they are likely to overlook the technical aspects of outsourcing when under financial pressures.  
There does need to be an awareness of the potential risks and the rigor required in outsourcing 
design and development.  Solid technical oversight must be maintained within the contracting 
organization. 
These may seem like a management 101 course in business management, however, the avionics 
industry has specialized requirements and the complexities require a level of expertise be maintained at 
all tiers.  There are avionics industry paradigms, risks, and practices that are not taught at business 
schools. 
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 Cultural Differences Awareness: The approach taken by a designer to solve a problem, the method and 
level of documentation, and the verification approaches will differ between individuals even though 
they are educated at the same university.  This is true even when they come from the same nationality 
and culture.  When they are embedded in different corporations or work in different countries these 
differences can diverge even more.  This issue is therefore not so much about nationality cultural 
differences but an awareness of characteristics that may emerge when working with anyone.  The 
business and technical manager should be made aware of certain characteristics that may emerge and 
best ways to deal with those characteristics.  For example: 
x There may be a “worldview” that the contractor is the authority and should never be 
questioned.  As a result the developer or supplier may not raise issues with requirements or 
designs that clearly have technical errors.  The developer designs exactly what was specified 
without question. 
x Another “worldview” is that everything should be questioned and that the supplier not only has 
the freedom to question but freedom to deviate without informing the contractor.  The 
contractor is not likely to get what he asked for. 
x There may be a reluctance to show work in progress because of the embarrassment associated 
with criticism of a work that is not yet complete.  This supplier may not provide materials for 
interim reviews and could result in major error at the final integration. 
Recognition of these potential characteristics at the contracting phase can be countered with oversight 
activities within the originating contract. 
 
6.2.2 Guide topic:  Multi-tier Supplier Contracting 
Table 7 list aids useful to the establishment of a multi-tier supplier contract. 
Table 7. Multi-tier Supplier Contracting 
Multi-tier Supplier Contracting 
Category Description 
Contracting Model Plan  
Outline the basic elements of a good contracting approach in the 
form of a contract model.  Address all the content of the 
recommended Guide for Multi-tier Contracting. 
Responsibility Boundaries 
and RAA Def  
Provide guidance addressing contractual methods of defining and 
contracting design boundaries for appropriate Responsibility, 
Accountability, and Authority 
PSAC, PHAC, PSyAC Flow-
down  
Provide guidance for the contractor in providing clarity to the tiered 
developer on what is "prescriptive" in nature from the guidelines that 
the FAA will expect to review and approve.  There should be guidance 
on the use of prescriptive documents and relationships to the 
guidelines that request them and define them i.e. PSAC in DO-178C, 
PHAC in DO-254, "PSyAC” in ARP4754A" [PSCP or SPP]. 
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 Contracting Plan Model: The contracting model plan is a template containing the key elements for the 
establishment of a contract that puts in place the agreements between the contractor and supplier prior 
to execution.  The model plan focuses on the aspects of issues to be agreed upon that impact multi-tier 
development activities beginning with the lists contained in Table 7 and Table 8. 
Responsibility Boundaries and RAA Definitions: Clear definitions and understanding of Responsibility, 
Accountability, and Authority (RAA) insure there are no conflicts or gaps.  There is a need to reestablish 
the concepts of RAA and so it is recommended that the Multi-tier Guide for Supplier Management 
address this topic.  For the guide it will be a list of issues to be defined in each of the three categories of 
RAA. 
PSAC, PHAC, “PSyAC” Flow-down: It is the responsibility of the contractor to flow down the correct 
content of the PSAC, PHAC, and PSyAC (recommended guideline) to the multi-tier supplier and to insure 
the necessary content is flowed down to any further tiers of suppliers.  Best practices in the content of 
these prescriptive documents and assurance of the information flow is a useful guide to the contractor 
of multi-tier suppliers. 
 
6.2.3 Guide topic:  Multi-tier Oversight 
Table 8 lists three key management guidance elements for effective oversight of multi-tier developers. 
Table 8. Multi-tier Oversight 
Multi-tier Oversight 
Category Description 
Oversight Agreements
Provide guidelines for contractual agreements that address proper 
levels of oversight and insight into the design during the 
development.  Pre-contract agreements that all parties agree to.    
Leverage Order 8110.105 in the determination not only of how much 
oversight is needed but what kind of oversight should be considered.  
Include oversight team composition, communication, data sharing, 
and reviews and audit agreements. 
Oversight Visibility
Support for contractor visibility accessibility throughout all tiers of the 
supply chain and visibility into cross-peer developers.  Must address 
intellectual property protection and balance between control and 
delegation. 
Focus on Systems Technical 
Oversight
Create a mindset towards systems technical management and 
oversight through a top down guidance of systems engineering 
oversight of technical developments.  Begin with transference of the 
application operational understanding.  Set a standard for technical 
oversight as a participatory partnership between contractor and 
supplier.   This is an oversight discipline that is more than just critical 
point reviews.  It encourages collaborative design. 
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 Oversight Agreements: There are too many examples of failures that have resulted in the contractor 
having to place personnel at the supplier sight to resolve performance issues and provide design 
direction.  Why not approach oversight from a preventive perspective rather than a corrective action 
perspective? There should be an encouragement towards continual participatory oversight as opposed 
to a periodic metric/questionnaire type of oversight. 
What level of oversight, where, and how it is to be conducted should be agreed to at the time of 
contract initiation.  Along with the PHAC, PSAC, and “PSyAC” the contract should lay out the 
agreements.  Both contract performance and technical design oversight must be performed.  Guidelines 
such as DO-178C list areas where oversight is to be applied but do not define how they are to be 
conducted other than periodic design reviews. Resources such as FAA Order 8110.105 can be used to 
provide additional insight that can be combined into a guideline for industry oversight. 
 
Oversight Visibility: There is value in top-down oversight visibility through all tiers from the prime 
contractor down to the lowest level multi-tier supplier.  Course corrections may need to be applied at 
any level because of the loss of application objectives as the requirements are translated between 
layers.  Requirements specifications are not perfect. The contract flow down should outline what and 
how this oversight will be accomplished.  Conversely trusted supplier and acknowledged expertise at the 
lower tier may suggest oversight be provided from the lower tier to the higher tier and the prime 
contractor. Intellectual property protection mechanisms and trust are key enablers toward 
establishment of what should be a partnership in oversight.  There is precedence for open partnerships 
recommended for guidance.  Documents such as Partnerships for Safety Plans between industry and the 
FAA reflect successful trusted partnerships. 
 
Focus on Systems Technical Oversight: The purpose of this guidance is to counteract the natural 
tendency to perform oversight from a contractual performance perspective and technical touch points.  
The tendency is towards reducing oversight as the design progresses because the performance metrics 
are acceptable. Unfortunately it is also a tendency to not report issues or the truth from a protective 
instinct. The developer would much rather solve his own problems than share his “failings” with the 
contractor.  
Contractual performance oversight is good.  However, system development oversight is critical.  The 
RTCA guidelines recommend supplier oversight be captured in the PSAC pointing to the planning 
documents as the location for oversight processes but go no further.  Coupled with recommended 
design reviews one might assume technical oversight is covered.  However, the reviews are targeted at 
verification of work already accomplished. 
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 6.3 Recommendation #2 – Guide to the Guidelines 
Recommendation 2:  Publish a hierarchical guide to the guidelines document showing 
interrelationships and dependencies between Advisory Circulars, FAA Orders, ARP guidelines, RTCA 
guidelines and key industry guidelines.  During this process close the missing cross reference holes 
found in the various guidelines.  Consideration should be given to an electronic guideline system. 
Note: In an attempt to provide examples that would assist the multi-tier developer, we generated some 
sample hierarchical diagrams included below.  These are just samples, and are not complete. 
At present there is no overall top down organization of the guidelines, ACs, and Orders documents that 
would provide an overview of the “safety system”.  Related or relevant documents can only be found by 
searching the references within the guidelines, orders, and advisory circulars.  For example: It may take 
some time for a developer to stumble onto the CPI Guide, which contains valuable guidance and models 
for the creation of a PSP and PSCP.  AC23.1309-1E calls out Order 8110.  Order 8110.4C Change 5 calls 
out the CPI guide a number of times.  However neither AC25.1309-1A nor AC23.1329-1B reference 
Order 8110.4C.  None of the ARP documents or RTCA documents reference Order 8110.4C.  So, unless 
the developer begins with AC23.1309-1E or stumbles onto 8110.4C he is likely to be unaware of the FAA 
and Industry Guide to Product Certification. 
Around half of the references made are just that, references.  The other half provide some meat as to 
why the reference is made and what the reference provides.  At least they point to other sources of 
guidance.  There are some notable reference absences: 
x DO-326 not being mentioned by the ARP documents. 
x The age of AC 25.1309 is showing by missing references that are found in AC 23.1309. 
We could not find any existing hierarchical guideline reference documents that would guide a multi-tier 
supplier in understanding the safety processes.  Experienced DER and Safety Specialists felt these kinds 
of graphics would be useful aids to them and experienced developers. 
When there is difficulty in extracting requirements or guidelines, it heightens the risk that all guideline 
requirements will not be followed. Therefore, we have identified the deficiency in the clarity of guideline 
interrelationships as a critical enhancement to enable multi-tier developer understanding of regulatory 
guidance.  Figure 12 below illustrates what might appear to the tiered developer as a forest of 
documentation he must wade through, assuming he found these.  Figure 12, however, is much more 
organized than the tiered developer will find.  It already reflects a pass through documents extracting 
relevant referenced documents from within them. 
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Figure 12. Document Forest 
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The most useful existing guideline interaction diagram is “Figure 1- Guideline Documents Covering 
Development and In-Service/Operational Phases” found in ARP4754A, shown below in Figure 13.   
 
Figure 13. ARP 4754A Document Interrelationship 
 
Figure 13 is however limited to the interactions between ARP-4754A and ARP-4761A, DO-254, DO-178C, 
and DO-297. 
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There are many more relationships to ARP-4754A as illustrated in Figure 14 below.   Those in boldface 
include a reference to ARP-4754. 
 
 
Figure 14. ARP4754A figure augmented with other documents 
 
Figure 14 still does not capture the relationships between all the guidelines. 
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 Figure 15. FAR and Top Level AC Guideline Cross-references 
Figure 15 provides an assessment of FAR Part 23/25, AC 23.1309-1E, AC 23.1329-1B, and AC 25.1309-1A 
references to guidelines and the call back or reference of those guidelines to these regulations.  Also 
included are analysis products that were listed in these ACs and the call back from the guidelines to 
these same analysis products.  Interrelationships between the called out guidelines are not reflected on 
this diagram.  It must be noted that there are many more ACs and guidelines not covered by this study, 
which is focused on electronic avionics development in a multi-tier environment. 
Though not completely clear from this kind of diagram, the ARP documents begin to emerge as primary 
guidance materials.  
Context Interrelationship Diagram Observations: 
x Both AC 23.1309-1E and AC 23.1329-1B call out AC 25.1309-1A but the converse is not true. 
x AC 23.1309-1E calls out four products: FHA, PSSA, SSA, and FMEA.  AC 25.1309-1A only calls out 
the FHA.  AC 23.1329-1B does not reference any analysis products. 
x AC 23.1309-1E and AC 23.1329-1B both call out ARP4754A and ARP4761.  AC 25.1309-1A does 
not call out either of the ARP documents.   
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x ARP4754A calls out all three of the AC documents as well as referencing the FAR.  ARP4761 only 
calls out AC 25.1309-1A.  (There is current activity to update 4761 to 4761A, so perhaps 4761A 
will reference 4754A.) 
x AC 20.115C calls out both AC 23.1309-1E and AC 25.1309-1A.  Itself is called out by the both the 
AC 23.xx documents but not the AC 25.1309-1A. 
x DO-254 calls out all four analysis products: FHA, PSSA, SSA, and FMEA.  DO-178C does not. 
x Even though these cross references are made in these documents, the reason, purpose, or 
content of the reference (the flow of information) is generally missing except in the cases of the 
ARP documents. 
 
Figure 16. ARP 4754 ARP4762 Guideline Cross References 
Figure 16 breaks out the cross references from ARP-4754A and ARP-4761 to the advisory circulars, 
orders, and RTCA documents.  Also included in the diagram are artifacts described in ARP-4754A and 
ARP-4761 that should be generated. 
ARP Guideline Cross Reference Observations: 
x AC 20-174 recognizes the ARP documents as an acceptable method for establishing a 
development assurance process.  
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x Half of the advisory circulars call out the ARP documents by name only with no specific purpose 
or content. 
x The ARP documents are consistent in their call out of artifacts. 
 
Figure 17 below provides a hierarchical reference graphic of DO-178C, DO-254, and DO-326 from the 
advisory circulars, orders, ARP, and primary RTCA documents.  Artifacts identified by the individual RTCA 
documents are included with a flow to what document gave them reference. 
 
 
Figure 17. RTCA Guideline Hierarchy 
RTCA Guideline Hierarchy Observations: 
x Some references are to specific revision numbers.  Later documents are generic: XXX-() 
x AC 25.1309-1A stands out as missing references here as well 
x DO-326 appears the most complete in its referencing 
x Some slight differences exist in artifact titles ex: SCM/SCMP 
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 6.4 Recommendation #3 – DO-178C/DO-254 Outline Restructure 
Recommendation 3:  Since the PSAC and PHAC are the operational product to which the FAA and 
developer will agree and execute the development, then DO-178C and DO-254 should be organized in 
accordance with the outlines of the PSAC and PHAC.    
All relevant explanatory material should be captured under that outline.  At the same time this 
restructure is performed, each tutorial and explanatory statement should be evaluated for keeping it 
simple but sufficient to reduce unnecessary content the simplest level.  The hope is that this 
restructuring would enable clarity to new multi-tier developers. 
Einstein said, “Everything should be made as simple as possible but not one bit simpler”.  This 
perspective goes for the regulatory guidelines as well as the description of the system being designed.  If 
you can’t explain it simply, then how can you expect the developer to execute the desired process or 
design the desired system?  Anything that obscures the desired outcome is not part of the solution. 
The structures of DO-178C and DO-254 contain obscurants, at least in the way they are assembled.  If it 
is true as stated in DO-178C that “the PSAC is the primary means used by the certification authority for 
determining whether an applicant is proposing a software life cycle that is commensurate with the rigor 
required for the level of software being developed” then paragraph 11.1 of DO-178C should be the 
upfront master plan for the structure of the DO-178C document.  The rest of the document then is 
subservient to the outline of the PSAC within Para 11.1.  Then only that which serves to guide execution 
of Para 11.1 should be retained. 
Likewise in DO-254 the PHAC “defines the processes, procedures, methods, and standards to be used to 
achieve the objectives of this document and obtain certification authority approval for certification of 
the system containing hardware items.”  Para 10.1.1 should be the upfront master plan and the rest of 
the document be subservient and explanatory to the outline of the PHAC in Para 10.1.1.  Only that which 
serves to complete or explain the content of Para 10.1.1 should be retained. 
Figure 18 and Figure 19 below provide quick assessments of what this would mean for each of DO-178C 
and DO-254.  The figures reflect that the major paragraphs remap quickly.  However, we made no effort 
yet to reduce the content to an appropriate level within this outline for the PSAC and PHAC.  These are 
for concept evaluation only at this time.  
This is also an opportunity to update the major guidelines to resolve discrepancies in responsibilities and 
boundaries, particularly differences between the FAA System Safety Handbook and ARP4754A.  Some 
documents like 25.1309-1A have not been updated recently. 
Sometime in the future, the guidelines should be restructured for website electronic access with 
hyperlink between references driven by topic much like the recommended DO-178C/254 restructuring.  
Access to the site could be through subscription as much of the material is currently sold. 
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Figure 18.  Suggested DO-178(x) and PSAC Outline Structure 
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Figure 19. Suggested DO-254 and PHAC Outline Structure 
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 6.5 Recommendation #4 – Plan for Systems Aspect of Certification (PSyAC) 
Recommendation 4:  We recommend systems be put on an equal footing with software and hardware 
through:  1) the development of an equivalent PSyAC; and 2) clarify the boundaries of authority 
between ARP4754A, DO-178, and DO-254. 
Tom Simonite (Microsoft): People seem to equate programming with coding, and that’s a problem. 
Before you code, you should understand what you’re doing. If you don’t write down what you’re 
doing, you don’t know whether you understand it, and you probably don’t if the first thing you write 
down is code. If you’re trying to build a bridge or house without a blueprint—what we call a 
specification—it’s not going to be very pretty or reliable. That’s how most code is written. Every 
time you’ve cursed your computer, you’re cursing someone who wrote a program without thinking 
about it in advance. 
There’s something about the culture of software that has impeded the use of specification. We have 
a wonderful way of describing things precisely that’s been developed over the last couple of 
millennia, called mathematics. I think that’s what we should be using as a way of thinking about 
what we build. 
We would add that the aircraft industry has done the same – the culture of software has impeded the 
use of systems specifications and methods in avionics. 
Tom’s statement above alludes to a lack of understanding of the system application or function and to 
jumping to implementation before the system design is complete.  Much of the avionics industry would 
say “we don’t do that”.  However, some old-timers would vigorously disagree, pointing out the 
degrading of system value that has slowly but progressively taken place since software implementation 
of systems functions entered the avionics arena.   
The more complex systems become, the greater is the need for a strong systems engineering design 
approach to implement the proper design for the application.  Although ARP4754A has been officially 
recognized (AC 120.74 dated 9/30/2011), years have passed during which this lack of recognition has 
degraded the value of systems engineering in the industry.  In some organizations, systems engineering 
has become a task of requirements decomposition and requirements tracing.  Some contractors even 
relegate verification to suppliers or low level software and hardware implementer. The result is a loss of 
application expertise, loss of system guidance, and the exclusion of system level verification and 
validation activities which are critical for complex systems. 
ARP-4754A provides guidance towards a System Safety Program Plan (SPP) for system development.  
The FAA and Industry Guide to Product Certification provides guidance towards a Project Specific 
Certification Plan (PSCP) for system development.  Either one of these could be assumed by industry as 
providing the systems equivalent to the PSAC and PHAC.  However, the ARP-4754A SPP differs 
significantly in content with the PSCP described in the FAA and Industry Guide, see Figure 20 below. 
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Synchronize  PSCP & SPP into a “PSyAC” – call it XXXX
Incorporate Para 4 & 5 & App B
Restructure 4754 to 
“PSyAC” Outline
 
Figure 20. Proposed PSyAC Construction Resources 
 
 The PSyAC ties to ARP4754A as a PSAC ties to DO-178(x).  The rationale for a PSyAC is: 
x The discrepancies between the FAA and Industry Guide to Product Certification (PSCP) and the 
ARP4754A System Safety Program Plan (SPP) need to be resolved.  See Figure 20 for a 
comparison of the two differing outlines. 
x It gives a single document where prescriptive agreements for the system and plans for system 
certification are recognized. The systems plan is more critical than the PHAC and PSAC for highly 
complex systems. 
x The use of multi-tier suppliers requires solid systems practices and application guidance 
throughout the tiers. 
x Increasingly complex systems need disciplined focus on the objectives, continual architectural 
guidance, continual collaborative safety design, and requirements and resulting design clarity. 
x It is systems responsibility to provide oversight into both software and hardware designs. 
x It is systems responsibility to integrate the various avionics components and to validate their 
compliance with safety regulations and compliance to application requirements. 
x Systems is the primary certification agency liaison and provides the system safety analyses and 
assessments. 
x Systems is responsible for the entire life-cycle of the system.  Hardware and software 
responsibilities are generally focused on the implementation phase of the V-diagram. 
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 6.6 Recommendation #5 – Systems Model-Based Design (MBD) Guideline 
We see MBD as a practical means to share systems knowledge across tiers.  It can capture functions and 
component relationships in clear graphical formats.  This is very useful for complex systems being 
developed across tiers.  The important caveat is that models be used properly and in the right scope – 
they can be mis-used the same as text requirements.  The current regulatory guidelines for MBD do not 
look at it as a systems tool, but more for software.   
MBD holds opportunities to address clarity in understanding, clean requirements flow-down, boundary 
interface rigor, handling system complexities, all the while providing motivation to the developer 
through cost control.   
Consequently, we recommend a guideline describing MBD for passing system knowledge across tiers.   
 
Recommendation 5:  Development of a Systems Model-Based Design Guideline addressing: 
x Translation layer management. 
x System life-cycle MBD. 
x Simulation and modeling standards. 
 
6.6.1 MBD Guideline Topic – Translation Layer Management 
Every translation of a concept, a definition, or a requirement to another person or organization is a 
point where information may not be properly transferred.  The probability of error insertion is the 
greatest at translation and interpretation, not during implementation.  This responsibility of correctness 
in translation and interpretation assurance again falls on the shoulders of good systems practices.  
Unfortunately the trend towards outsourcing and multi-tier developments increases the number of 
translation points and variability in interpretation styles, methods, and languages.  Figure 21 below 
illustrates the addition of translation layers in a single tier development scenario.   
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 Figure 21. V-Diagram Translational Layers 
The guidelines recognize the need for accurate requirements and address these issues primarily through 
rigorous requirements traceability methods.  However, requirements traceability and the guidelines do 
not address if the requirement is interpreted correctly by a supplier or if the supplier’s component fits 
the application purpose.   
Accuracy, completeness, and singleness of interpretation of all the requirements is critical to the 
sufficiency of application objectives and safety assurance objectives.  Therefore, every effort should be 
made to eliminate translation points.  If they cannot be eliminated, then the transfer “language” 
(textual, graphical, or model) must be carefully chosen and executed. 
How, and with what mechanism, does a developer eliminate translation layers or reduce the impact of 
the translation layers he cannot eliminate? 
It seems like the major solution is to get the human out of the translation process.  Beginning in its 
infancy machine coding was replaced with assembly coding which was later replaced with coding in 
higher-order languages.  As a picture is worth a thousand words and as models are usually represented 
as pictures, the next step must naturally be an acceptance of graphical compilers.  Machine code 
validation gives way to statement validation, and statement validation gives way to model validation 
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during the design process.  In all cases embedded testing remains as the final validation for delivery of 
the product. 
It also appears that moving towards MBD as a mechanism for requirements development and 
communication is a way to both reduce the number of translation layers and the impact of any 
remaining translation layers.  The impact towards reducing translation layers is illustrated in Figure 22.  
This figure assumes a graphical model that can be compiled to executable embedded code.  The 
translation layers and associated analyses that were necessary to validate software requirements 
translation and design interpretation, 6, 7, and 8 are eliminated. 
The flow-down to the multi-tier developer includes: higher level architecture models instructing the 
developer in application usage, performance and behavior specification models, high fidelity interface 
models describing interfaces between individual sub-systems, and may include low fidelity functional 
models to assist in the description of the functional requirements. 
 
Figure 22. Development Waterfall 
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 The capabilities exist today for this change from the typical waterfall process.  This pushes the design 
modeling details to the system level and therefore increases the need for a system level MBD guideline.  
It must address the full life-cycle apart from DO-331 which was intended by the authors to address the 
implementation phase of software modeling. 
Still missing from the guidelines, general practices, and tool capabilities is the capability to exercise 
application performance and validate behavior against the requirements.  This would seem to fit the 
specification model paradigm described in DO-331.  However, there is a gap in understanding exactly 
what the intent is and how to implement that intent.  There must be a means to validate that the 
requirements accurately define the intended application performance and behavior.  Individual 
requirements should be unique, resulting in one interpretation – not necessarily one implementation.  
However, a specified stimulus should result in a unique and deterministic response. 
 
6.6.2 MBD Guideline Topic – System Life-cycle 
There is a need for a Systems Guide to MBD that addresses the full life-cycle of a system development 
from concept to certification.  MBD is much greater than the item development phase addressed by DO-
331.  MBD also should not impose artificial constraints on the process because of historical approaches.  
It must expand the ability to clearly describe the concepts and requirements while at the same time 
providing the means to validate the design at the current decomposition level.  System, software, and 
hardware design boundaries will shift as a result. 
Almost all of our industry interviewees recognized MBD as a valuable mechanism for improving 
development while at the same time reducing cost.  MBD is considered by a large segment of industry as 
a game changer to avionics development.  Yet, even though the 1st MBD certification of an avionics 
system occurred more than 15 years ago, there still remains an uncertainty and division on a broad 
application of MBD principles.   
 Weaknesses remain in: 
x The definition of what MBD is 
x Industry holding to a software view of MBD 
x Poor understanding of which modeling methodologies support MBD objectives 
x Interpretations detracting from MBD objectives 
x Model sharing inadequacies 
o Weak or non-existent MBD modeling standards 
o Wide variation in modeling methodologies and toolsets 
o Variation in the design level application of MBD 
o Cross-tier management barriers 
o Guideline constraints 
x Weak provision for performance and behavior modeling methodologies 
x Weak usage of MBD in requirements flow-down 
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The guidelines should first clarify the definition of MBD.  Our definition would be:   
Model-Based Design (MBD) is a mathematical and visual method of addressing problems 
associated with designing complex control, signal processing and communication systems.  
Rather than relying on physical prototypes and textual specifications, model based design uses a 
system model as an analyzable specification throughout development.  It supports system- and 
component-level design and simulation, automatic code generation, and continuous test and 
verification.  In Model-Based Design, a system model is at the center of the development process, 
from requirements development, through design, implementation, and testing. 
 
 
Figure 23. System Model Based Design 
Figure 23 modifies the traditional V-Diagram to illustrate the MBD activities from a systems perspective 
over the full life-cycle of a program.  It is also drawn to show interactions between a primary developer 
and one supplier tier.  Hopefully, it will assist in showing why we believe approaching MBD from a 
software perspective is inadequate. 
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 Modeling could and should begin with mission concepts and operation objectives that define constraints 
and objectives.  This includes the establishment of environmental reactive models against which early 
models and final models are played for Early User Assessments (EUA) all along the design process.  
There are two paths shown on the integration up-slope: one serves the purpose of evaluating models as 
they are developed and refined and the second serves the purpose of accomplishing the final 
integration, verification and validation activities.  This EUA process is one of the greatest benefits of 
MBD towards removing defective requirements and defective models early in the process. 
Models may begin as specifications against which a design model is evaluated or as low fidelity design 
models which morph into the detailed design models.  These are used to develop the system 
requirements in a graphical modeling format.  Application usage, intended function, conditions, 
performance, and behavior are all captured at the system requirements modeling stage.   
Before these models are passed on to the subsystem development and/or next tier level the interfaces 
between all interacting models are defined.  The interface models must be at a higher TRL level than the 
intended functional model to be developed. 
During development there must be a continual sharing and open model exchange between the specifier 
and the developer.  This iterative process is another form of EUA that validates interpretations of: 
application intent, performance, and behavior. 
The sub-system developer converts the low fidelity design model into a high fidelity model or develops a 
design model from the given specification models.  The sub-system developer eventually generates 
embedded code from the models that flow up through the test models developed during the item 
design process.  During this verification process test scripts run against the models in the EUA 
assessments form foundations for development of final verification test scripts run in an embedded 
environment. 
An alternative view of this process is illustrated in Figure 24 below.  The prime or contractor builds a 
modeling environment of the aircraft and desired functional items as Configuration Items.  He may have 
multiple low fidelity CI-(x) items Specification Models in his environment or a mix of low fidelity Design 
Models, Specification Models, and full maturity Design Models.   
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 Figure 24. System MBD Process 
A critical component the prime or contractor develops is the Interface Model.  Most likely the interface 
model would be in the form of a high TRL maturity Design Model in order for the multiple developers to 
have clarity in interfaces.   
The prime or contractor passes the high fidelity Interface Design Models and the low fidelity 
Specification/Design Model to the developer.  When completed, or in an iterative fashion, the developer 
passes the developing Design Model of CI-B back to the Prime for integration and validation.  The low 
fidelity Specification/Design Model is focused on functional performance requirements of CI-B avoiding 
detailed design and CI-B internal architectures. 
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 6.6.3 MBD Guideline Topic – Simulation and Modeling Standards 
Modeling standards are needed that enable cross-tier model sharing, early user assessment of the 
design as it progresses, application understanding propagation through the tiers, verification and 
validation development during the design process, and verification and validation during the integration 
process 
To insure cross-tier and cross-peer modeling consistency, there must be modeling standards established 
that support model sharing.  Simulations must be sufficient at each tier level to capture the application 
operational intent, performance, and behaviors in order that EUA’s can be performed at each design 
spiral.  These same simulations and models must support the development of test scripts that can be 
translated into embedded testing for final verification and validation. 
This is a large topic that we did not have the time or scope to delve into for this study. 
It may be useful to establish a “Systems Engineering Capability Maturity Model Integration” (SE-CMMI) 
measure of MBD capability for candidate supplier selection purposes. 
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 1 Purpose 
Over the years, avionics systems have continued to increase in complexity to the point where 1st tier 
suppliers to an aircraft OEM have found it financially beneficial to outsource designs of subsystems to 
2nd tier and at times to 3rd tier suppliers.  Combined with challenging schedule and budgetary pressures, 
the environment in which safety-critical systems are being developed introduces new hurdles for 
regulatory agencies and industry.  This new environment of both complex systems and tiered 
development has raised concerns in the ability of the designers to ensure safety considerations are fully 
addressed throughout the tier levels.  The growth in avionics complexity and the increase in the number 
of developers in a multitier developer community raise questions about the sufficiency of current 
regulatory guidance to insure; proper flow down of safety awareness, avionics application 
understanding at the lower tiers, OEM and 1st tier oversight practices, and capabilities of lower tier 
suppliers.  Therefore, NASA established a research project to address Regulatory Compliance in a 
Multitier Supplier Network. 
The research was divided into three major study efforts: 
1. Describe Modern Multi-tier Avionics Development 
2. Identify Current Issues in Achieving Safety and Regulatory Compliance 
3. Short-term/Long-term Recommendations Toward Higher Assurance Confidence 
This document summarizes civil and military safety standards, and current commercial and military 
industry practices.  It provides an assessment of regulatory guidelines and industry’s application of 
regulatory guidance to address the issue of complex systems development in a multitier supplier 
environment. 
2 Documents Reviewed 
Standards and guideline documents reviewed for the NASA Flight Critical Systems Research (FCSR) study 
are listed below.  The review focused on determining the level of guidelines, if any, for managing 
complex system designs in a multitier supplier network environment.   
The documents were searched for the keywords: tier, multitier, supplier, developer, complex, 
compliance, certification, experience, proficiency, oversight, delegation, assessment, qualitative, 
quantitative, and (including references to DO, ARP, TC, STC and use of shall, will, must) providing an 
assessment of guidance content as it applies to multitier avionics development.   
Attention was also given to references of: requirements, allocation, trace, model, interface, interop, 
trace, and design as an assessment of functional requirements management.   
The list below is organized for documents classified as: system level guidelines, RTCA Documents, FAA 
advisory circulars, FAA Orders, Mil Standards, industry practices, and papers relevant to the topic. 
Systems Level Guidelines 
x DoDAF 2.0, DoD Architecture Framework  
x FAA System Safety Handbook 
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 x DOT/FAA/AR-08/32, Requirements Engineering Management Handbook  
x FAA Air Traffic Organization Safety Management System Manual 
x FAR Part 25, Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category Airplanes 
x ARP 4754A, Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems 
x ARP4761, Guidelines and Methods for Conducting Safety Assessment on Civil Airborne Systems 
and Equipment 
RTCA Documents 
x DO-178C, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification 
o DO-330, Software Tool Qualification Considerations 
o DO-331, Model Based Development and Verification Supplement to DO-178C 
o DO-332, Object-Oriented Technology and Related Techniques Supplement to DO-178C 
o DO-333, Formal Methods Supplement to DO-178C 
x DO-254, Design Assurance Guidelines for Airborne Electronic Hardware 
x DO-264, Guidelines for Approval of Provision and use of Air traffic Services supported by Data 
Communications 
x DO-297, Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) Development Guidance and Certification 
Considerations 
x DO-326, Airworthiness Security Process Specification 
Advisory Circulars 
x AC 23.1309-1E, System Safety Analysis and Assessment for Part 23 Airplanes 
x AC 25.1309-1A, System Design and Analysis 
x AC 25.1309 Arsenal, - System Design and Analysis 
x AC 25.1329-1B, Approval of Flight Guidance Systems 
x AC 20.115C, Airborne Software Assurance 
x AC 20-145, Guidance for IMA that implement TSO-C153 Authorized Hardware Elements 
x AC 20-152, Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware 
x  AC 20-170 IMA development, Verification, Integration, and Approval using DO-297 and TSO-
C153 
x AC 20-174 Development of Civil Aircraft Systems 
x AC 25-7C, Flight Test Guide for Certification of Transport Category Airplanes 
FAA Orders 
x Order 8110.4C, Type Certification 
x Order 8110.7D, Aircraft Certification Systems Evaluation Program 
x Order 8110.49, Software Approval Guidelines 
x Order 8110.105, Simple and Complex Electronic Hardware Approval Guidance 
x Order 8130.2, (Draft) Airworthiness Certification of Aircraft and Related Products 
x TSO-C153, Integrated Modular Avionics Hardware Elements 
Mil Standards 
x MIL-STD-882E Standard Practice for System Safety 
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 Industry Practices 
x The FAA and Industry Guide to Product Certification 
x Sample Contractor Supplier Assessment and Oversight process  
x Sample Contractor Partnership for Safety Plan  
x Sample Developer PSAC 
x Sample Developer PHAC 
x INCOSE-TP-2003-002-03.2.1 System Engineering Handbook 
Studies and Papers 
x 787 Case Study – Tang and Zimmerman 
x Use of Safety Cases in Cert and Regulation –Leveson  
x Reliance on Development Assurance Alone for Complex Criticality - CAST 
x Certification Concerns of IMA Avionics Systems - Bartley and Lingberg 
x Complexity Concept Causes and Control – McDermid 
x The Impact of RTCA DO-178C on Software Development - Reddy 
x Transitioning to DO-178C and ARP 4754 for UAV SW development using MBD  - Erkkinen  
x Complying with DO-178C and DO-331 using MBD - Potter 
Other resources 
The following document was defined by NASA (Wilfredo Torres-Pomales) as outside the boundaries of 
this study.  It was included here for reference only.  The NASA System Safety Handbook was reviewed so 
as to obtain another perspective. 
x NASASP2010580, NASA System Safety Handbook  
The following are included for reference only. 
x NASA/SP-2007-6105, NASA Systems Engineering Handbook, Washington, DC 
x NASA. NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements, Washington, DC. 2008.  
x NASA. NPD 8700.1, NASA Policy for Safety and Mission Success, Washington, DC. 2008.  
x NASA. NPR 7123.1A, NASA Systems Engineering Processes and Requirements, Washington, DC. 
2007.  
x NASA. NASA-STD-7009, Standard for Models and Simulations, Washington, DC. 2008.  
x Quality assurance plans and processes SAE Aerospace Standard (AS) 9100 [27]  
3 Summary of Findings 
3.1 Relationship of the Documents 
A graphical representation of the sources of guidance available to the avionics developer is shown in 
Figure 1 below.   The documents listed on this figure and those examined in this research do not address 
all available regulatory guidance sources but focus on those that impact the development of avionics 
systems and their safety aspects as related to the topic of this study – complex avionics systems 
development in a multitier environment.  One might conclude from the accident-incident databases that 
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the occurrence of avionics generated incidents is very rare (no accidents have been reported due to 
avionics failures alone) that the certification processes are quite effective.  Indeed they have served the 
aerospace industry well.  However, the growth in complexity has reached a new level and the 
introductions of multitier suppliers has been recently increasing with some reports of failed 
performance – managed by the OEM or 1st tier contractor, nevertheless raising a concern.  It should be 
noted that the accident/incident databases contain insufficient data details to make a proper 
assessment of the potential risks from complex avionics systems. 
 
 
Figure 1. Safety Regulations and Guidelines (Context) 
 
We have found that OEM and supplier experience on relevant certification programs is a key factor in 
successfully applying regulatory guidance and achieving regulation compliance.  We found no top level 
document or hierarchical figure that gave complete guidance to a developer regarding which regulatory 
guidelines would apply to a development.  Neither is there much guidance regarding what topics within 
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 the guidelines are applicable to the developer.  The developer must sort through the various documents 
to find those items that may apply on his/her own application or depend on the contractor, an OEM, or 
the ACO office to guide him.  For a sub-tier contractor new to avionics systems and the safety aspects of 
the various guidelines this is likely to cause difficulty in execution because the information is spread over 
so many documents.  The content of the guidelines is not easily assimilated by inexperienced suppliers.  
The sub-tier contractor is likely to do only what s/he is told to do in a statement of work (SOW) and may 
not know what questions to ask before beginning work.   A major threat to safety is introduced when an 
experienced supplier switches to outsourcing for profit or development magnitude reasons.  The 
experienced supplier is likely to place a contract based on assumptions on the knowledge and 
experience of the lower tier developer translated from his own internal organization’s experience.  The 
FAA has some internal documents that guide them on determining developer oversight but this kind of 
evaluation is not provided as a guideline for oversight to the industry.  It is very dependent on the 
insight of the contracting OEM or developer. 
A considerable amount of material must be assimilated in order to plan and execute a cost-effective 
approach to developing and certifying complex avionics systems.  The FAA, EASA, ICAO and sovereign 
states have various ways of issuing guidance that pertain to certification processes and demonstrating 
compliance with applicable airworthiness regulations.  Regulatory agencies issue policies, orders, notes, 
advisory circulars, issue papers, SARPs (Standards and Recommended Practices), and CRIs (Certification 
Review Items) along with TSOs and ETSOs to ensure safety and interoperability across the spectrum of 
national and international rules and regulations.  When a lower-level supplier is unaware or 
inexperienced at showing compliance, the risk to the overall program may not be recognized until later 
when the cost, in terms of schedule and effort, can be much greater.  This issue must be recognized and 
addressed by the contracting supplier with sufficient oversight in application knowledge and regulatory 
process guidance. 
It should be noted that the regulatory guidance is intentionally non-prescriptive.  The developer’s 
interpretation of the guidelines, in the form of an approved Plan for Software Aspects of Certification 
(PSAC) and Plan for Hardware Aspects of Certification (PHAC), provides the processes the developer will 
follow.  This approach allows applicants to use their own processes, methods, and tools to develop 
products and take advantage of improvements as development progresses.  However, regulatory 
agencies need to have confidence that the process, methods, and tools used to develop a product will 
result in a certifiable product.  To address this concern, early in the development life cycle the OEMs and 
suppliers develop these certification plans and seek acceptance of the system, software, and hardware 
development plans from the RAs.  Figure 1 utilizes the ARP 4754A Design Activities diagram as the core 
process description to develop a context diagram into which the regulatory guidelines flow. 
In collecting the documents listed in Figure 1 relevant to this study, it was beneficial to visually represent 
the developer’s activities by overlaying development documents identified in the various guidelines in 
Figure 2 because of differences in activities between documents such as the FAA Systems Safety 
Handbook (SSH) and ARP-4754A.  These were overlaid on the ARP-4754A Interaction Between Safety 
and Development Process figure in the form of a design layer, safety layer, and FAA SSH layer. 
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The goal was to extrapolate the elements that impact multitier development from existing guidance and 
use this to guide improved regulatory guidance mechanisms for complex multitier avionics 
developments of the future. 
 
Figure 2. Development Safety Documents 
The safety guidance within the various FAA Advisory Circulars, FAA System Safety Handbook, ARP4754A, 
ARP4761, and the DO-documents is intentionally designed to be non-prescriptive.  However, this leaves 
complex systems and multitier supplier network developments dependent on FAA and OEM DER 
oversight, industry experience, and product knowledge.  More recent releases, such as DO-178C, have 
specifically called out the need for oversight.   
3.2 Multitier Notes 
Of the documents reviewed, DO-297, DO-178C, DO-254, and Order 8110.49 provide greatest amount of 
guidance to multitier development.  From an overall system perspective, DO-297 by its very nature of 
the architecture must address a multitier supplier development environment approach to safety.  It 
outlines multitier overarching responsibilities.  From an implementation development perspective DO-
178C and its supplements specifically addresses lower tier supplier responsibilities better than any of 
the other documents.  Order 8110.49 nicely expresses the issues of this study: complex systems being 
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 developed in a multitier environment focusing on the oversight of the suppliers.  Although meant for the 
FAA it can be useful to the applicant in determining suppler and sub-tier supplier capabilities. 
Where written guidance does not exist, then oversight from an ACO and each supplier using a 
subcontractor is necessary to enforce safety in design and V&V.  Each group will be accounting for roles 
and responsibilities (set in contracts) and intellectual property as well as technical interfaces.  The FAA 
will usually expect proposals to be made by the applicant to address the rules and regulations. 
The adequacy of any identified safety assurance guidance is dependent on the level of prescription 
deemed appropriate.  The safety assurance approaches and processes determined from the guidelines 
by the OEM or 1st tier supplier that are turned into prescriptive processes are translated by humans tier 
to tier.  These are judgment calls based on experience.  Just as any requirements translation from 
English to English is subject to quality concerns so are the guidance mechanism translations.  When 
provided to a foreign supplier there is a cultural difference that may also undermine communication 
assumptions. 
In general it is cumbersome for the developer to extract the safety assurance objectives from the 
guidelines in order to define what will become the prescriptive processes he will follow.  Developers 
often generate tables or checklists from the guidelines to guide themselves in assessment of compliance 
with the guidelines.  For a number of the documents it would be helpful if the guideline structures were 
more succinct and to the point - subscribe to a Keep It Simple but Sufficient (KISS) principle.  Digging 
through the excess information to find the value added information in this volume of documentation is 
not straightforward, especially since so much unwritten experience-based knowledge exists.  This tends 
to make this the domain of the experienced and so adding multitier suppliers increases risk. 
3.3 Individual Document Summaries 
The following paragraphs summarize the insights gained in searching through the guidelines for written 
direction to the potential developer of complex systems utilizing tiered suppliers. 
3.3.1 Systems Level Guidelines 
DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF) 
The primary value of C4ISR was the mechanisms to insure clear requirements interpretation.  DoDAF 2.0 
appears to depart from these values in DoDAF 1.0, taking instead a focus on business information to aid 
a manager in making decisions.  As a result the values of the graphical representations of a systems 
design for complex avionics are diminished.  The C4ISR utility for design of complex avionics systems is 
gone. 
FAA System Safety Handbook (SSH) 
The FAA SSH loosely addresses multitier suppliers by suggesting that the contractor should impose SSP 
requirements on suppliers, including a System Safety Working Group (SSWG).  It also has a section 
defining contractor oversight containing principles which could be considered applicable for guidance of 
multitier suppliers.  
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 DOT/FAA/AR-08/32 
The document presents a set of recommended practices on how to collect, write, validate, and organize 
requirements.  The document does not favor high-level modeling or model driven requirement 
development.  The perspective is from the software engineering low-level modeling.  It has no 
perspective on tiered or supplier-developed requirements, therefore does not address the concerns raised 
over complex avionics development in a multitier environment.  There is no discussion regarding flow 
down to other suppliers, delegation, or oversight in any form.   It does follow the C4ISR style of 
decomposition of requirements; system overview, identification of boundaries, definition of operational 
concepts, development of the functional architecture, and definition of the software requirements.  It 
does refer to ARP 4754, ARP 4761, and DO-178B. 
FAA Air Traffic Org Safety Mgt Sys Manual 
The document discusses oversight from a number of FAA perspectives.  It does not address applicant 
oversight of suppliers or sub-tier suppliers.  Complexity is discussed from a NAS perspective.  There are no 
guidance mechanisms suggested to address complex systems development in a multitier environment.  
Although our study focuses on the avionics aspect of this issue, it seems like the NAS would have a 
common issue with complex systems and multitier/multipeer suppliers. 
FAR Part 25 
FAR Part 25 contains rules and regulations that must be complied with distinguishing it from the 
guidelines which give approaches by which compliance may be shown.  FAR Part 25 addresses the use of 
safety equipment and the safety design of the installed systems in terms of performance hazards they 
might produce.  It contains no references to ARP, RTCA, or AC guidelines.  However, 1309 specifies a 
number of items that “must” be achieved which by implication might cause a supplier to flow down 
requirements and assessments to lower tier suppliers.  However, FAR Part 25 provides no guidance 
control for supplier or multitier supplier networks safety management.   
ARP-4754A 
ARP-4754A is one of the primary documents which address the complete lifecycle of a system 
development.  ARP-4754A safety assurance control authority is through the Aircraft Safety Group which 
is to establish and communicate safety requirements to all tiers. There is mention of tiered development 
but it does not address supplier oversight.  However it develops a good system safety perspective.  The 
style of the document is like all the guidelines, it provides a recommended means of compliance but does 
not prescribe a specific approach.  So, although it does not specifically address complex development in a 
multitier supplier network the principles, it outlines excellent guidance for the applicant to implement.  
Oversight mechanisms, though not spelled out, could be extrapolated from the content of the document.  
Enhancements to the document to address multitier oversight are recommended. 
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 ARP-4761 
ARP-4761 does not address multitier developments specifically, therefore it provides no multitier 
guidance material.  The described mechanisms could, however, be applied to lower tiered subsystems 
much as the aircraft requirements are assessed with system requirements.  It neither precludes nor 
informs on multitier developments.  However there is inherent tiered hierarchy within the FHA and FTA.  
An FMES is compiled including supplier’s FMEAs. 
3.3.2 RTCA Documents 
DO-178C 
DO-178C calls out multiple oversight areas for lower tier supplier critical processes.  Yet there are holes in 
the system level requirements validation.  The document excludes itself from the validation of any system 
requirements allocated to hardware so in a manner it creates a gap between the system and the sub-
system.  It is these interfaces between a contractor and supplier where system understanding and 
requirements boundaries cause the greatest error.  There is also no guidance on managing the impact of 
an in-experienced developer. No assessment of supplier lack of experience in aircraft systems, real-time, 
and design of safety critical systems is given.   
DO-330 
DO-330 is a supplement to DO-178C focused on software tool qualifications.  It reflects the same level of 
supplier oversight established in DO-178C and so does address the issue of multitier supplier 
development to that level. 
DO-331 
The definition of what model-based development is and how it is applied will vary greatly over the 
industry and between disciplines.  ARP 4754A is referenced as defining the system life cycle processes. 
DO-332 
DO-332 is identical to DO-331 in terms of guidelines and wording in relation to this study.  The notes 
from DO-331 apply to DO-332. 
DO-333 
DO-333 discusses Formal Methods as a verification method.  It contains no guidance or control 
mechanisms related to complex multitier network of suppliers. 
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 DO-254 
The document does not address tiered level developments but does consider aspects of COTS hardware 
provided by a commercial vendor.  In that requirements are to be traceable to the next level of 
requirements, there might be some level of control of the developer even though the idea of a supplier 
and/or sub-tier supplier is not mentioned.  Furthermore, the document excludes itself from the validation 
of any system requirements allocated to hardware.  Effectively, DO-254 provides no guidance for tiered 
development.  Like DO-178C, DO-254 defines objectives that should be satisfied in order to establish 
compliance with airworthiness requirements.  Relevant objectives need to be flowed down to suppliers 
who provide hardware and/or software for the system. 
DO-264 
DO-264 does not address multitier or a supplier base in any way and so does not provide any guidance 
for multitier supplier oversight.  However, the document has good process guidance and stakeholder 
interaction definitions that could be expanded to address multitier supplier oversight and design 
requirements control. 
DO-297 
DO-297 guides a IMA system development so by its nature addresses an environment that will involve 
multiple suppliers and potentially tiers.  It has a number of guidance statements regarding supplier 
control including references to DO-178 that could provide some management guidance of sub-tier 
suppliers. However, considering the environment is that of multitier or multipeer development it is weak 
in providing guidance directions towards sub-tier supplier oversight. 
DO-326 
DO-326 does not address multitier or supplier base.  The relevant airworthiness security requirements 
need to be flowed-down to suppliers of system components. 
3.3.3 Advisory Circulars 
AC 23.1309-1E 
The AC clearly states that it is neither mandatory nor is it a regulation.  However, the AC also states that 
“While these guidelines are not mandatory, they are derived from extensive FAA and industry experience 
in determining compliance with the relevant regulations. Whenever an applicant’s proposed method of 
compliance differs from this guidance, the proposal should be coordinated with the Small Airplane 
Directorate Standards Staff, ACE-110”.  So there is an implication of prescription imposition.  Any 
potential multitier guidance found could therefore be interpreted as more than just recommendations.  
However, the AC does not address multitier supplier networks or oversight of suppliers.  The document 
does provide potential guidance awareness of areas for supplier or multitier supplier networks safety 
management.  The AC references: ARP 4754A, ARP 4761, DO-178B, and DO-254. 
Appendix A - Regulatory Guideline Assessment A-10 
 
 AC 25.1309-1A 
Throughout the document, AC 25.1309 addresses complexity concerns and means of assuring safety 
through analyses. The document addresses qualitative assessment and failure risk and consequence 
assessment decision rationales.  It takes exception to its applicability to software errors stating “it is not 
feasible to assess the number or kinds of software errors, if any, that may remain after completion of 
system design, development, and test”, instead referring to DO-178A.  The use of experienced judgment 
is clearly the cornerstone of the hazard assessments.  Any new tier supplier is very likely not to have that 
necessary experience.  The last issue of this document is 1988.  An update to AC 25.1309-1A was drafted 
in 2002 (draft ARSENAL revised) but a revision has not yet been released for Part 25 aircraft.  It does not 
address supplier oversight or tiered supplier management. 
AC 25.1309 Arsenal 
AC/AMJ No. 25.1309 (draft ARSENAL revised) was reviewed in terms of differences that might provide 
guidance for complex multitier avionics systems design and safety assurance.  Certain enhancements 
within the document are also noted.  No enhancements were added that address complex systems or 
multitier management.  It did invoke the ARP safety guidelines and additional DO documents. 
AC 25.1329-1B 
AC25.1329-1B acknowledges the growth in complexity but does not offer control mechanisms in 
response other than alerts to higher risks. The AC is pretty specific on flight control system modes and 
their assessment.  ARP 4754, ARP 4761, DO-178B, DO-254 are referenced.  The document expresses the 
need to examine and test interfaces between systems in a manner which reflects a system functional and 
performance examination of the exchange of data between the systems where the greatest risk of failure 
reside. However, it does not address the multitier or supplier aspects of a system development.   
AC 20-115C 
This AC was written to recognize DO-178C and it supplements and to provide guidance for transitioning 
to DO-178C. It also explains the use of DO-178C for TSO authorizations.  It does not, however, address 
any of the issues associated with complex system design in multitier environments.  This AC references a 
number of DO and AC documents as well as ARP 4754A. 
AC 20-145 
Control of third party production of hardware is discussed.  It is recommended that, because of the 
complexity, applicants conduct a structured formal analysis in accordance with ARP 4754 and ARP 4761.  
The appropriate design assurance should be achieved for each complex electronic device using DO-254. 
The use of third party software is not addressed by this AC.  Although third party suppliers are discussed 
there really is little implication of oversight management of the design process of third party suppliers. 
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 AC 20-152 
This AC addresses complex micro-coded components with design assurance levels of A, B, and C 
airworthiness appropriateness for the intended function.  DO-254 is called out as the primary guidance 
document.  The AC does not provide guidance for management or oversight of complex system design in 
multitier environments. 
AC 20-170 
DO-297 is an integral part of AC 20-170. The AC applies to systems developed by a single company as 
well as those developed by multiple companies.  However, this document does not address the issues 
associated with complex systems development in a multitier environment.  It does reference DO-297 
which by the nature of an IMA system considers the use of multitier suppliers even though DO-297 is 
weak in its description of oversight management of suppliers. 
AC 20-174 
The purpose of this AC is to recognize ARP-4754A as an acceptable method for establishing a 
development assurance process.  The AC addresses the concern of possible development errors stemming 
from the ever increasing complexity of modern aircraft systems taking the route that ARP-4754 provides 
a structured methodology to address these concerns.  There is, however, no additional guidance as to 
managing complexity or the development of systems in a multitier supplier environment.   References are 
made to a number of RTCA documents: DO-178B, DO-254, and DO-297. 
AC 25-7C 
AC 25-7C provides no oversight or management guidance of supplier or multitier supplier networks 
safety management.  The AC is not mandatory nor does it constitute a regulation.  Safety discussions are 
limited to performance related issues. The only reference to guidelines is to DO-160.  Any modeling 
discussions are at the aircraft level. 
Order 8110.4C 
TO 8110.4C is primarily written for internal use by the FAA, its designees, and delegated organizations. 
The order provides procedures and policy for the type certification of products.  The document provides a 
high-level model of the certification events that typically make up the life cycle of an aircraft but does not 
address multitier aspects of avionics development and safety. 
Order 8110.7D 
The purpose of this document is to apply standardized systems evaluations to the continued integrity of 
the design data after initial approval by the FAA at the PAH and associate facilities. It does not 
reevaluate previously approved design or safety data.  It forms a good basis for production multitier 
supplier management assessments.  However, the focus is on production quality assurance rather that 
design and development safety compliance assurance.  As such it provides no guidance to the design and 
development of complex avionics systems in a multitier supplier network.  Elements of production control 
and oversight could be redirected to form a basis of enhanced supplier control during the design phase. 
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 Order 8110.49 
This order establishes procedures for evaluating and approving aircraft software and software changes 
to approved aircraft software.  It guides Aircraft Certification Service (AIR) field offices and Designated 
Engineering Representatives (DER) on how to apply DO-178B.  It is applicable to TC, STC, ATC, ASTC, and 
TSO.  This document nicely expresses the issues being addressed in this study: complex systems being 
developed in a multitier environment.  It does not provide additional insight on solutions to the issues 
but focuses on the use of oversight of the supplier and the conduct of reviews to address the concerns.  It 
does not address MBD. Included is a supplier assessment table, although meant for the FAA, which could 
be useful to an applicant in determining a supplier and sub-tier supplier capability.  It should be updated 
in light of DO-178C use of oversight. 
Order 8110.105 
Order 8110.115 is primarily written for internal use by the FAA.  It assists in determination of FAA 
involvement in a project, types of reviews, and how much delegation of oversight is given to designees.  
This document includes an assessment checklist of developer experience to determine the level of 
involvement necessary by the FAA that could be useful to the industry as a potential supplier capability 
assessment.  It does not provide guidance for the complexity issues and multitier development issues of 
this study, although the checklist accesses the system complexity when determining oversight. The use of 
MBD is not addressed. 
Order 8130.2 
This order is focused on processes for airworthiness certification and maintenance activities and 
responsibility assignments, but all at the aircraft level.  With the focus on the high level applicant, FAA 
interaction, and designee responsibilities it does not address the multitier design and development issues 
of complex avionics.  There are a few items of delegation discussed. 
TSO-C153 
There is no mention of suppliers, oversight, or delegation in the document.  Neither is complexity, 
requirements management, or model based development addressed.  It therefore does not provide any 
guidance for complex avionics developed in a multitier supplier environment. 
3.3.4 Mil Standards 
Mil-Std-882E 
In place of the terms suppliers, oversight, or delegation the document discusses the responsibilities of the 
developer and the interaction with the program manager.  Oversight is discussed in the form of 
monitoring the developer’s system safety activities with review and approval of the delivered artifacts.  
Complexity, requirements management, or model based development are not addressed.  As such, the 
document addresses the safety management between the manager and the developer at one tier.  The 
principles described between the manager and developer could be applied at the developer and sub-tier 
developer as well.  The use of model simulation for safety testing is allowed, however, the subject of 
MBD is not addressed. 
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 3.3.5 Industry Practices 
FAA and Industry Guide to Product Certification 
This document has quite a bit of discussion on management of design and safety for a system 
development.   Oversight and delegation guidelines are given throughout the document; however they 
only address the first tier supplier.  Although it does not specifically address multitier supplier 
development the principles could be applied by the applicant and the supplier.  It fails on the count of 
multitier in that it focuses on foreign suppliers almost to the exclusion of the management of US 
suppliers.  Although it contains considerable valuable guidelines its adherence or enforcement is not 
clear.  It is up to the applicant to develop the content of a Partnership for Safety Plan (PSP) and Project 
Specific Certification Plan (PSCP).  The PSP and PSCP will need to detail the sub-tier supplier assessment 
and oversight management processes that will be followed.  The document references DO-160 and DO-
178B but no ARP documents. 
Contractor Supplier Assessment and Oversight Processes  
If a contractor has a supplier assessment and oversight process their oversight process will generally 
summarize the methods and processes to be used by the contractor to perform supplier assessments and 
determine the level of technical oversight, citing assessment of the suppliers control of the design 
process for compliance with ARP 4754, DO-178, DO-200, and/or DO-254.  Supplier selection and 
management processes may be declared outside the scope of the Supplier Assessment and Oversight 
Process leaving those controls to be managed through a flowed down PSCP, PSAC, and PHAC.   
Weaknesses found in these oversight processes are in: 
1) the assumption that management and technical oversight will take place through the flow down 
of the PSCP, PSAC, and PHAC,  
2) they tend to focus on-going supplier performance assessment that will determine and adjust the 
percentage of oversight deemed necessary with a bent towards reducing oversight and design 
participation through a sampling metric,  
3) they generally  fall short of providing supplier oversight guidance save in the assessments of their 
performance after they are on contract,  
4) the net impetus of this approach is a focus on supplier defect leakage rather than on supplier 
design oversight.   
INCOSE-TP-2003-002-03.2.1 System Engineering Handbook 
The document recognizes that complexity is a major issue but does not provide a means to manage 
complexity other than rigor in the decision gate review and assessment processes.  There is only 
recognition of a single layer of suppliers.  No oversight of suppliers is mentioned.  No references to any 
RTCA or ARP documents are made.  INCOSE provides no insight on the topic of this research. 
3.3.6 FAA Issue Papers 
Issue papers are generally project specific so do not provide assistance to industry across the board for 
guidance.  So, no issue papers were reviewed. 
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 3.3.7 Papers 
787 Procurement Case Study  - Tang and Zimmerman 
Under the 787, Boeing instituted a risk sharing approach and tiered supply chain to contracting 
approximately 50 tier-1 suppliers who also served as integrators of subsystems produced by tier-2 
suppliers.  These tier-1 suppliers were responsible for delivering complete systems to Boeing.  The paper 
highlights two primary issues with Boeings institution of this multitier network of suppliers that are 
applicable to any structure with multiple tiers of suppliers: 1) care in selection of tier-1 supplier 
experience and capability, and 2) oversight through the multi-levels of the resulting tiered structure.  It 
also brings out several issues with assumptions: 1) assumed alignment in technical and management 
with the OEM goals and principles, 2) lack of understanding cultural impacts, 3) capability and 
experience of the supplier including the engineering expertise as well as the depth of resources within the 
supplier.  As a paper it does not provide regulatory guidance, however it highlights issues associated with 
the use of multitier developers and recommends greater level of OEM involvement in tier-1 supplier 
selection of sub-tier suppliers.  It also recommends an oversight working team with visibility across the 
tiers.  These recommendations apply to this study. 
Use of Safety Cases in Cert and Regulation - Leveson  
This paper does not address multitier supplier issues or complexity directly.  Neither does it address 
delegation of design tasks or integration of subsystems and the oversight of these activities, although it 
does allude to local government oversight through inspections and audits.  It does not reference any 
RTCA papers or ARP documents and procedures.  There are however, certain elements identified in the 
paper that that are applicable to increasing the safety of multitier complex systems. 
Reliance on Development Assurance Alone for Complex Criticality - CAST 
The document does not address multitier supplier development and does not discuss oversight or 
delegation.  It recognizes the ARP and RTCA documents as a means to provide assurance through a 
development process.  The paper takes a position that the regulations and policy are not sufficiently 
explicit (prescriptive).  The greater discussion on the use of diversity (dissimilarity) implies guidance 
towards the use of diversity as a means to supplement development assurance.  It does not provide 
guidance towards complex avionics developed in a multitier environment. 
Certification Concerns of IMA Avionics Systems – Bartley and Lingberg 
By its nature an IMA system may be made up of multitier suppliers of the individual components and 
functions.  This paper raises many of the concerns relevant to development of complex systems in a 
multitier environment.  It states that the existing regulatory guidance material, though fragmented, 
provides sufficient guidance to accomplish the necessary safety design and assessments.  The concern is 
that a fragmented supplier development base will exacerbate the issue by inadvertently missing certain 
aspects of the design and analysis. 
Complexity Concept Causes and Control – McDermid 
The paper is focused on the issue of complexity and how to manage and asses the system.  The paper 
provides nothing new or of value but rather proposes some unacceptable means of dealing with 
assessments for avionics.  Not useful to this study. 
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 The Impact of RTCA DO-178C on Software Development - Reddy 
The document provides a nice summary of the impact of DO-178C.  It is a concise description of the 
changes made from DO-178B to get to DO-178C.  It has no direct value to this study but is recognized as 
an aid to someone wanting to understand DO-178C structures. 
Transitioning to DO-178C and ARP 4754 for UAV SW development using MBD - Erkkinen  
This paper takes a look at the changes in DO-178C and supplement DO-331 in regards to the use and 
processes of MBD.  The use of MBD to capture requirements, model the design, and generate code from 
the model is now clearly acknowledged as an acceptable means to certification by the governing 
standards.  A long standing issue wherein DO-178B provided an uncertainty in mapping objectives to 
MBD artifacts is now clarified.  DO-178C, supplement DO-331, calls out ARP4754A recommendations for 
MBD requirements capture, modeling, simulation, analysis, and validation.  Also noted is that DO-331 
defines a design model that is used to not only capture and analyze but to generate embedded code for 
both hardware and software implementations. 
So as it relates to this study this paper provides insight into guideline support for use of MBD as a means, 
although not stated, by which complex multitier systems requirements can be captured, modeled, tested, 
and coded.  The paper does not outline this system design management approach but establishes that 
the regulatory documents contain the acknowledgment of MBD that can enable guidelines that raise the 
bar on multitier development.  [This flows into our pre-conceived thoughts that the use of MBD and 
systems control can be strengthened to address the issues]. 
Complying with DO-178C and DO-331 using MBD - Potter 
This document is basically the same as the paper on Transitioning to DO-178C and ARP 4754 for UAV SW 
development using MBD with a few noted differences. 
3.3.8 Other Resources 
NASASP2010580, NASA System Safety Handbook Volume 1  
Although this document is out of the scope of assessing the regulatory guidelines for management and 
oversight of multitier supplier development of complex systems, this document was reviewed for an 
alternate perspective.  The document defines complexity as one of the primary reasons for its purpose, to 
provide a safety framework with a holistic assessment of the aggregate sources of risk.  It does not 
specifically address multitier supplier network risks: experience, interpretation, boundary issues, etc.  
However, the purpose of the document is intended for those with oversight responsibilities.  The overall 
framework could easily be applied to multitier suppliers.  The document does not reference any ARP or 
DO documents, but references Mil-STD-882D, Mil-HDBK-217F and a number of NPR documents. 
4 Guideline Reviews 
What follows is a collection of relevant statements to complexity, multitier, and the use of modeling 
from the documents.  Each collection for that document is preceded by a short summary and relevance 
assessment of the guideline or practice towards the issue of multitier developments. The summaries 
were collected into paragraph 3.3 for a quick review by the reader. 
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 4.1 Systems Level Guidelines 
4.1.1 DoDAF 2.0, DoD Architecture Framework  
The primary value of C4ISR was the mechanisms to insure clear requirements interpretation.  DoDAF 2.0 
appears to depart from these values, taking instead a focus on business information to aid a manager in 
making decisions.  As a result the values of the graphical representations of a systems design for complex 
avionics are diminished.  The C4ISR utility for design of complex avionics systems is gone. 
DoDAF as outlined in the C4ISR methodology was considered a very good systems practice approach to 
be recommended and followed throughout industry to define complex systems. 
• However; the direction within DoDAF V2.0 which has replaced C4ISR and DoDAF 1.0 makes its focus 
management tools for control - departing from a technical guidance purpose.  
• DoDAV 2.0 quotes:  
– “DoDAF V2.0 focuses on architectural "data", rather than on developing individual 
"products“ 
– “The major emphasis on architecture development has changed from a product-centric 
process to a data-centric process designed to provide decision-making data organized as 
information for the manager.” 
– “The three major viewpoints of architecture described in previous version (e.g., Operational, 
Technical, and System) have been changed to more specific viewpoints that relate to the 
collection of architecture-related data which can be organized as useful information for the 
manager in decision-making” 
– “Architecture development is a management tool that supports the decision-making 
process” 
– Any discussion regarding allocation and delegation is limited to organizational structures 
within the government. 
4.1.2 FAA System Safety Handbook  
The FAA SSHB loosely addresses multitier suppliers by suggesting that the contractor should impose SSP 
requirements on suppliers, including an System Safety Working Group (SSWG).  It also has a section 
defining contractor oversight containing principles which could be considered applicable for guidance of 
multitier suppliers.  
• Section 5.3.11 The contractor must impose requirements on suppliers that are consistent with and 
contribute to the SSP.   
• Subcontracted systems impacting safety are required to implement an SSP.   
• The prime contractor has responsibility for integrating the overall SSP. 
• The SSP should indicate how the contractor or prime plans to effect integration and procedures. 
• Section 5.4 describes an integrated SSP, although very loose in its construction and execution. 
– Organization 
– Formation of a System Safety Working Group (SSWG). 
– Risk hazard identification and risk resolution 
– Integrated safety V&V 
– Integrated Audit program 
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 • Section 6.4 outlines Managing Contractor System Safety (Contractor Oversight) 
– It does not address multitier management, although these principles are useful to lower tier 
management 
• Appendix D discusses the use of OOA/OOD modeling to specify requirements and formal inspections 
of specifications. 
4.1.3 DOT/FAA/AR-08/32, Requirements Engineering Management Handbook 
The document presents a set of recommended practices on how to collect, write, validate, and organize 
requirements.  The document does not favor high level modeling or model driven requirement 
development.  The perspective is from the software engineering low level modeling.  It has no 
perspective on tiered or supplier developed requirements, therefore does not address the concerns raised 
over complex avionics development in a multitier environment.  There is no discussion regarding flow 
down to other suppliers, delegation, or oversight in any form.   It does follow the C4ISR style of 
decomposition of requirements; system overview, identification of boundaries, definition of operational 
concepts, development of the functional architecture, and definition of the software requirements.  It 
does refer to ARP 4754, ARP 4761, and DO-178B. 
x The document is not a fan of MBD: “There are other ways that the requirements could be 
specified besides shall statements. One approach is to use a graphical model to define the ideal 
value function and supplement it with the tolerances and latencies for each controlled variable. 
One disadvantage of this approach is that it is no longer obvious what constitutes an individual 
requirement.” 
x The Handbook describes the following 11 main-level recommended practices that allow 
developers to progress from an initial, high-level overview of the system to be developed to a 
detailed description of its behavioral and performance requirements. 
1. Develop the System Overview  
2. Identify the System Boundary  
3. Develop the Operational Concepts  
4. Identify the Environmental Assumptions  
5. Develop the Functional Architecture  
6. Revise the Architecture to Meet Implementation Constraints  
7. Identify System Modes  
8. Develop the Detailed Behavior and Performance Requirements  
9. Define the Software Requirements  
10. Allocate System Requirements to Subsystems  
11. Provide Rationale  
x Input-Function-Output requirement clarity must be translated to the developer. 
x A good requirement specification should describe everything necessary to produce the correct 
system—and nothing more.  This succinctly states the balance that requirements need to 
achieve.  A KISS description. 
x The document recommends a system overview be generated and be generated early.  Use 
context diagrams, describe external entities, identify system boundaries, and capture 
preliminary system goals.  Include operational concepts. 
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 x The document outlines the development of a functional architecture.  Use data flow diagrams, 
define interfaces, minimize coupling, provide rationale etc. 
x Then the document acknowledges spiral maturation as design details are refined and original 
specifications are revised. 
x Requirements are to be traceable back to system goals. 
4.1.4 FAA Air Traffic Organization Safety Management System Manual 
The document discusses oversight from a number of FAA perspectives.  It does not address applicant 
oversight of suppliers or sub-tier suppliers.  Complexity is discussed from a NAS perspective.  There are no 
guidance mechanisms suggested to address complex systems development in a multitier environment.  
Although our study focuses on the avionics aspect of this issue, it seems like the NAS would have a 
common issue with complex systems and multitier multipeer suppliers. 
x Complete elimination of risk is unachievable considering the complex interplay of human, 
material, and environmental factors. 
x Recognizing the critical role that humans and human error play in complex systems and 
applications has led to the development of the human-centered design approach. This human-
centered design approach is central to the concept of managing human errors that affect safety 
risk. 
x An accident rarely results from a single failure or event.  They often result from degrading 
events that may be complex and involve primary, secondary, or even tertiary events. 
x A correct requirement is unambiguous and verifiable.  Controls can be complex or simple. 
x If an organization is too complex or the attitude is such that information is not shared readily or 
willingly, safety could suffer. 
x The section on incident reporting and its value raises an issue we ran into during this study – the 
data available in the accident/incident databases is very hard to search for avionics faults and 
has virtually no information as to the cause of the incident or its corrective action.  Their utility 
for this study was of little value. 
x A safety culture, Figure 3, is promoted in which the individual and group values, attitudes, 
competencies, and patterns of behavior determine commitment to safety. 
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Figure 3. Organizational Safety Culture 
 
 
Figure 4. SRM Safety Analysis Phases 
 
4.1.5 FAR Part 25, Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category Airplanes 
FAR Part 25 contains rules and regulations that must be complied with distinguishing it from the 
guidelines which give approaches by which compliance may be shown.  FAR Part 25 addresses the use of 
safety equipment and the safety design of the installed systems in terms of performance hazards they 
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 might produce.  It contains no references to ARP, RTCA, or AC guidelines.  However, 1309 specifies a 
number of items that “must” be achieved which by implication might cause a supplier to flow down 
requirements and assessments to lower tier suppliers.  However, FAR Part 25 provides no guidance 
control for supplier or multitier supplier networks safety management.   
x There is a general statement that the airplane design may not have design features or details 
that experience has shown to be hazardous or unreliable.  Generally the document discusses 
aircraft systems design in terms of performance hazards generated by systems. 
x Electrical wiring interface system safety requires that 1) each catastrophic failure condition be 
extremely improbable and does not result from a single failure, 2) each hazardous failure 
condition is extremely remote. 
x Electrical equipment and installations must not result in one system adversely impacting 
another system. 
x The design must prevent occurrences of any failure that could prevent continued safe flight, 
reduce the capability of the crew or airplane to cope with adverse operating conditions and 
must provide the crew appropriate warnings. 
o Compliance with these requirements must be shown by analysis, simulator, or flight 
tests.   
4.1.6 ARP-4754A, Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems 
ARP-4754A is one of the primary documents which address the complete lifecycle of a system 
development. ARP-4754A safety assurance control authority is through the Aircraft Safety Group which is 
to establish and communicate safety requirements to all tiers. There is mention of tiered development 
but it does not address supplier oversight. However it develops a good system/safety perspective.  The 
style of the document is like all the guidelines, it provides methods as means but does not prescribe any. 
So, although it does not specifically address complex development in a multitier supplier network the 
principles it outlines provide excellent guidance for the applicant to implement.  Oversight mechanisms, 
though not spelled out, could be extrapolated from the content of the document.  Enhancements to the 
document to address multitier oversight are recommended. 
• The complete development cycle is described and guidance for functional allocation, design, 
requirements management, validation, and etc is outlined. 
• Frequently, significant elements systems are developed by separate individuals, groups or 
organizations. These systems require added design discipline and development structure to ensure 
that safety and operational requirements can be fully realized and substantiated. A top down 
iterative approach from aircraft level downwards is key to initiating the processes. 
• The Safety Program Plan section suggests that the plan may include the project safety organization 
responsibilities and its relationship with partners and/or suppliers with respect to the safety 
process. 
• When discussing FDAL/IDAL acknowledges: “Note that the boundaries between systems and items 
may not coincide with the boundaries between aircraft manufacturers and suppliers, or between 
suppliers and sub-tier suppliers or with physical packaging.” 
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 • Specifies the responsibility for the Aircraft Safety Group (which has responsibility for performing and 
monitoring program safety tasks) to: “Establish and communicate the safety requirements at all tiers 
of definition” 
• Multitier developments is recognized: “Note that the boundaries between systems and items may 
not coincide with the boundaries between aircraft manufacturers and suppliers, or between 
suppliers and sub-tier suppliers or with physical packaging.” 
• A Safety Program Plan is defined that should be developed which identifies the project safety 
organization and defines responsibilities within this organization and its relationship with partners 
and/or suppliers with respect to the safety process. 
• While the format of the validation effort is left to the developer, a structured process should be 
defined in the validation plan. 
• Allocation of functions and requirements development is discussed at a high level. 
• Modeling is a tool recognized in the integration and validation phases.   
• When graphical requirements capture is planned the use of the models/modeling should be 
identified and the intended tools should be specified along with modeling standards. 
– The use of MBD for requirements development, flow down of requirements, and tiered 
developer management is not excluded but is also not developed as a method. 
• There is an implied but not defined tier boundary crossing by the “Integral Processes” of Fig 6 in 
ARP-4754A flowing from aircraft functions down to sub-systems.  A cross-tier control organization 
and process should be defined to address this but ARP-4754A does not describe such a function or 
organization. 
• ARP-4754A relinquishes development guidance of the design process to DO-178 and DO-254 at the 
point where requirements are allocated to hardware and software – pg 29. 
• One of the primary questions posed to multitier development is in the safety assessments in Para 
5.1 on ARP-4754A page 31.  How are these analyses managed through the multitier levels?  Neither 
does Fig 7 page 33 address multitier developments. 
– A key part of the multitier FHA/PASA/PSSA/ASA/SSA is 1) how the identified failure 
conditions are specified as flow down to the lower tiers as causes of that failure condition, 
2) how the verification and validation of those identified failure conditions and causes is 
executed, and 3) how lower level tiers maintain awareness of safety so as to identify 
previously unidentified failure conditions impacting the higher level systems and aircraft. 
• A multitier development requires that a means to track, collect, and unify validation artifacts to 
show compliance at the aircraft level be used.  This should fall into a systems oversight discussion 
justifying a paragraph on this topic. 
4.1.7 ARP-4761, Guidelines and Methods for Conducting Safety Assessment on Civil 
Airborne Systems and Equipment 
ARP-4761 does not address multitier developments, therefore it provides no multitier guidance material.  
The described mechanisms could, however, be applied to lower tiered subsystems much as the aircraft 
requirements are assessed with system requirements.  It neither precludes nor informs on multitier 
developments.  However there is inherent tiered hierarchy within the FHA and FTA.  An FMES is compiled 
including supplier’s FMEAs. 
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 • The bottom-up SAA process collects the necessary source data from suppliers as specified in the 
FHA/PSSA, FMEA/FMES, study results, etc. 
• All safety requirements should be traceable and validated at each level of derivation. A good way to 
accomplish this is to create a table of derived requirements based on design decisions. Once the 
high level requirements have been identified, they may be used to generate lower level 
requirements as part of the PSSA process for the systems or items. 
4.2 RTCA Documents 
4.2.1 DO-178C, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment 
Certification 
DO-178C calls out multiple oversight areas for lower tier supplier critical processes.  Yet there are holes in 
the system level requirements validation.  The document excludes itself from the validation of any system 
requirements allocated to hardware so in a manner it creates a gap between the system and the sub-
system.  It is these interfaces between a contractor and supplier where system understanding and 
requirements boundaries cause the greatest error.  There is also no guidance on managing the impact of 
an in-experienced developer. No assessment of supplier lack of experience in aircraft systems, real-time, 
and design of safety critical systems is given.   
• The guideline applies to the applicant and to any subtier suppliers.  The applicant is responsible 
for oversight of the suppliers. 
• Planning should address supplier oversight. 
• The SQA objective includes oversight of suppliers software life cycle process compliance with 
approved plans and standards. 
• Certification reviews may take place at supplier’s facilities.  Certification reviews may involve 
discussions with suppliers. 
• The PSAC outline defined in 11.1 includes Section h. Supplier oversight: This section describes 
the means of ensuring that supplier processes and outputs will comply with approved software 
plans and standards. 
• The SCMP outline defined in 11.4 includes Section e.  Supplier control:  The means of applying 
SCM process requirements to suppliers. 
• The SQAP outline defined in 11.5 includes Section g. Supplier oversight:  A description of the 
means of ensuring that supplier’s processes and outputs will comply with the plans and 
standards. 
• The SW Accomplishment Summary defined in 11.20 includes Section g. Supplier oversight:  This 
section describes how supplier processes and outputs comply with plans and standards. 
• Systems processes are defined as responsible for refinement and allocation of system 
requirements to hardware and/or software as determined by the system architecture. 
• 2.5.6 states that guidance for system verification is beyond the scope of DO-178.  ARP-4754A 
does not give clear guidance for software/system verification either. There appears to be a gap 
on systems development guidelines and system verification. 
– Section 6.3.1 describes a review and analysis of high level requirements.  The objective 
is to ensure that the system functions to be performed by the software are defined and 
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 that the functional performance and safety-related requirements of the system are 
satisfied by the high level requirements and that derived requirements and the reason 
for their existence are correctly defined. 
4.2.2 DO-330, Software Tool Qualification Considerations 
DO-330 is a supplement to DO-178C focused on software tool qualifications.  It reflects the same level of 
supplier oversight established in DO-178C and so does address the issue of multitier supplier 
development to that level. 
x If tool life cycle activities will be performed by a supplier then configuration management 
activities should be applied to the supplier. 
x The Tool Quality Assurance Process objectives provide confidence that the tool life cycle 
development and integral processes produce a tool that conforms to approved tool plans and 
standards. 
x Third party or COTS tool qualification data is generated to acquire certification as specified in 
the PSAC. 
x The tool qualification plan should include a means of ensuring supplier processes and outputs 
comply with approved tool plans and standards. 
x The tool configuration management plan includes supplier TCM control of supplier processes. 
x Supplier oversight is part of the Tool Quality Assurance Plan and the Tool Accomplishment 
Summary. 
x Tool design standards include complexity restrictions ex: maximum level of nested calls or 
conditional structures, use of unconditional branches, and number of entry and exit points of 
code components. 
x Hardware/software integration testing is clearly defined as needing to be done on the target 
computer environment with a focus on requirements based testing of the high level 
functionality, the hardware/software interfaces, and the error sources associated with the 
software operating within the target computer environment. 
x Tool selection evaluations: The aspects of tool history to be evaluated include the level of 
experience and /or training in the use of the tool on the part of the applicant.  The tools stability 
and maturity is examined. 
x The document alludes to the greater use in the future of formal methods, model-based 
development and other tool-intensive methodologies.  It states: The increased risk that these 
tool-intensive methodologies brings leads to the conclusion that an intermediate level of tool 
category between the two DO-178B tool categories is needed in order to address all tool types 
and define the appropriate TQLs.  The two categories are; 1) development tools, and 2) 
verification tools.  It is not, however, clear what this means. 
x Automatic Code Generator (ACG) is discussed in its potential application.  Here it states that an 
ACG must be qualified under DO-178C section 12.2 criteria 1 (since it could insert an error into 
the airborne code).  This argument could be questioned where the verification is performed on 
the embedded code. 
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 4.2.3 DO-331, Model Based Development and Verification Supplement to DO-178C 
As does DO-178C this document provides some guidance to multitier supplier control in the form of 
recommended supplier oversight and compliance with design processes and quality management.  The 
guideline requires oversight of any lower tier software supplier, however, there is no guidance on the 
managing the impact of experience on the developer. No assessment of supplier lack of experience in 
aircraft systems, real-time, and design of safety critical systems is given.  The definition of what MBD is 
and how it is applied will vary greatly over the industry and between disciplines.  ARP 4754A is 
referenced as defining the system life cycle processes. 
x If software development activities will be performed by a supplier DO-331 states planning should 
address supplier oversight. 
x Software quality assurance processes include assurance that suppliers comply with approved 
software plans, standards.   
x Supplier processes and outputs should be assured by the SQA process to comply with approved 
plans and standards. 
x The PSAC outline includes a section entitled:  Supplier oversight describing the means of ensuring 
that the supplier processes and outputs will comply with approved software plans and standards. 
x The SCM outline contains a section entitled: Supplier control describing a means of applying SCM 
process requirements to suppliers. 
x It is stated that constraints and rules on development, design, and coding methods can be included 
to control complexity.  Potentially using defensive programming practices.   
x Complexity definition is not stated, however, complexity includes the degree of coupling between 
software components, the nesting levels for control structures, and the complexity of logical or 
numeric expressions. 
x It is stated that the current state of software engineering does not permit a quantitative correlation 
between complexity and the attainment of system safety objectives.  Complexity should be avoided 
however. 
x The conformance to standards includes evaluation of the software design to complexity restrictions 
and constraints. 
x Reviews are used to detect and report requirements errors introduced during the software 
requirements development process.  This includes top level system requirements, low level software 
requirements, derived requirements, and the software architecture. 
x The PSAC defines the proposed means of compliance.   
4.2.4 DO-332, Object-Oriented Technology and Related Techniques Supplement to 
DO-178C 
DO-332 is identical to DO-331 in terms of guidelines and wording in relation to this study.  The notes 
from DO-331 apply to DO-332. 
x If software development activities will be performed by a supplier DO-332 states planning should 
address supplier oversight. 
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 x Supplier processes and outputs should be assured by the SQA process to comply with approved 
plans and standards. 
x The PSAC outline includes a section entitled:  Supplier oversight describing the means of ensuring 
that the supplier processes and outputs will comply with approved software plans and standards. 
x The SCM outline contains a section entitled: Supplier control describing a means of applying SCM 
process requirements to suppliers. 
x The use of classes in managing complexity is more powerful when they are related to each other 
through a class hierarchy. 
x It is stated that constraints and rules on development, design, and coding methods can be included 
to control complexity.  Potentially using defensive programming practices.   
x It is stated that the current state of software engineering does not permit a quantitative correlation 
between complexity and the attainment of system safety objectives.  Complexity should be avoided 
however. 
4.2.5 DO-333, Formal Methods Supplement to DO-178C 
DO-333 contains no guidance or control mechanisms related to complex multitier network of suppliers. 
x In the review process: If high-level requirements and low-level requirements are formally modeled 
then formal analysis can be used to show compliance. 
4.2.6 DO-254, Design Assurance Guidelines for Airborne Electronic Hardware 
The document does not address tiered level developments.  In that requirements are to be traceable to 
the next level of requirements there might be some level of control of the developer even though the idea 
of a supplier and/or sub-tier supplier is not mentioned.  Furthermore the document excludes itself from 
the validation of any system requirements allocated to hardware.  Effectively, DO-254 provides no 
guidance for tiered development. 
• It acknowledged that COTS component suppliers may not have followed design safety processes 
outlined in DO-254. 
• Section 2.3.5 states that a PHAC be developed outlining the design assurance approach and 
strategy.  Section 9.1 outlines PHAC liaison with the cert authority.  However, there is no tiered 
supplier guidance here or in the PHAC outline Section 10.1.1.  COTS is to be addressed but there 
is no topic for developers. 
• Section 9.2 states that Certification authority reviews may take place at the applicant’s facilities 
or applicant’s supplier’s facilities. 
• Requirements should be traceable to the next higher hierarchical level  or requirements. 
• Just like DO-178C, page 37, DO-254 excludes validation of system requirements allocated to 
hardware – assuming that they are validated as part of the systems process.  It also states that 
not all hardware derived requirements need to be validated.  
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 4.2.7 DO-264, Guidelines for Approval of Provision and use of Air traffic Services 
supported by Data Communications 
DO-264 does not address multitier or a supplier base in any way and so does not provide any guidance 
for multitier supplier oversight.  The document has some process guidance and stakeholder interaction 
definitions that might be expanded to address multitier supplier oversight and design requirements 
control. 
x This document has a good focus on the development processes ex: Section 1.3.3 provides a 
relationship of guidance material to standards and evidence, Section 2.0 provides a description 
of the processes.   
o Although the document does not invoke “shall”, “will” (“should” is used) in its guidance 
the focus on processes and guidance is of a nature that achieves prescriptive effects 
without being prescriptive. 
x Complexity is recognized as an issue for data communications in operational issues that must be 
coordinated.  The document states there is a need for a certification agency/industry accepted 
guidance process for coordinating implementation requirements and qualifying approaches. 
x The document specifies that stakeholders should be identified.  The question is if anyone will 
call a sub-tier supplier a stakeholder. 
x There are some natural positions in the sequence of requirements – design – validation process 
description and Figs 2-3, 2-4, and 2-6 with the associated multitier oversight could be inserted.   
4.2.8 DO-297, IMA Development Guidance and Certification Considerations 
DO-297 guides a IMA system development so by its nature addresses an environment that will involve 
multiple suppliers and potentially tiers.  It has a number of guidance statements regarding supplier 
control including references to DO-178 that could provide some management guidance of sub-tier 
suppliers. However, considering the environment is that of multitier or multipeer development it is weak 
in providing guidance directions towards sub-tier supplier oversight. 
• The primary objective is for satisfying airworthiness with the ability to obtain incremental 
acceptance of individual items (including the core software) and hosted applications without 
compromising system safety. 
• Makes a point in the purpose section that the certification applicant for a TC or STC should 
develop an effective system of communication among developers and system integrators.  Very 
critical to programs where suppliers are from differing companies. 
• The allocation of aircraft functions should be addressed in the IMA system architecture to 
ensure availability, integrity, and safety requirements are satisfied. 
• Section 2.4 outlines tasks and outputs of the various stakeholders – at a high level general topic 
(interfaces, shared resource definitions, results of V&V, etc.  However, the information flow is 
supplier up, not giving responsibility to the applicant or integrator for controlling the supplier 
designs. 
• Section 3.4 makes the point of hosted applications coming from multiple suppliers using 
differing toolsets.  It states that an IMA platform user’s guide be provided to all application 
developers. 
Appendix A - Regulatory Guideline Assessment A-27 
 
 • Each developer is given responsibility for identifying potential failure modes of their application.  
Response to fault actions required by the platform should be identified. 
• Module suppliers may develop the Module Requirements Specification based on assumptions 
for intended use.  Assumptions should be documented in the MRS and validated during V&V. 
• Section 4.6.2 a change management process should be established and coordinated between all 
stakeholders.  The process should identify how levels of developers, suppliers, integrators, and 
certification applicants will coordinate and address changes. 
• Requirements traceability should be performed. 
• Section 5.1.2 The IMA system integrator is responsible for consolidation of results of system 
safety assessments performed by all suppliers ensuring the SSA results are consistent and 
compatible with the IMA SSA.  Includes verifying PSSA/SSA results with testing of resource 
management, health monitoring, fault management and other protection features. 
• Section 5.1 defines stakeholder responsibilities for safety assessments.  Listing key items to be 
addressed and describes failure mode analyses requirements for each component of IMA.  
References ARP4754 and ARP-4761. 
• Section 5.2 describes system development assurance guidelines and mechanisms.  References 
DO-178 and DO-254. 
• Fig 5 outlines a hierarchical layered functional/module/application layered PSAC and PHAC. 
• The IMA system development process should consider the primary characteristics of IMA: 
flexible, reusable, and interoperable. 
4.2.9 DO-326, Airworthiness Security Process Specification 
DO-326 does not address multitier or supplier base. 
• The document references DO-254, DO-178, ARP-4754, and ARP-4761 but does not address 
multitier or supplier aspects in development or in safety assurance.  It spends some time 
providing an interaction with ARP-4754 so in a dependent fashion there is some indirect 
development guidance.  It contains a diagram reflecting consistency with ARP 4754. 
• Relative to DO-178 it does not make use of it but rather distinguishes levels of security from 
levels of safety as viewed in DO-178 
• There is a flow of requirement validation artifacts up to the certification evidence. 
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Figure 5. DO-326 Airworthiness Safety Activities 
4.3 Advisory Circulars 
4.3.1 AC 23.1309-1E, System Safety Analysis and Assessment for Part 23 Airplanes 
The AC clearly states that it is neither mandatory nor is it a regulation.  However, the AC also states that 
“While these guidelines are not mandatory, they are derived from extensive FAA and industry experience 
in determining compliance with the relevant regulations. Whenever an applicant’s proposed method of 
compliance differs from this guidance, the proposal should be coordinated with the Small Airplane 
Directorate Standards Staff, ACE-110.  So there is an implication of prescription imposition.  Any potential 
multitier guidance found could therefore be interpreted as more than just recommendations.  However, 
the AC does not address multitier supplier networks or oversight of suppliers.  The document does 
provide potential guidance awareness of areas for supplier or multitier supplier networks safety 
management.  The AC references: ARP 4754A, ARP 4761, DO-178B, and DO-254. 
x 1309 alludes to increasing complexity and integration difficulties experienced in assessing 
hazards that could result from complex systems. 
x Complexity is defined as: “A system is “complex” when its operation, failure modes, or failure 
effects are difficult to comprehend without the aid of analytical methods or structured 
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 assessment methods.”  “Increased system complexity is often caused by such items as 
sophisticated components and multiple interrelationships.” 
o FMEA and FTA are examples of such structured assessment methods. 
o A portion of compliance may be shown by the use of DAL’s processes within DO-178 and 
DO-254. 
o The applicant is advised to perform analyses commensurate with the levels of 
complexity – however there is no definition of complexity levels. 
x  It is necessary to conduct a qualitative functional FTA or FMEA to show malfunctions are indeed 
remote in systems of high complexity. 
x For simple and conventional installations it may be possible to assess a hazardous or 
catastrophic failure on the basis of experienced engineering judgment using only qualitative 
analysis. 
x Installed systems should be evaluated by performing a safety assessment as shown in this AC. 
x A four-tier set of aircraft classes is defined and associated levels of safety the aircraft must 
meet. 
x In order to show compliance with the requirements of FAR Part 23.1309(a), (a)(1), (a)(2), and 
(a)(3) it will be necessary to verify that the installed systems and each item will cause no 
unacceptable adverse effects… 
x The applicant should conduct bench, ground, and/or flight testing when necessary to validate 
hazard classifications 
x The applicant must also discuss with the project ACO what aspects of this testing will need to be 
included in the FAA certification testing 
x Compliance with § 23.1309(c) may be shown by analysis and, where necessary, by appropriate 
ground, flight, or simulator test. 
x The applicant is responsible for identifying and classifying each failure condition and choosing 
the methods for safety assessment 
4.3.2 AC 25.1309-1A, System Design and Analysis 
Throughout the document AC 25.1309 addresses complexity concerns and means of assuring safety 
through analyses. The document addresses qualitative assessment and failure risk and consequence 
assessment decision rationales.  It takes exception to its applicability to software errors stating “it is not 
feasible to assess the number or kinds of software errors, if any, that may remain after completion of 
system design, development, and test instead referring to DO-178A.  The use of experienced judgment is 
clearly the cornerstone of the hazard assessments.  Any new tier supplier is very likely not to have that 
necessary experience.  The last issue of this document is 1988.  An Arsenal update was attempted in 
2002 but the effort was apparently abandoned.  It does not address supplier oversight or tiered supplier 
management. 
x The document addresses the difficulty in assessing hazards with the increase in the degree of 
system complexities, integration, and number of safety critical functions performed by systems.   
o For these reasons, structured means for showing compliance were introduced with 
25.1309(b) and the associated guidance of 25.1309(b), (c), and (d). 
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 o These are the selective use of rational analyses to estimate quantitative probabilities, 
and the development of related criteria based on historical data of accidents and 
hazardous incidents caused or contributed to by failures expressed as numerical 
probability ranges associated with the terms used in 25.1309(b).  
o Both qualitative and quantitative assessment techniques are allowed. 
x 1309 defines failure conditions in terms of severity; Minor, Major, Hazardous, Catastrophic.  It 
defined an analysis of each level of severity, see Figure 6. 
x Tests are not required to verify failure conditions that are postulated to be catastrophic. 
 
Figure 6. AC25.1309 Probability of Failure Condition Assessment 
x Complexity is defined as:  A system is considered to be complex if structured methods, of 
analysis are needed for a thorough and valid safety assessment. A structured method is very 
methodical and highly organized. Failure modes and effects, fault tree, and reliability block 
diagram analyses are examples of structured methods.  Determination of complexity is an 
engineering judgment.  Note: the judgment of complexity drives much of the subsequent hazard 
assessment and hazard mitigation effort and techniques. 
x RAA: The responsibility for applying criteria, experienced operational judgment, and engineering 
judgment to identify and classify failure conditions is the applicant’s responsibility. 
o The cognizant certification office provides oversight in providing concurrence with the 
applicant’s assessments. 
x It requires a safety assessment be made and specifies safety levels in qualitative terms.  7.b and 
7.d are intended to insure an orderly and thorough evaluation of the effects on safety of any 
foreseeable failures. 
o Common cause and cascading effects should be considered. 
x It allows that techniques can include the use of service experience data of similar previously 
approved systems through a qualitative analysis. 
Appendix A - Regulatory Guideline Assessment A-31 
 
 x A “fail-safe” design concept from Part 25 is outlined: integrity and quality, redundancy or backup 
system, isolation, proven reliability, failure warning, flight crew procedures, designed in failure 
effect limits, designed in failure path control, margins or safety factors, and error tolerance. 
4.3.3 AC 25.1309 Arsenal, System Design and Analysis 
The abandoned AC25.1309 Arsenal version was reviewed in terms of differences that might provide 
guidance for complex multitier avionics systems design and safety assurance.  Certain enhancements 
within the document are also noted.  No enhancements were added that address complex systems or 
multitier management.  It did invoke the ARP safety guidelines and additional DO documents. 
x The Arsenal version of AC 25.1309 references DO-178B, DO-160D, ARP 4754, and ARP 4761 and 
the complementary EUROCAE documents. 
x Complexity is defined as:   A system is Complex when its operation, failure modes, or failure 
effects are difficult to comprehend without the aid of analytical methods. 
o The document alludes that some complex systems may be too difficult for exhaustive 
testing as a means of showing compliance.  An alternate technique is allowed through 
the use of Development Assurance.  Considerations for systems architectures for this 
purpose are appropriate. 
o It is recommended that a top down approach to assessing hazards is taken for complex 
systems. 
4.3.4 AC 25.1329-1B, Approval of Flight Guidance Systems 
AC25.1329-1B acknowledges the growth in complexity but does not offer control mechanisms in 
response other than alerts to higher risks. The AC is pretty specific on flight control system modes and 
their assessment.  ARP 4754, ARP 4761, DO-178B, DO-254 are referenced.  The document expresses the 
need to examine and test interfaces between systems in a manner which reflects a system functional and 
performance examination of the exchange of data between the systems where the greatest risk of failure 
reside. However, it does not address the multitier or supplier aspects of a system development.   
x A system is complex when its operation, failure modes, or failure effects are difficult to 
comprehend without the aid of analytical methods. 
x The AC uses the term “should” and “should not” when discussing compliance to the AC itself, as 
the AC represents one, but not the only method of complying with the regulations.  It uses 
“must” and “may not” when discussing compliance to 25.1329 and other rules as compliance to 
a rule is not optional. 
x A design philosophy is espoused where the applicant should establish, document, and follow a 
design philosophy that support the intended operational use regarding FGS behavior, modes of 
operation, the pilot interface with controls, indications, alerts, and mode functionality. 
x In demonstrating the intended function and performance of both the FGS and systems providing 
outer loop commands, the applicant needs to address potential inconsistencies between limits 
provided by the two different systems. 
x The applicant should demonstrate the intended function and performance of the FGS across all 
possible functional interfaces. 
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 x The use of simulator (which is a model of the systems installation environment) for 
demonstrations is an accepted means of aircraft/pilot situational evaluation. 
4.3.5 AC 20-115C, Airborne Software Assurance 
This AC was written to recognize DO-178C and it supplements and to provide guidance for transitioning 
to DO-178C. It also explains the use of DO-178C for TSO authorizations.  It does not, however, address 
any of the issues associated with complex system design in multitier environments.  This AC references a 
number of DO and AC documents as well as ARP 4754A. 
x The AC states it was written for applicants, design approval holders, and developers of airborne 
systems and equipment containing software for type certificated aircraft, engines, and 
propellers.   We recommend developers of TSO articles use this AC for software assurance (see 
paragraph 7).
x The AC recommends industry upgrade processes to DO-178C because DO-178B has areas that 
are not adequately addressed. 
x Systems that have utilized earlier versions of DO-178 are referred to as legacy systems. 
x The applicant PSAC should identify how DO-178C supplements will be applied. 
x 8.c. If you are using models as defined in DO-331, section MB.1.0, as the basis for developing 
software, you should apply the guidance in DO-331. Section MB.6.8.1 identifies certain 
objectives and describes the activities for using model simulation to satisfy those objectives.  
4.3.6 AC 20-145 Guidance for IMA that implement TSO-C153 Authorized Hardware 
Elements 
Control of third party production of hardware is discussed.  It is recommended that because of the 
complexity applicants conduct a structured formal analysis in accordance with ARP 4754 and ARP 4761.  
The appropriate design assurance should be achieved for each complex electronic device using DO-254. 
The use of third party software is not addressed by this AC.  Although third party suppliers are discussed 
there really is little implication of oversight management of the design process of third party suppliers. 
x Third party manufacturers are suppliers to the TC/STC/ATC/ASTC applicant and must be 
controlled during production by the applicant’s quality assurance organization. 
o For this AC, a third-party manufacturer is a developer of a hardware module to be 
installed into a rack or cabinet that has TSO-C153 authorization, and who is not the rack 
or cabinet manufacturer nor the IMA system integrator. 
o Third-party hardware modules may or may not obtain TSO-C153 authorization. In 
order to not violate the TSO-C153 authorization granted for the rack or cabinet, the 
third-party manufacturer’s hardware module must be shown to meet the 
environmental, interoperability, configuration management, and regulatory 
requirements of the installation 
x Third party hardware module and/or software installed in the IMA system compliance to 
regulations is the responsibility of the applicant. 
x Functional partitioning is recognized as a mechanism to reduce complexity and provide fault 
containment. 
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 x The fidelity of simulator testing must be commensurate with the complexity of the task and 
degree of system integration at the aircraft level. 
x System Safety Assessment (SSA). A systematic, comprehensive evaluation of the functions 
implemented by the IMA system, as installed in the aircraft, should be conducted to show that 
the relevant safety requirements identified in the PSSA have been met 
4.3.7 AC 20-152, Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware 
This AC addresses complex micro-coded components with design assurance levels of A, B, and C 
airworthiness appropriateness for the intended function.  DO-254 is called out as the primary guidance 
document.  The AC does not provide guidance for management or oversight of complex system design in 
multitier environments. 
4.3.8 AC 20-170, IMA Dev, Verification, Integration, and Approval using DO-297 and 
TSO-C153 
DO-297 is an integral part of AC 20-170. The AC applies to systems developed by a single company as 
well as those developed by multiple companies.  However, this document does not address the issues 
associated with complex systems development in a multitier environment.  It does reference DO-297 
which by the nature of an IMA system considers the use of multitier suppliers even though DO-297 is 
weak in its description of oversight management of suppliers. 
x This AC is intended to address IMA developer, integrator, and IMA application/component 
supplier. 
x The applicant for a TSO authorization must control the design and quality of the parts, 
processes, and services provided by any supplier to the applicant. 
x Complexity is defined as: Attribute of systems or items that makes their design and/or operation 
difficult to comprehend. 
x The AC uses the term “should” when discussing compliance to the AC itself, as the AC represents 
one, but not the only method of complying with the regulations.  It uses  “must” when 
discussing compliance to the regulations, as compliance to a regulation is not optional. 
4.4 AC 20-174 Development of Civil Aircraft Systems 
The purpose of this AC is to recognize ARP-4754 as an acceptable method for establishing a development 
assurance process.  The AC addresses the concern of possible development errors stemming from the 
ever increasing complexity of modern aircraft systems taking the route that ARP-4754 provides a 
structured methodology to address these concerns.  There is, however, no additional guidance as to 
managing complexity or the development of systems in a multitier supplier environment.   References are 
made to a number of RTCA documents; DO-178B, DO-254, and DO-297.
x This AC is not mandatory: and is not a regulation.  
x This advisory circular (AC) recognizes the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Aerospace 
Recommended Practice (ARP) 4754A, Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems, 
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 dated December 21, 2010, as an acceptable method for establishing a development assurance 
process.  
x  The AC was written for manufacturers who are seeking certification of their aircraft or aircraft 
system including Line Replaceable Units (LRU) and components. 
x This AC addresses the concern of possible development errors due to the ever increasing 
complexity of modern aircraft and systems. In order to address this concern, a more structured 
methodology to mitigate development errors is described in SAE ARP 4754A. 
4.4.1 AC 25-7C, Flight Test Guide for Certification of Transport Category Airplanes 
AC 25-7C provides no oversight or management guidance of supplier or multitier supplier networks 
safety management.  The AC is not mandatory nor does it constitute a regulation.  Safety discussions are 
limited to performance related issues. The only reference to guidelines is to DO-160.  Any modeling 
discussions are at the aircraft level. 
x The use of FMEA is indicated for braking systems, multi-axis AHRS faults, anti-skid system, and 
control system failure assessments. 
x It may be agreed that a simulation will be used to establish compliance with the performance 
and handling requirements.  This simulation must be of a type and fidelity appropriate for the 
task and be validated by flight test data for the conditions of interest. 
x The level of substantiation of the simulator to flight correlation should be commensurate with 
the level of compliance (i.e., the closer the case is to being non-compliant, the higher the 
required fidelity of the simulation). 
4.5 FAA Orders 
4.5.1 Order 8110.4C, Type Certification 
TO 8110.4C is primarily written for internal use by the FAA, its designees, and delegated organizations. 
The order provides procedures and policy for the type certification of products.  The document provides a 
high-level model of the certification events that typically make up the life cycle of an aircraft but does not 
address multitier aspects of avionics development and safety. 
x The FAA encourages applicants to develop a plan for working with their geographic ACO that 
considers all safety aspects. 
1. Is a tool that helps determine how much attention the various safety aspects warrant and helps 
the FAA establish priorities that best promote safety, 
2. Addresses the unique characteristics of the applicant’s affiliation with the FAA, 
3. Remains independent of specific projects, 
4. Identifies expectations and develops specific interface procedures between the applicant and 
the FAA, within the limits of FAA regulations and policy, and 
5. Helps the FAA build a constructive relationship with the applicant, including how the FAA and 
the applicant hold each other accountable. 
x The document acknowledges that information will be lacking for complex projects at the time of the 
writing of a certification plan that is required at the time of application. 
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 x The document alludes to the “experienced” applicant recognition of the value of addressing safety 
aspects.  The implication is that the in-experienced will not.  Project team members must build on 
their experience to identify critical issues – would be lacking in the in-experienced. 
x Oversight and delegation is addressed (pg 37) as it relates to a DER.  The level of FAA involvement 
will vary as the level of experience of a applicant or designee varies. 
x The document references ARP-4761, and DO-160 only. 
4.5.2 Order 8110.7D, Aircraft Certification Systems Evaluation Program 
The purpose of this document is to apply standardized systems evaluations to the continued integrity of 
the design data after initial approval by the FAA at the PAH and associate facilities. It does not 
reevaluate previously approved design or safety data.  It forms a good basis for production multitier 
supplier management assessments.  However, the focus is on production quality assurance rather that 
design and development safety compliance assurance.  As such it provides no guidance to the design and 
development of complex avionics systems in a multitier supplier network.  Elements of production control 
and oversight could be redirected to form a basis of enhanced supplier control during the design phase. 
Here just a few example evaluation statements.  There are many. 
x Section 6 Supplier Control 
o The term supplier includes distributors 
o Approved suppliers and criteria for supplier approval is evaluated. 
o Supplier’s quality systems are reviewed. 
o How is authority for major inspection/material review delegated. 
o Section 6.11 asks the question if the evaluated facility flows down applicable technical 
and quality requirements to both US and international suppliers 
o AIR directorates implement an Aircraft Certification Systems Evaluation Program 
(ACSEP). 
 The ACSEP team leader may extend an ACSEP evaluation at PAH to key suppliers 
and subtier suppliers to verify that the Production Approval Holder (PAH) is 
satisfactorily controlling its suppliers. 
o The supplier audit records of its own suppliers is audited by the ACSEP. 
x The supplier control mechanisms used for production if redirected could form a basis for 
enhanced supplier control during the design phase. 
4.5.3 Order 8110.49, Software Approval Guidelines 
This order establishes procedures for evaluating and approving aircraft software and software changes 
to approved aircraft software.  It guides Aircraft Certification Service (AIR) field offices and Designated 
Engineering Representatives (DER) on how to apply DO-178B.  It is applicable to TC, STC, ATC, ASTC, and 
TSO.  This document nicely expresses the issues being addressed in this study:  complex systems being 
developed in a multitier environment.   It does not provide additional insight on solutions to the issues 
but focuses on the use of oversight of the supplier and the conduct of reviews to address the concerns.  It 
does not address MBD. Included is a supplier assessment table, although meant for the FAA, which could 
be useful to an applicant in determining a supplier and sub-tier suppler capability.  It should be updated 
in light of DO-178C use of oversight. 
x This document is the only one that literally uses the words sub-tier suppliers. 
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 x Chapter 13 “Properly Overseeing Suppliers” 
o This policy applies when an applicant uses suppliers and sub-tier suppliers to perform 
system and software development, verification, and certification activities.  Confer with FAA 
system and software specialists as required. 
o Contemporary issues are listed 
 “Many TC/STC/TSOA applicants have shifted system and software development, 
verification, and certification activities onto their aircraft system suppliers and sub-tier 
suppliers.  In the past, these suppliers participated in compliance activities only at their 
respective system, subsystem, or component levels. With airborne systems becoming 
increasingly more complex and integrated, and suppliers and sub-tier suppliers 
accepting these new responsibilities, we are concerned that their lack of expertise 
could result in incomplete or deficient certification activities.” 
 “Each responsibility that the applicant delegates to a supplier creates an interface with 
that supplier that needs to be validated and verified to ensure that the transition from 
the supplier’s processes to the applicant’s processes (or vice-versa) is accomplished 
correctly and accurately. Lack of proper validation and verification of life cycle data at 
the transition point has resulted in issues with regard to requirements, problem 
reporting, changes, etc.” 
 “Some certification tasks and activities may be performed in a foreign country. We can 
review the bilateral agreement with that country to determine if the certification 
authority may be able to help us in making a determination of compliance to the 
applicable FAA regulations. We can’t, however, request the certification authority of a 
country with which we do not have a bilateral agreement in place to assist us in making 
a determination of compliance to FAA regulations.” 
x Note:  this does not address the additional issue of cultural differences affecting the 
engineering process.  Assumptions that the engineering thought process, rigor, open 
questioning/challenges to design and understanding are the same as in the US even 
for those educated in an American college are the same is often wrong. 
 “Finally, retention of substantiating data, such as software life cycle data and other 
certification and compliance data, is a critical part of the certification process. When this 
data is retained by a foreign supplier, it may not be readily available to us. This may also 
affect the continued operational safety of the aircraft and its systems, especially with 
regard to in-service problems (service difficulties), problem resolution (service 
bulletins), and mandatory corrections (airworthiness directives).” 
o “The applicant should create oversight plans and procedures that will ensure all suppliers 
and sub-tier suppliers will comply with all regulations, policy, guidance, agreements, and 
standards that apply to the certification program.”  This includes all the publications that the 
applicant is responsible to comply with ACs, Orders, Issue papers, etc. 
 The past experience, knowledge of the certification process, software development 
capability, and application complexity determine the level of oversight deemed 
necessary from the FAA.   
o The type and number of software reviews will depend on the software level of the project, 
the amount and quality of DER support, the experience and history of the applicant and/or 
software developer, service difficulty history, and several other factors. Chapter 3 of this 
order covers specific guidelines for determining the level of FAA involvement. 
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 o The applicant’s planning documents, such as certification plans and PSACs, should describe 
how the applicant will have visibility into their suppliers’ and sub-tier suppliers’ activities. 
This includes commercial off-the-shelf software component suppliers and vendors. 
 The plan should address how the applicant will ensure that all applicable regulations, 
policy, plans, standards, issue papers, partnership for safety plans, and memoranda of 
agreement are conveyed to, coordinated with, and complied with by prime and sub-tier 
suppliers. 
 The plan should address how the system components will be integrated, and who will 
be responsible for validating and verifying the software and the integrated system. 
 The plan should identify who the designees are and what their responsibilities are, who 
the focal points are, and how their activities will be coordinated and communicated. 
 The plan should establish a system to track problem reports. It should describe how 
problems will be reported between the applicant and all levels of suppliers. The plan 
should describe how the designee(s) will oversee problem reporting. 
 The plan should identify who will be responsible for ensuring that all integration 
verification activities between all levels of suppliers comply with applicable guidance. It 
should describe how the designee(s) will oversee the verification process. 
 The plan should describe the procedures and tools to aid configuration management of 
all software life cycle data. It should describe how configuration control will be 
maintained across all sub-tier suppliers, including those in foreign locations, and how 
designees will oversee configuration management. 
 Compliance substantiation and data retention. The plan should describe how the 
applicant will ensure that all supplier and sub-tier supplier compliance findings are 
substantiated and retained for the program. 
o The applicant’s supplier management plan (or equivalent plans) should address the concern 
of newly created interfaces with a supplier when delegation occurs regarding the transition 
of life cycle data between the applicant’s processes and the suppliers’ processes. 
o Sampling is the primary means of assessing the compliance of the software processes and 
data. 
o Both low-level requirements are to be documented, reviewed, and be traceable to high-lvel 
requirements and system requirements.  
x Chapter 14 Software Problem Reporting  
o This policy applies when an applicant’s suppliers and sub-tier suppliers will be responsible 
for managing problems detected during the development of aircraft systems implemented 
with software. 
o The applicant’s suppliers and sub-tier suppliers may not have the expertise to determine 
whether problems with their component(s) will have safety, functional, or operational 
impacts on the aircraft or airborne system in which they are used. 
 Due to these concerns, the applicant will need to actively participate in the oversight of 
problem reporting processes to ensure that problems are properly identified, reported, 
and resolved. 
o The applicant should discuss in their Software Configuration Management Plan, or other 
appropriate planning documents, how they will oversee their supplier’s and sub-tier 
supplier’s software problem reporting process.  The plan should describe the supplier and 
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 sub-tier supplier problem reporting processes, how notification of problems is flowed up the 
hierarchy, how appropriate disciplines will be involved in reviewing report resolutions, and 
establish the criteria for acceptability of closure or deferment. 
x Figure 3-2 Other Relevant Data provides a good experience assessment table that may be useful 
to an applicant in determining supplier and sub-tier supplier capability in receiving a delegation 
of design authority.  This is intended for FAA determination of Level of FAA Involvement (LOFI) 
but could be useful to industry. 
4.5.4 Order 8110.105, Simple and Complex Electronic Hardware Approval Guidance 
Order 8110.115 is primarily written for internal use by the FAA.  It assists in determination of FAA 
involvement in a project, types of reviews, and how much delegation of oversight is given to designees.  
This document includes an assessment checklist of developer experience to determine the level of 
involvement necessary by the FAA that could be useful to the industry as a potential supplier capability 
assessment.  It does not provide guidance for the complexity issues and multitier development issues of 
this study, although the checklist accesses the system complexity when determining oversight. The use of 
MBD is not addressed. 
o This document was written to supplement DO-254 to give guidance for approving both simple 
and complex custom micro-coded components. 
o There should be regular contact between the applicant, the supplier, and the cognizant FAA 
office.  The FAA must monitor both the applicant and the hardware developer. 
o AC 20-152 recognized RTCA/DO-254 as an acceptable means to gain FAA approval of complex 
custom micro-coded components; the AC doesn’t recognize RTCA/DO-254 as an acceptable 
means to gain design assurance for COTS components. 
o The TO distinguishes between COTS hardware (DO-254  Section 11.2) and COTS IP which DO-254 
does not address.  The topic here is the assurance that the applicant and developer show 
airworthiness compliance with the use of COTS IP. 
o As COTS IP is likely to have sufficient documentation to support assurance the applicant 
may need to utilize architectural mitigation, component verification, testing, analysis, 
and other life cycle data to demonstrate the IP is free from anomalous behavior and 
meets airworthiness requirements. 
o The availability of experienced hardware designers is a consideration for hardware FAA 
involvement.  The first three criteria in Figure 3-2 of 8110.105 are an assessment of the 
applicant, developer certification experience. 
o Fig 3-2 is a score card of an applicant/Developer Hardware Certification Experience.  Considering 
the dependence on experience from FAR, through 1309 and on to the ARP,  and RTCA 
documents, an expansion of this guidance to industry as a key item for managing complex 
multitier developments should be considered.   
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 4.5.5 Order 8130.2, (Draft) Airworthiness Certification of Aircraft and Related 
Products 
This order is focused on: processes for airworthiness certification and maintenance activities, 
responsibility assignments, but all at the aircraft level.  With the focus on the high level applicant, FAA 
interaction, and designee responsibilities it does not address the multitier design and development issues 
of complex avionics.  There are a few items of delegation discussed. 
x The document addresses responsibilities for a number of areas: ASI, designees, registration, etc. 
x Delegation of authority (RAA):  The FAA is authorized to delegate private persons or organizations to 
act as representatives and issue airworthiness certificates and related approvals under 14 CFR part 
183.  There is no discussion of subsequent delegation in the form of tiered DMIR or DAR (pg 2-1).  
Other than:   
o The authority of a DMIR must be specifically linked to a production approval holder (PAH) or 
PAH’s approved supplier. 
o An organization designation authorization (ODA) may be approved to issue airworthiness 
certificates, airworthiness approvals, conformity certifications, and export approvals (pg2-2). 
 The organization management team (OMT) is the group of FAA personnel from the 
managing MIDO responsible for the oversight of the ODA. 
o A designated manufacturing inspection representative (DMIR) or designated airworthiness 
representative (DAR) may issue standard and special airworthiness certificates, 
airworthiness approvals. 
o The designee must obtain in writing from the regional MIDO, FSDO, or CMO any limitations 
on special airworthiness certificates before issuance. 
o Delegation of inspection and certification, relating to conformity, can be delegated to a 
supplier by the applicant – a letter of delegation must be submitted to the FAA (pg 3-2). 
x Applicant is responsible for providing all supplier affidavits to the FAA. 
4.5.6 TSO-C153, Integrated Modular Avionics Hardware Elements 
There is no mention of suppliers, oversight, or delegation in the document.  Neither is complexity, 
requirements management, or model based development addressed.  It therefore does not provide any 
guidance for complex avionics developed in a multitier supplier environment. 
x ARP 4754, DO160D, DO-254, and DO-178B are referenced 
x An application to the ACO includes delivery of the PHAC and PSAC. 
4.6 Mil Standards 
4.6.1 Mil-Std-882E, Standard Practice for System Safety 
In place of the terms suppliers, oversight, or delegation the document discusses the responsibilities of the 
developer and the interaction with the program manager.  Oversight is discussed in the form of 
monitoring the developer’s system safety activities with review and approval of the delivered artifacts.  
Complexity, requirements management, or model based development are not addressed.  As such the 
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 document addresses the safety management between the manager and the developer at one tier.  The 
principles described between the manager and developer could be applied at the developer and sub-tier 
developer as well.  The use of model simulation for safety testing is allowed, however, the subject of 
MBD is not addressed. 
x The developer is to document an approved system safety engineering approach.  This includes a 
description of how hazards and mishap risk are communicated to the acceptance authority. 
o Describe specific analysis techniques and formats to be used in qualitative or 
quantitative assessments of hazards, their causes, and effects. 
x The document states it is impossible or impractical to design a complex system completely 
hazard-free. 
x The document proposes a proficiency certification process be used as safety critical tasks may 
require personnel proficiency.  Experience indicates that the degree of safety achieved in a 
system is directly dependent upon the emphasis given to application of professional knowledge 
and specialized skills together with the principles and methods of engineering design and 
analysis. 
o Safety critical tasks may require personnel proficiency; if so, the developer should 
propose a proficiency certification process to be used. 
x Establish, plan, organize, implement, and maintain an effective system safety effort that is 
integrated into all life cycle phases 
x Ensure that system safety planning is documented to provide all program participants with 
visibility into how the system safety effort is to be conducted. 
x Establish definitive safety requirements for the procurement, development, and sustainment of 
the system. 
x Monitor the developer’s system safety activities and review and approve. 
x Ensure that the appropriate system specifications are updated to reflect results of analyses, 
tests, and evaluations. 
x Establish system safety teams to assist the program manager in developing and implementing a 
system safety effort. 
x Quantitative requirements are usually expressed as a failure or mishap rate. 
x Oversight is described in terms of:  Monitor the developer’s system safety activities and review 
and approve delivered data in a timely manner, if applicable, to ensure adequate performance 
and compliance with safety requirements. 
x Where costs for safety testing would be prohibitive, safety characteristics or procedures may be 
verified by engineering analyses, analogy, laboratory test, functional mockups, or  
subscale/model simulation.  Integrate testing of safety systems into appropriate system test and 
demonstration plans to the maximum extent possible. 
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 4.7  Industry Practices 
4.7.1 FAA and Industry Guide to Product Certification 
This document has quite a bit of discussion on management of design and safety for a system 
development.  Oversight and delegation guidelines are given throughout the document; however they 
only address the first tier supplier.  Although it does not specifically address multitier supplier 
development the principles could be applied by the applicant and the supplier.  It fails on the count of 
multitier in that it focuses on foreign suppliers almost to the exclusion of the management of US 
suppliers.  Although it contains considerable valuable guidelines its adherence or enforcement is not 
clear.  It is up to the applicant to develop the content of a Partnership for Safety Plan (PSP) and Project 
Specific Certification Plan (PSCP).  It is off of these documents that an applicant is likely to generate the 
necessary sub-tier supplier assessment and oversight management.  The document references DO-160 
and DO-178B but no ARP documents. 
o This guide is focused on large and complex systems.  It identifies an FAA Chief Scientific and 
Technical Advisor who is to provide technical guidance.   
o The FAA Directorate will establish operating norms.  These are affected by many factors 
including complexity and degree of delegation. 
o The document provides guidelines for a management, delegation, and oversight structure in 
accordance and partnership with the FAA. 
o The document discusses supplier identification, risk evaluation, and management but only in 
terms of foreign suppliers.  Little if any is said regarding management of US suppliers. 
o The experience of team members is relied upon to identify critical issues.  The FAA determines 
its involvement based on that experience. 
o The FAA maintains its control through oversight of the Designees.  Descriptions of areas and 
mechanisms of oversight are given throughout the document. 
o Defined oversight criteria and defined delegations are deliverables to the FAA. 
o The FAA and the applicant agree to manage all designee activity within the 
regulations and policy regarding designee appointment, procedures, and oversight. 
o It is necessary to have all stakeholders in the delegation process agree on the extent 
of delegation, the procedures, and the degree of delegation oversight to be used in 
each project. 
o Appendix VIII Delegation and Planning  
o The designee is given some guidance in classifying findings into categories for the 
purpose of determining the level of FAA oversight. 
o There is no multitier delegation guidance given. 
o A number of documents are outlined that are along the lines of complex multitier supplier 
management. 
o Partnership for Safety Plan (PSP) is a document defining a working relationship between 
an applicant and the FAA.  It addresses corporate planning, communication and 
coordination, delegation, and operating norms. 
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 o Project Specific Certification Plan (PSCP) defines a certification plan between the FAA 
and the applicant.  It defines the certification basis and means of compliance.  
Delegation and oversight is addressed only at the applicant tier. 
4.7.2 Contractor Supplier Assessment and Oversight processes  
If a contractor has a supplier assessment and oversight process their oversight process will generally 
summarize the methods and processes to be used by the contractor to perform supplier assessments and 
determine the level of technical oversight, citing  assessment of the suppliers control of the design 
process for compliance with ARP 4754, DO-178, DO-200, and/or DO-254.  Supplier selection and 
management processes may be declared outside the scope of the Supplier Assessment and Oversight 
Process leaving those controls to be managed through a flowed down PSCP, PSAC, and PHAC.   
Weaknesses found in these oversight processes are in;  
1) the assumption that management and technical oversight will take place through the flow down 
of the PSCP, PSAC, and PHAC,  
2) they tend to focus on on-going supplier performance assessment that will determine/adjust the 
percentage of oversight deemed necessary with a bent towards reducing oversight and design 
participation through a sampling metric,  
3) they generally  fall short of providing supplier oversight guidance save in the assessments of their 
performance after they are on contract,  
4) the net impetus of this approach is a focus on supplier defect leakage rather than on supplier 
design oversight.   
x The purpose of this document is to define a process to assess the capability of a supplier to 
develop and verify airborne navigation/terrain databases, electronic hardware, software or 
systems. The assessment will result in a rating to be used as a guide for “Contractor” Project 
Teams to determine the level of Technical Oversight required for the suppliers. The results of 
the assessments can be used by the DER/AR/UM and PDQA organizations to determine the 
focus areas for their audits and to ensure that the appropriate level of Technical Oversight takes 
place. 
x A multistep supplier assessment process is described in 2.1. 
o The assessment process will result in an Oversight Rating for suppliers. The Oversight 
Rating is generated through completion of the Supplier Ratings Tables, as described in 
the Supplier Assessment and Rating Form. 
x Supplier definition:  Any entity involved in the engineering development or verification of 
airborne navigation / terrain databases, electronic hardware, software or systems that is to be 
used in an airborne installation for Contractor and certified by the FAA or other regulatory 
authority.    
o This includes all levels of sub-tier suppliers.   
o This definition applies to Global Contractor Suppliers as well as Non-Contractor 
Companies.   
o This definition does not apply to Suppliers that are the TSO Leads or already hold the 
TSO. 
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 x Suppliers that outsource to other suppliers must inform the Contractor Lead Site of their intent 
to outsource.  If a sub-tier supplier at any level is selected for new work, then they must be 
assessed and receive oversight per this process to include technical, DER/AR/UM/TSO Specialist, 
and PDQA oversight. The sub-tier supplier will receive a rating and oversight percentage specific 
to their business location (e.g., the parent supplier at one location will be separately rated from 
their sub-tier supplier at another location). The Lead Site is responsible for oversight of all tiers 
of suppliers. 
x Certification information addressing outsourcing and the use of suppliers will be documented 
per the Contractor Systems Certification Plan, PSAC, PHAC, SAS, and HAS templates as 
applicable. 
x Oversight Scope and Purpose:  This documents primary purpose is to assure oversight of 
suppliers and sub-tier suppliers occurs. 
o This document summarizes the methods and the process to be used to perform 
assessments and determine the level of Technical Oversight for suppliers that develop 
and/or verify airborne navigation/terrain databases, electronic hardware, software or 
systems for compliance with ARP 4754, RTCA/DO-178( ), DO-200( ) and/or DO-254( ).  
o The supplier ratings and oversight percentages generated by the assessments will be 
used by engineering organizations to provide appropriate Technical Oversight of a 
supplier’s work and will provide information that will be used during the supplier 
selection process. 
o HOWEVER:  The purpose statement states that: Supplier selection and management 
processes are outside the scope of the Supplier Assessment and Oversight Process.  Yet 
a section 3 is included which describes the Oversight Process. 
o The purpose of this document is to define a process to assess the capability of a supplier 
to develop and verify airborne avionics systems. A rating is developed to be used as a 
guide for Applications Project Teams to determine the level of Technical Oversight 
required for the suppliers. The results of the assessments can be used to determine the 
focus areas for audits and to ensure that the appropriate level of Technical Oversight 
takes place. 
x Oversight Process: 
o Supplier and sub-tier supplier oversight will be performed by the Lead Site/Non-Lead 
Site Oversight Engineers, PDQA, and the project DER/AR/UM.   
o The Lead Site that is applying for TSO, TC, or STC performs the supplier assessment. 
x Technical Oversight: 
o Technical oversight consists of reviews conducted on a percentage basis of the supplier-
produced artifacts.  [Note: there is no mention of design participation] 
o Three review models are described: 
 Co-reviews, oversight engineer participates with supplier reviews but holds 
defects found until supplier discloses his/her defects found list. 
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  Re-reviews, oversight engineer conducts a review on his own and discloses 
defects not identified by supplier (defect leakage) and records supplier 
performance data. 
 Co-Development, 100% of all technical reviews include oversight engineering in 
the role as a moderator.  This model is not recommended as it does not develop 
supplier performance data. 
o A formula/table is provided to determine the level of oversight necessary based upon an 
oversight rating. 
o Oversight takes on the form of taking a sampling of the supplier produced artifacts. 
o Oversight engineer’s qualification is defined as a highly competent engineer in the 
relevant product area. 
x DER Oversight:   
o Per the Contractor DER Handbook DER/AR/UM oversight shall be conducted on the 
work produced by all suppliers. 
 The level of effort will include appropriate coverage of the following: 
x Higher criticality functions and safety features 
x Functional areas 
x Complex implementation 
x New or previously developed software or complex hardware 
x Work produced with and without Technical Oversight. 
o A representative sampling of the work performed by a supplier shall be audited. 
4.7.3 Contractor Partnership for Safety Plan  
An outline for this document can be found in FAA and Industry Guide to Product Certification, Appendix I.  
The document is a general MOA that the FAA and Contractor will work together in a certain manner.  
Generally non-prescriptive there are a number of “will” statements regarding execution.  From a complex 
system multitier supplier perspective there is only a mention of “extent of delegation”, and “supplier or 
supplier partner” internal requirements mentioned.  As this PSP is directed only at defining the interfaces 
between Contractor and the FAA, it does not address supplier or developer control and management.  It 
provides no guidance to this study of complex avionics being developed in a multitier environment. 
x While at the highest levels, safety is of the utmost priority for both organizations, compliance to 
the regulations and conformance of products to the design as well as internal requirements will 
ultimately be the key drive to produce safe products. 
x The document describes the organizations internal structure and responsibilities of each. 
x Describes the framework for how programs requiring FAA approval or acceptance are to be 
conducted. 
x Subservient document to regulations 
x Contractor typical requirements: 
o Type Certificate (TC) 
o Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) 
o Technical Standard Order Authorization (TSOA) 
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o Production Certificate (PC) 
o Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA) 
o DO-200 Letter of Acceptance (LOA) 
o Major Repair, Major Alteration, and Airworthiness Function (MRA) 
x FAA office interactions: 
o Aircraft Certification Offices (ACO) 
o Manufacturing Inspection District Offices (MIDO) 
o Aircraft Evaluation Groups (AEGs) 
o Flight Standards Office (FSDO) 
x Organizational structures and responsibilities 
o Describes the Contractors overall organizational structure in general terms of function. 
 
Figure 7. Safety Organization Interactions 
o Describes the Contractor governance team and describes top level responsibilities. 
o Describes the FAA governance team structure and primary responsibilities  
x Communication and coordination 
o Defines types of communication: structured meetings, electronic information, 
telecommunication, management reviews, project specific technical coordination, 
regular project specific status awareness 
o Defines an issue resolution process 
o Operational safety database is described that collects history and issues 
o Accident/incident investigation activities are described and responsibility assigned. 
x Gives an overview of compliance activities 
x Gives an overview of production quality activities 
x Defines critical effective program management: oversight, planning, communication, and 
documentation areas in: 
o Certification basis 
o PSCP 
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 o Type design issues, production certification issues, and means of compliance 
o Issue papers, exemptions, special conditions, equivalent safety proposals, limitations 
applicable in-service maintenance/operational history 
o Pass/fail criteria for certification testing 
o Critical assumptions, installation interface issues, data for Airworthiness Limitations 
Section of instructions for Continued Airworthiness 
o Conformity inspection requirements which identify major/critical manufacturing 
processes, new materials and new technologies 
o Extent of delegation 
o Internal requirements (supplier or supplier-partners, international authorities 
involvement, validation needs, undue burden assessment 
4.7.4 Developer PSAC  
This PSAC was written for a project in which the 1st tier supplier to the applicant outsourced development 
of functions to sub-tier corporations located in the US, Europe, and Asia.  It was a complex critical 
component for the aircraft.  The document outlines oversight of the sub-tier suppliers in terms of SQA 
and DER artifact inspections with the 1st level suppliers DERs having oversight of the sub-tier supplier 
DERs.  It is a good example of management of complex systems development in a multitier environment 
and reflects on the experience of the 1st tier supplier understanding of the management needs not 
outlined in the regulations or guidelines.   
MBD: It made partial use of MBD practices in the flow down of requirements from the applicant and 
through to the sub-tier suppliers.  Proper use of MBD should span all the tiers in order to obtain its full 
value.  The process defines a component or unit level verification although the guidelines do not drive the 
developer to this conclusion.   
x Sub-tier supplier PSAC documents are called out by publication number. 
x This PSAC outlines supplier requirements responsibilities. 
x Documents provided by sub-tier suppliers are inspected by PDQA and DERs using engineering 
practices defined in the SDP to insure documents conform to DO-178B.  Changes fall under the 
management of the System Change Request (SCR) and System/Software Review Board (SSRB). 
x The Contractor DERs will also conduct audits to assure that the sub-tier suppliers adhere to the 
applicable regulations, policies, plans, standards, and agreements. 
x SQA provides oversight of sub-tier suppliers. 
x Oversight of the sub-tier supplier DERs are assigned specific names within the Contractor 
organization DERs. 
x The Contractor DERs will audit a sampling of artifacts produced by the sub-tier supplier.  This 
includes oversight of the corporation’s foreign developers. 
x The document references DO-178B, DO-248B, DO-254, ARP-4754. 
x The document provides a high level software architecture and a high level list of systems 
functions allocated to major software blocks.  Textual outline coupled with an architecture 
figure. 
x Traceability to FAA issue papers is provided. 
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x The SRDD is developed to include both the high-level and low-level software requirements. The 
software requirements in the SRDD are explicitly traced to the appropriate OEM SCD and 
Contractor SRS system requirements. Software requirements contained in the SRDD consist of 
both traditional textual requirements as well as requirements expressed in requirements 
models.  Models are used for functionality that is algorithmic in nature as well as for 
combinational logic.  The requirements models are developed using the 
MATLAB/Simulink/Stateflow tool suite. 
x Contractor will write high level textual requirements applicable to the software functionality 
allocated. Models will then be created based on the textual requirements. The models, which 
are the low level software requirements, are the final items that engineers create and edit prior 
to machine creation of the executable object code. The models are in machine readable format 
and are used as input into an autocode generator. The output of the autocode generator is then 
compiled/linked into an executable image.  This executable is then tested with a suite of 
software requirements-based tests. The model based development process is shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Textually Driven Model Based Development 
 
x The OEM model-based development process differs in that the models are created from 
diagrams in the OEM Specification Control Drawing (SCD), rather than textual requirements.  
The planned development process is shown in Figure 9 below. 
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Figure 9. Hardcopy Model Driven Model Based Development 
x Software requirements are formally inspected and accepted using the applicable inspection 
process, applicable requirements standards, and associated checklists. Prior to formal 
inspection, the SRDD section or model is placed under configuration control. From that point on, 
changes to the document section or model are controlled through System Change Requests 
(SCRs) and the System/Software Review Board (SSRB).  More detailed information about the 
software requirements process can be found in the Software Development Plan.  For 
comparison purposes, the hand code development process follows a traditional DO-178B 
development process. The planned development process is shown in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10. Hand-coded development
x Hand-Generated Code – For functionality that is defined using textual requirements, without the 
use of models, a software engineer develops the software source code by translating the 
requirements into the appropriate source code language. After a source code component has 
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 been developed, it is formally inspected and accepted using the applicable inspection process, 
applicable coding standards, and associated checklists. 
x Model-Generated Code – For functionality that is defined in the SRDD using requirements 
models, C source code is generated using  a modeling tool suite. After each source code 
component is generated, it is verified against the model using a qualified verification tool. 
x A System Modeling Tool (SMT) is used to design and manage the time and space partitioning.  
x Fig 6-2 and the general process described in the PSAC reflects a hole that should be filled for 
multitier applications, that is the higher tier requirements flow down should be in the form of a 
model – not text, nor even a graphic to be captured.  It should be an executable low fidelity 
model of the requirements. 
x The PSAC drives verification of model generated code to the component level – With a qualified 
verification tool.  Although it is an approach, this is not required by the regulatory documents 
and could be a big certification cost driver.  Furthermore this approach could introduce risk from 
the assumption that the function has been validated at the lower level. 
4.7.5 Sample Developer PHAC 
This PHAC was written for a project in which the 1st tier supplier to the applicant outsourced 
development of functions to one sub-tier corporation located in Europe.  There was also foreign 
development by the contractor’s corporate engineers in a Contractors European office.  All hardware 
components were evaluated as complex critical items for the aircraft.  The document outlines oversight 
of the sub-tier suppliers in terms of PDQA and DER artifact inspections.  It provides an example of 
management of complex systems development in a multitier environment and reflects on the experience 
of the 1st tier supplier understanding of the management needs not outlined in the regulations or 
guidelines.  It is not as strong in multitier management as is the PSAC. 
x The sub-tier supplier PHAC is referenced by document number. 
x All PLDs and ASICs used in these designs are considered complex per the definition in section 1.6 
of RTCA DO-254 (reference 400). 
x The document spends considerable time in the identification of complex components and 
associated DAL.  It identifies lifecycle tools for complex device development. 
x The design goals restrict the use of complex COTS devices.  A specific allowable list is provided. 
x The Contractor has an independent organization with processes to support overall development 
process assurance, a Product Development Quality Assurance (PDQA) department 
x Designated Engineering Representatives (DERs) that have oversight are called out by name. 
x Certification Liaison and Process Assurance 
o The Contractor DERs will provide oversight of the lower tier Supplier Quality Assurance 
plans and activities at key phases of the development and verification process. 
o The Contractor DERs will provide oversight of the Common Partition PLD development 
activities by both its Supplier and the Contractor in close coordination with the 
certification authorities and OEM. 
o The contractor’s engineers from its European office were involved in requirements 
based test case procedure development.  Hardware process assurance oversight for the 
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 Contractors European engineers will be provided by the European office and 
Contractors US site PDQA engineers. 
x DO-254, DO-178B, ARP-4754, ARP-4761 were referenced. 
x Requirements flow down is through a Specification Control Drawing (SCD) and Interface Control 
Document (ICD).   The Software Requirements Specification (SRS) also feeds the requirements. 
x Systems functional allocation to hardware is provided in the document in terms of major 
hardware components and what systems functions are provided by or reside on those 
components. 
4.7.6 INCOSE-TP-2003-002-03.2.1 System Engineering Handbook 
The document recognizes that complexity is a major issue but does not provide a means to manage 
complexity other than rigor in the decision gate review and assessment processes.  There is only 
recognition of a single layer of suppliers.  No oversight of suppliers is mentioned.  No references to any 
RTCA or ARP documents are made.  INCOSE provides no insight on the topic of this research. 
x Only in the supply process activities is a sub-tier supplier mentioned: “Maintain communications 
with acquirer, sub-suppliers, stakeholders, and other organizations regarding the project.” 
x Complexity is a major issue. – As system elements are added, the complexity of system 
interaction grows in a non-linear fashion.  Furthermore, conflicting or missing interface 
standards can make it hard to define data exchanges across system element interfaces. 
x Lean Systems Engineering: The application of lean principles, practices and tools to SE to 
enhance the delivery of value to the system's stakeholders. 
x Standards have also grown in number and complexity over time, yet compliance with standards 
remains one of the keys to interoperability. 
x Decision Gates are specified as guidance decision points following a review by qualified experts 
and stakeholders to establish compliance with a requirement.  There is a heavy process in 
conducting peer reviews, inspections, testing, and conformity audits to insure compliance with 
requirements. 
x Experience in the systems engineer leading a development is valued. 
4.8 FAA Issue Papers 
Issue papers are generally project specific so do not provide assistance to industry across the board for 
guidance.  So, no issue papers were reviewed. 
4.9 Papers 
4.9.1 787 Procurement Case Study  - Tang and Zimmerman 
Under the 787 Boeing instituted a risk sharing approach and tiered supply chain to contracting 
approximately 50 tier-1 suppliers who also served as integrators of subsystems produced by tier-2 
suppliers.  These tier-1 suppliers were responsible for delivering complete systems to Boeing.  The paper 
highlights two primary issues with Boeings institution of this multitier network of suppliers that are 
applicable to any structure with multiple tiers of suppliers; 1) care in selection of tier-1 supplier 
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 experience and capability, and 2) oversight through the multi-levels of the resulting tiered structure.  It 
also brings out several issues with assumptions; 1) assumed alignment in technical and management 
with the OEM goals and principles, 2) lack of cultural impact understanding, 3) capability and experience 
of the supplier including the engineering expertise as well as the depth of resources within the supplier.  
As a paper it does not provide regulatory guidance, however it highlights issues associated with the use 
of multitier developers and recommends greater level of OEM involvement in tier-1 supplier selection of 
sub-tier suppliers.  It also recommends an oversight working team with visibility across the tiers.  These 
recommendations apply to this study. 
Issues 
x Technology: Invisibility of development issues with tier-1 suppliers partners to the prime 
x Supply:  Tier-1 suppliers outsource development tasks to tier-2 partners, which may not have 
technical know-how, and without Boeing’s knowledge. 
x Overreliance on tier-1 partners to coordinate their development tasks with their suppliers 
further down the supply chain. 
x Boeing reactive responses: 
o Purchase company at the bottleneck stage 
o Send hundreds of engineers to solve issues with underperforming partners at their sites 
(tiers-1 through tier-3). 
Recommendations 
o Greater level of involvement with strategic partner selection and relationship vetting up 
front.  Spend more effort on evaluating each supplier technical ability and management 
capabilities.  
 Require participation in lower tier vetting of suppliers. 
o Establish a cross tier management working team.  Appoint individuals at key integration 
collection points to manage design throughout the lifecycle. 
Tiered structure events:  
o In one case a tier-1 supplier hired a tier-2 supplier to serve as system integrator without 
informing Boeing. 
o As Boeing outsourced more, communication and coordination between Boeing and its 
suppliers became critical for managing the progress of the 787 development program. To 
facilitate the coordination and collaboration among suppliers and Boeing, Boeing 
implemented a web-based tool called Exostar 
 In several cases due to cultural differences tier-2 and tier-3 suppliers did not enter 
accurate and timely data into a database system resulting in delays. 
o Upon realization that some tier-1 strategic suppliers did not have the necessary know-how 
to develop the systems or experience in managing tier-2 suppliers Boeing took over the 
supplier for direct control. 
o In some cases the limited resources of a tier-1 supplier were taxed by other delays to the 
point they were unable to continue providing their critical subsystems without subsidy from 
Boeing. 
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 o The strategy of relying on suppliers for subassembly proved to be too risky for Boeing in 
certain circumstances and resulted in Boeing having to perform the work themselves. For 
instance, Boeing sent hundreds of its engineers to the sites of various tier-1, tier-2, or tier-3 
suppliers worldwide to solve various technical problems that appeared to be the root cause 
of the delay in the 787's development. 
o Expecting Tier 1 suppliers to naturally align with Boeing expectations was clearly unrealistic. 
Engineering design challenges and resolutions clearly required additional unplanned 
resources and escalated costs for the overall project.  
o Computer Network Security Issues: The current configuration of electronics on the 
Dreamliner puts passenger electronic entertainment on the same computer network as the 
flight control system. This raises a security concern for terrorist attacks (Zetter 2008). 
4.9.2 Use of Safety Cases in Cert and Regulation - Leveson  
This paper does not address multitier supplier issues or complexity directly.  Neither does it address 
delegation of design tasks or integration of subsystems and the oversight of these activities, although it 
does allude to local government oversight through inspections and audits.  It does not reference any 
RTCA papers or ARP documents and procedures.  There are however, certain elements identified in the 
paper that that are applicable to increasing the safety of multitier complex systems. 
x The extra communication step between the engineer and the software developer is the source 
of the most serious problems with software today. 
 
x Both prescriptive and performance based requirements and process management are necessary 
for complex systems.  MBD can address both. It creates the model by which prescriptive 
coverage can be validated.  It creates the model by which performance is validated.  It creates 
the model by which human interaction can be validated.  It creates the model by which 
environmental interactions (traffic, etc) can be validated. It creates the model by which 
requirements are flowed down without interpretation. 
x General issues of the day: 
o Design is directed by those unskilled in the art 
o Control of design is relegated to implementers without system level oversight i.e. no 
systems engineers 
o As the system oversight is missing the KISS principle fails and results in no one that 
understands the system – creating high risk for complex and multitier systems. 
x Failure to assess properly from an “out of sight, out of mind” phenomenon can develop at each 
tier.  If the representation is not complete the likelihood of recognizing the missing information 
is not likely to be found.  An incomplete problem representation actually impaired performance 
because the subjects tended to rely on it as a comprehensive and truthful representation—they 
failed to consider important factors omitted from the specification.  This is a big concern for 
complex systems, multitier systems, and specification interfaces between subsystems. 
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 x System engineering must be in control of the design throughout all phases to insure proper 
functional and safety design at all tiers. 
Notes from the document 
x Probabilistic risk assessments, particularly for complex systems cannot be verified.  Probabilistic 
risk assessments are useful to direct the design approach through a fault tree and are useful for 
shotgun testing to look for missed combinatorial faults but they then must be converted to 
clinical tests. 
x To be most useful, qualitative and verifiable quantitative information must be used, not just 
probabilistic models of the system.   
o Clinical repeatable qualitative and verifiable artifacts are always necessary: probabilistic 
artifacts are useful for performance evaluations alone. 
o Models can be used to generate the clinical artifacts but there must be a direct 
generation of the implementation from the model and a method to show the 
equivalence of the model and the implementation. 
x Local Government Oversight authority is composed of oversight through inspections, 
surveillance, audits, and witnessing of critical contractor work. 
x Address Prescriptive vs Performance based Regulation and Safety Cases  
o FAA and NASA have heavily favored prescriptive although NASA has been somewhat 
influenced towards a performance based safety case by the nuclear regulatory 
functions. 
o Prescriptive weaknesses, according to Cullen report 
 Too superficial; 
 Too restrictive or poorly scoped; 
 Too generic; 
 Overly mechanistic; 
 Demonstrated insufficient appreciation of human factors; 
 Were carried out by managers who lack key competences; 
 Failed to consider interactions between people, components and systems. 
x Use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) such as Fault Tree and Event Tree Analyses. 
o Other high risk industries such as the nuclear submarine community does not allow PRA, 
instead they require Objective Quality Evidence (OQE) 
 OQE may be qualitative or quantitative, but must be based on observation, 
measurements or tests that can be verified.   
 Probabilistic risk assessments, particularly for complex systems, cannot be 
verified. 
x Impact of confirmation bias: Confirmation bias is a tendency for people to favor information 
that confirms their preconceptions or hypotheses regardless of whether the information is true.  
If the goal is to prove the system is safe, they will focus on the evidence that shows it is safe and 
create an argument for safety. If the goal is to show the system is unsafe, the evidence used and 
the interpretation of available evidence will be quite different. 
x Failure to assess properly from an “out of sight, out of mind” phenomenon.  If the 
representation is not complete the likelihood of recognizing the missing information is not likely 
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 to be found.  An incomplete problem representation actually impaired performance because the 
subjects tended to rely on it as a comprehensive and truthful representation—they failed to 
consider important factors omitted from the specification.  This can be addressed somewhat by 
changing the goal from proving the system is safe to look for unrecognized fault and hazards. 
x Some key points from the Nimrod accident 
o The Safety Case Regime has lost its way. It has led to a culture of ‘paper safety’ at the 
expense of real safety. It currently does not represent value for money. 
o The current shortcomings of safety cases in the military environment include: bureaucratic 
length; their obscure language; a failure to see the wood for the trees; archaeological 
documentary exercises; routine outsourcing to industry; lack of vital operator input; 
disproportionality; ignoring of age issues; compliance-only exercises; audits of process only; 
and prior assumptions of safety and ‘shelf-ware’.  
o Safety cases were intended to be an aid to thinking about risk but they have become an end 
in themselves.  
o Safety cases for ‘legacy’ aircraft are drawn up on an ‘as designed’ basis, ignoring the real 
safety, deterioration, maintenance and other issues inherent in their age. 
o Safety cases are compliance-driven, i.e., written in a manner driven by the need to comply 
with the requirements of the regulations, rather than being working documents to improve 
safety controls. Compliance becomes the overriding objective and the argumentation tends 
to follow the same, repetitive, mechanical format which amounts to no more than a 
secretarial exercise (and, in some cases, have actually been prepared by secretaries in 
outside consultant firms). Such safety cases tend also to give the answer that the customer 
or designer wants, i.e. that the platform is safe. 
o Large amount of money are spent on things that do not improve the safety of the system 
x Conclusion Topics 
o To avoid confirmation bias and compliance-only exercises, assurance cases should focus not 
on showing that the system is safe but in attempting to show that it is unsafe. It is the 
emphasis and focus on identifying hazards and flaws in the system that provides the “value-
added” of system safety engineering. The system engineers have already created arguments 
for why their design is safe. The effectiveness in finding safety flaws by system safety 
engineers has usually resulted from the application of an opposite mindset from that of the 
developers. 
o The process should start early.  
o The assumptions underlying the assurance case should be continually monitored during 
operations and procedures established to accomplish this goal. 
o The analysis needs to be integrated into system engineering and system documentation so it 
can be maintained and updated. Safety assurance is not just a one-time activity but must 
continue through the lifetime of the system, including checking during operations that the 
assumptions made in the assurance argument remain true for the system components and 
the system environment. 
o The analysis should consider worst cases, not just the likely or expected case (called a design 
basis accident in nuclear power plant regulation). 
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 o The analysis needs to include all factors, that is, it must be comprehensive. It should include 
not just hardware failures and operator errors but also management structure and decision-
making. 
o To be most useful, qualitative and verifiable quantitative information must be used, not just 
probabilistic models of the system. 
4.9.3 Reliance on Development Assurance Alone for Complex Criticality - CAST 
The document does not address multitier supplier development and does not discuss oversight or 
delegation.  It recognizes the ARP and RTCA documents as a means to provide assurance through a 
development process.  The paper takes a position that the regulations and policy are not sufficiently 
explicit (prescriptive).  The greater discussion on the use of diversity implies guidance towards the use of 
diversity as a means to supplement development assurance.  It does not provide guidance towards 
complex avionics developed in a multitier environment. 
x The purpose of this paper is to highlight that development assurance alone is not necessarily 
sufficient to establish an acceptable level of safety for complex and full-time critical functions 
implemented in software or complex hardware.  
o The paper presents rationale for the use of mitigation means in the system 
development to prevent either software or complex electronic hardware development 
errors from becoming a common point of failure.   
x When a failure is caused by a development error in the system, particularly in software or 
complex electronic hardware, the guidance materials are not clear on the applicability of fail-
safe concept and techniques. 
o Thus, the applicant and system designers need to consider the potential effect of such 
errors in the aircraft-level safety assessment, in order to ensure that their proposed 
system design and implementation of complex, safety-related systems can be 
demonstrated to have achieved an acceptable level of safety. 
x As the regulations and policy are not sufficiently explicit, this paper explains how the fail-safe 
concept and design techniques can be interpreted when addressing software-related and 
complex electronic hardware-related development errors. 
o No clear solutions are suggested. Moreover, this paper does not promote any particular 
concept. 
x New technologies and complexity introduce greater challenges and can introduce new sources 
of development error.  It is generally not practical or maybe even feasible to develop a finite test 
suite that can conclusively demonstrate the absence of development errors. 
x Development process assurance can establish a level of confidence through reliance on methods 
such as ARP-4754, ARP-4761, DO-178, and DO-254. 
x Four basic safety techniques are recognized; fault tolerance, fault detection, fault removal, and 
fault avoidance. 
x There is no quantitative means to assess the acceptable level of safety regarding the 
mitigation for systematic error.  Therefore, the acceptance is based upon engineering 
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 judgment and common understanding of best practices between certification authorities 
and applicants. 
4.9.4 Certification Concerns of IMA Avionics Systems – Bartley and Lingberg 
By its nature an IMA system may be made up of multitier suppliers of the individual components and 
functions.  This paper raises many of the concerns relevant to development of complex systems in a 
multitier environment.  It states that the existing regulatory guidance material, though fragmented, 
provides sufficient guidance to accomplish the necessary safety design and assessments.  The concern is 
that a fragmented supplier development base will exacerbate the issue by inadvertently missing certain 
aspects of the design and analysis. 
x This paper explores some of the issues and concerns surrounding approval of large scale 
IMA systems. 
o The FAA is concerned that the complexity of these IMA systems and the interaction 
between their functions is not well understood, especially under failure conditions. 
Additionally, given the developing business models used by industry, it is likely that 
large-scale IMA systems will be developed and integrated by multiple companies. 
o  From the FAA perspective, IMA systems are not fundamentally different in nature 
from more traditional, usually simpler, federated systems. 
 What has changed is the complexity of these systems and number of 
companies developing components of IMA and the increasing possibility of 
unintended interactions 
x Major concerns 
o Lack of integrated and cohesive FAA policy and guidance specific to IMA 
 FAA regulations, policy, and guidance is disbursed across many different 
sources and documents, may not always be harmonized, and may be 
confusing. 
o Distributed IMA design responsibility 
 Due to the fragmented nature and scale of IMA there is a danger many 
necessary design considerations and integration activities may be 
inadvertently omitted. 
 Specific engineering and design expertise is required to produce the 
complete IMA 
 Economic incentives and availability of specialized avionics suppliers across 
the globe may influence distributing the design work to different companies 
and different countries and cultures. 
x The risk is that no single entity “owns” or “understands” completely 
all functions in the IMA 
 Additional complications arise through limitations in communication 
between developers when developers are normally competitors in other 
areas. 
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 o Unintended operation 
 One obvious difference between IMA systems and simpler federated 
systems is that failure of the IMA infrastructure will affect all systems that 
make use of a shared resource.  It may be more difficult to determine 
secondary effects (cascading failures) caused by a failed resource. 
 A data dependency may have multiple links in the chain such that multiple 
functions are involved. 
 Secondary effects caused by failure of shared resources may not be immediately 
obvious without some level of detailed, cross functional analysis. 
o Erroneous assumptions regarding robust partitioning 
 Overconfidence in robust partitioning could result in compromised IMA 
architecture 
 Dependency between functions is not erased with robust partitioning, data 
exchanges remain as dependencies that must be taken into account; 
x Data Coupling – The dependence of a software component on data 
not exclusively under the control of that software component.  
x Control Coupling – The manner or degree by which one software 
component influences the execution of another software 
component.  
 Processor stacks, registers and data overlays must be considered. 
 It is false to assume that if the ICD between partitioned systems is not 
impacted by a change in functional parameters, then the functions using 
those parameters cannot be impacted. 
 The experts that are required to assess the impact of the change are the 
designers and analysts of the using system, not the source system. 
o Use of TSO for approval of IMA systems 
 With a system as complex as an IMA, there will undoubtedly be some aspects of 
the IMA system that will come under the purview of the issue papers levied 
against the aircraft program. 
4.9.5 Complexity Concept Causes and Control – McDermid 
The paper is focused on the issue of complexity and how to manage and asses the system.  The paper 
provides nothing new or of value but rather proposes some unacceptable means of dealing with 
assessments for avionics.  Not useful to this study. 
x Thus we can view complexity as having a number of key facets: 
o Scale - the number of elements in the system; 
o Diversity - the extent to which systems are made up of different elements; 
o Connectivity - the inter-relationships between the components. 
x Causes of complexity 
o Intrinsic (due to the nature of the system elements) 
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  The paper lists the hardware: processors, ASICS 
 Also interconnectivity and systems of systems 
o Extrinsic (due to the environment of the system) 
 Measurements of success, human desire for achievement 
 Embedded in systems such as aerospace 
x Difficulties in assessment of complex systems 
o Shared resources – processors, memory, etc 
o Discontinuous behavior – software is discontinuous 
o Multi-faceted – many properties 
o Hierarchies – understanding of all levels. 
o Emergent behavior – behavior of the whole are not simple combinations of lower 
level properties 
o Extreme requirements – civil aerospace probability less than 1x10-9  per hour 
occurrence requirement 
x Coping with complexity 
o Simplicity spelled out as KISS “Keep it simple stupid”, basically a value judgment for 
each requirement is made 
 Simplifying assessments to differences between product families [comment: 
not acceptable for critical avionics systems] 
 Design for assessment through partitioning 
o Assessment 
 Multi-criteria decision analysis 
 System Modeling – model based assessments 
 Automated analysis 
 Abstraction – purposefully omit details 
4.9.6 The Impact of RTCA DO-178C on Software Development - Reddy 
The document provides a nice summary of the impact of DO-178C.  It is a concise description of the 
changes made from DO-178B to get to DO-178C.  It has no direct value to this study but is recognized as 
an aid to someone wanting to understand DO-178C structures. 
4.9.7 DO-178C and ARP 4754 for UAV SW development using MBD - Erkkinen  
This paper takes a look at the changes in DO-178C and supplement DO-331 in regards to the use and 
processes of MBD.  The use of MBD to capture requirements, model the design, and generate code from 
the model is now clearly acknowledged as an acceptable means to certification by the governing 
standards.  A long standing issue wherein DO-178B provided an uncertainty in mapping objectives to 
MBD artifacts is now clarified.  DO-178C, supplement DO-331, calls out ARP4754A recommendations for 
MBD requirements capture, modeling, simulation, analysis, and validation.  Also noted is that DO-331 
defines a design model that is used to not only capture and analyze but to generate embedded code for 
both hardware and software implementations. 
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 So as it relates to this study this paper provides insight into guideline support for use of MBD as a means, 
although not stated, by which complex multitier systems requirements can be captured, modeled, tested, 
and coded.  The paper does not outline this system design management approach but establishes that 
the regulatory documents contain the acknowledgment of MBD that can enable guidelines that raise the 
bar on multitier development.  [This flows into our pre-conceived thoughts that the use of MBD and 
systems control can be strengthened to address the issues]. 
x DO-178B lacked guidance on modern development and verification practices such as model-
based design, object-oriented technologies, and formal methods, until DO-178C standard 
was developed. The FAA and EASA worked with aircraft manufacturers, suppliers, and tool 
vendors to update standards based on modern technologies. Rather than significantly 
modify the standards, they created technology supplement documents. 
o The impact of the new standards to UAV developers using model-based design is 
especially significant. 
x A general description of MBD design is given where engineers develop and simulate system 
models comprised of HW and SW using block diagrams.  Then they automatically generate, 
deploy, and verify code on their embedded systems.  The outputs of modeling tools 
generate textual language code in C, C++, Verilog, and VHDL. 
x Testing through flight test is expensive.  A better way is to test early in the design process 
using desktop simulation and lab test benches. 
o Test cases based on high level requirements formalize simulation testing.  These 
simulation tests are reused throughout the model based design as the model 
transitions from a system model to a software model to source code to executable 
code using code generators and cross-compilers. 
1. Simulation test cases are derived and run on the model using Model-In-the-
Loop (MIL) testing. 
2. Source code is verified by compiling and executing it on a host computer 
using Software-In-the-Loop (SIL) testing. 
3. Executable object code is verified by cross-compiling and executing it on the 
embedded processor or an instruction set simulator using Processor-In-the-
Loop (PIL) testing. 
4. Hardware implementation is verified by synthesizing HDL and executing it on 
an FPGA using FPGA-In-the-Loop (FIL) testing. 
5. The embedded system is verified and validated using the original plant 
model using Hardware-In-the-Loop (HIL) testing. 
x A requirement based test approach with test reuse for models and code is explicitly 
described in ARP-4754A and DO-178C supplement DO-331. 
x ARP4754A 
o ARP4754A recommends the use of modeling and simulation for several process-
integral activities involving requirements capture and requirements validation. 
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 o ARP4754A Table 6 recommends (R) analysis, modeling and simulation (tests) for 
validating requirements at the highest Development Assurance Levels (A and B). For 
Level C, modeling is listed as one of several recommendations. 
o Also noted in ARP4754A is that a graphical representation or model can be used to 
capture system requirements. The standard now notes that a model can be reused 
for software and hardware design. 
o If engineers use models to capture requirements, ARP4754A recommends engineers 
consider the following: 
1. Identify the use of models/modeling 
2. Identify the intended tools and their usage during development 
3. Define modeling standards and libraries 
x DO-178C 
o DO-178C calls out ARP4754A, so by implication endorses these processes. 
o The biggest changes for MBD are captured in DO-331 supplement Model-Based 
Development and Verification 
o A long-standing issue with DO-178B for practitioners of model-based design is the 
uncertainty in mapping DO-178B objectives to model-based design artifacts. 
Addressing this mapping was a main goal of the DO-178C Sub-Group (SG-4) focused 
on model-based design. No single mapping sufficed, so several mappings are 
provided in DO-331.  
 Some include the concept of a Specification model, which is a model 
separate from that of the one used for design and code generation.  
 The other concept is a Design model, which serves as the detailed 
requirements used to generate code.  The essence of a Design model is the 
following: 
1. A model can be used for design (system and/or software) and should 
be developed using requirements external to the model (for 
example, a textual document or requirements database). 
2. Source code can be generated directly from the design model 
(by hand or automatically). 
o One approach noted in the standard is that a model used initially for system design 
can be elaborated on and reused for software design and code generation. This ties 
ARP 4754A and DO-178C together quite nicely for UAV system and software 
developers using model-based design. 
o The test cases for system requirement validation likewise are reused on the model, 
source code, and executable object code to perform functional testing and collect 
coverage metrics. 
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 4.9.8 Complying with DO-178C and DO-331 using MBD - Potter 
This document is basically the same as the paper on Transitioning to DO-178C and ARP 4754 for UAV SW 
development using MBD with a few noted differences. 
x In the past, some suppliers may have claimed that subsystem development was beyond the 
scope of ARP4754, even for complex subsystems containing hardware and software, but not 
anymore. ARP4754A also more clearly refers to DO-178 and DO-254 for item design. 
x Model usage in DO-331: 
1. A model can be used for design (of the system, the software, or both) and should be 
developed using requirements external to the model (e.g., a textual document or 
requirement database). 
2. Source code can be generated directly from the design model (by hand or 
automatically). 
x DO-331 introduces two important techniques, simulation and model coverage analysis, that may 
be used with Model-Based Design to satisfy objectives for design models.   
o For some, but not all, objectives for high and low level requirements, DO-331 allows the 
use of simulation to satisfy objectives in place of traditional reviews and analysis. In fact, 
simulation can be more effective than reviews in determining correctness, because 
simulation provides a means of predicting the dynamic behavior of a system.  
o Model coverage analysis is a new technique called out in DO-331, and in fact this 
analysis is a required activity when using design models. One of the concerns raised by 
the certification authorities during the development of DO-178C and DO-331 was that 
past projects using Model-Based Design sometimes had vague requirements associated 
with very complex models. This raised the concern that unintended functionality could 
be introduced into the system during the model development process. Model coverage 
analysis is performed during model simulation and the simulation cases must be based 
on the requirements from which the model is developed. This is similar to how code 
coverage is performed; it is done using test cases based on the software requirements, 
not on the code itself. DO-331 contains examples of the types of model coverage 
metrics that should be considered for the analysis.  
x The factors used to determine if a tool needs to be qualified have not changed from DO-178B to 
DO-178C.  For example, a modeling tool does not need to be qualified as long as the output of 
the tool (the model) is verified per DO-331 model verification objectives. If an automatic code 
generator is used, and the generated code (tool output) is reviewed then qualification is not 
necessary. If, however, the code review is to be eliminated then the code generator must be 
qualified. 
x With Model-Based Design it is possible to also use object-oriented technology and formal 
methods. For example, an automatic code generator could be used to generate C++ code, or a 
formal methods tool could be used to prove properties within a model. 
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 4.10 Other Resources 
4.10.1 NASASP2010580, NASA System Safety Handbook Volume 1  
Although this document is out of the scope of assessing the regulatory guidelines for management and 
oversight of multitier supplier development of complex systems this document was reviewed for an 
alternate perspective.  The document defines complexity as one of the primary reasons for its purpose, to 
provide a safety framework with a holistic assessment of the aggregate sources of risk.  It does not 
specifically address multitier supplier network risks; experience, interpretation, boundary issues, etc.  
However, the purpose of the document is intended for those with oversight responsibilities.  The overall 
framework could easily be applied to multitier suppliers.  The document does not reference any ARP or 
DO documents, but references Mil-STD-882D, Mil-HDBK-217F and a number of NPR documents. 
x The document is prefaced with a statement questioning the adequacy of traditional safety analysis 
tools and processes for identifying and quantifying hazards (FMEA and probabilistic risk assessment 
methods (PRA).  However, the increasing complexity has become an issue and drives the need for a 
more holistic approach.  The handbook takes a more holistic approach in 3 areas: 
1. The handbook takes the position that it is important to consider measures of aggregate 
safety risk as opposed to focusing on the individual risk.  The term aggregate risk, when 
used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that 
lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level. 
2. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls 
derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been 
identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for 
protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. 
3. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of 
risk.  Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to 
plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The 
evaluation of uncertainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the 
analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome 
perceived to be “most likely.” 
o In line with these considerations, the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric 
approach to system safety but rather strives to emphasize the most critical scenarios 
that contribute to the aggregate risk and then identifying the risk drives that cause 
these scenarios to be critical. 
x Volume 1 purpose is to present an overall framework for system safety.  Volume 2 provides specific 
guidance on the conduct of major system safety activities towards development of evidence. 
x The document structure is a clear build up of the safety objective with 4 major points; 1) overview of 
system safety, 2) safety objectives, 3) system safety activities, and 4) RISC informed safety measures. 
x Though it is not clearly annunciated there is a discussion of flowing down probabilistic allocations to 
subsystem elements to the organizational units responsible for the design of these elements (p 60).  
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 The use of tiers does not refer to multitier suppliers, however, but tiered technical flow down of; 1) 
reliability allocations, 2) recovery from faults, and 3) crewed mission recovery from faults. 
x The document identifies several drivers that motivate a change in approaches to safety: 
o The high cost of testing limits the ability to rely on test-fail-fix strategies drives towards 
reliance on analytical results. 
o Increasing system complexity makes it necessary to go beyond traditional hazard 
assessments as they are limited in their ability to identify hazardous system interactions.  
This states a case for modeling and simulation. 
o Development of systems and technologies that operate on the edge of engineering 
expertise driving a high degree of discipline and oversight. 
o The use of unproven technologies requiring design conservatism to protect against 
unknown safety risks. 
x Scenario development requires systematic analysis of complex interactions, dependencies and 
combinatorial effects.  This states a case for modeling and simulation 
x RAA: There is a short statement in (3.2.3) regarding the allocation of requirements to lower levels of 
the organizational hierarchy.  It places oversight responsibility on the organization that is allocating 
the requirements. 
x The Conclusion statement is a very nice statement of what the document is about – organizing the 
safety aspects under a framework bringing together the results into a single final measure point. 
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 1 Purpose 
This part of the NASA Flight Critical Systems Research (FCSR) study captured safety issues, cost and 
schedule issues, and recommendations raised by experts in the avionics and air transport industry.  We 
conducted interviews with 19 people who have experience as part of aircraft OEMs, avionics vendors, 
and the FAA.  We looked for a mix of safety, technical, and program management expertise.  We were 
not able to interview anyone in an FAA ACO, which would have been valuable.  
Some issues and recommendations were repeated by multiple interviewees, and we extracted these 
themes into the summary section below.  Extracts from the interviews are listed afterwards as 
supporting material.   
We excluded the names of companies, programs, and individuals so this document can be openly 
shared. 
The study objective is “identify effective means to ensure, with a high level of confidence, that 
computer-based aircraft-level systems are safe and compliant with the letter and intent of regulations 
and development guidance.”  The term “effective” also implies that safety mechanisms must be 
balanced with the time and cost to execute. 
2 Summary of Highlights and Repeated Themes 
Combined list of SAFETY ISSUES in a very rough order of priority: 
x The top safety issue for suppliers is their lack systems understanding and experience with 
designing safety critical functions – how their components interact with the rest of the aircraft.  
Suppliers do not know assumptions being made by the primes, and misinterpret the 
requirements.   
o Overseas suppliers have cultural limits on asking questions and taking initiative. 
o Knowledge of how to deal with hazard levels is very tribal – only a few special people 
know it. 
o The pool of experienced suppliers is small. 
x Requirements (and complexity) are increasing exponentially because of interactions between 
systems – when every system can talk to every other system then there is lots of interaction to 
specify. 
x Primes and suppliers have different expectations for new technology, and the missed 
requirements cause problems. 
x Primes and suppliers are not rigorous enough about defining interfaces – within their own 
groups and between suppliers. 
x There is a loss of systems expertise, and therefore an understanding of safety, as companies 
outsource work and don’t replace experienced engineers that retire. 
x Testing for system behavior and “unintended function” is starved (in funding and time) by 
testing requirements that are not safety related.  Testing individual software modules has some 
value, but does not address system effects.  DO-178B originally intended more system bench 
tests. 
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 x Process steps (docs, reviews, oversight) are given a higher priority in suppliers than a robust 
design, making systems less safe.  This issue is compounded when a supplier has tight budget 
constraints – design time is cut before the “mandatory” process time. 
x It’s hard to quantify criticality in chains of partial failures, and only OEMs can do it because they 
have the systems knowledge. 
x ARP-4754A is incomplete for defining systems documentation. 
x Reviews are not effective at finding boundary condition problems. 
 
Combined list of COST and SCHEDULE DRIVERS in a very rough order of priority: 
x The biggest avionics cost driver is large jumps in complexity due to all the possible interactions 
between systems on open busses. 
x The most common cause of budget and schedule overruns is missed expectations for new 
components.   
x Some primes (OEMs and 1st tier suppliers) do not draw adequate boundaries (in contracts) 
around system pieces and integration – responsibilities are not well defined and their suppliers 
cannot afford “add-on tasks”.  These primes also underestimate the time and funding to manage 
and provide continuing systems support to the suppliers. 
x Standards and certifications in one country are not accepted in another (e.g., US / China).  This 
multiplies the cost and time for each country that a system will fly in. 
o Suppliers are being forced to choose what airspace to support. 
o Suppliers are not pursuing TSO’s as often.  There are too many regulatory bodies with 
different requirements, so suppliers just get their system certified with an OEM’s 
aircraft. 
o FAA is not taking a more active role in committees with other regulatory bodies (EASA, 
etc.).  This causes two big problems.  First, other regulatory bodies are adding process 
that is not necessary but FAA accepts it anyway.  Second, requirements for TSO’s and 
airworthiness certs are diverging between the FAA and other bodies.   
x Suppliers hurt themselves when they test beyond what the standards require (particularly DO-
178B).   
x If requirements tracing and design are done properly, then suppliers do not need to allocate the 
same amount of time for testing as they do for design. 
x TBD’s in requirements is a big schedule and cost driver.  Avionics requirements take a long time 
to be set, usually because they are waiting for attention after the fuselage and engines. 
x Programs requiring DO-178B compliance are 5x to 10x more expensive than non-DO-178B 
(based on personal comparison of commercial to military). 
o Time and cost is added for testing detailed requirements when system behavior 
problems are hidden in corner cases. 
o The time and cost to define, build the test environment, and document tests for every 
software module is expensive. 
x ACO’s within the FAA are not consistent – ACO’s sometimes drop handoffs of TSO articles 
between each other because their responsibilities are not clear, ACO’s sometimes disagree on 
cert requirements for systems.  
x Suppliers will deliberately underbid engineering efforts by as much as half to win programs, then 
deal with overruns as they occur. 
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 Combined list of RECOMMENDATIONS in a very rough order of priority: 
x Primes should train their suppliers.   
o One best practice is bringing suppliers on-site with the prime for several months during 
design, then hold weekly meetings with suppliers. 
o Directives and processes are only as good as the people / groups that execute them.  
Therefore, spend more time training and mentoring rather than  adding processes. 
o Train overseas suppliers to ask questions and look for functional / safety issues. 
x Develop and execute a supplier assessment and oversight process. 
x Have a competent experienced team for defining requirements and verification. 
x Trade testing on requirements that are not safety related (coverage) for testing “unintended 
functions”. 
o There are already plenty of scripted repeatable tests done under DO-178B.   
o Add “break it test teams” of experienced engineers for each function.  Start with a list of 
test outlines.  Set up and run tests manually that are likely to break the system. 
x Put conditions in contracts so that missed deadlines for TBD’s give schedule and cost relief to 
the supplier. 
x MBD helps system understanding, and reduces requirements confusion.   
o Overall cost and schedule should go down.  
o For MBD to be effective, models must stretch across contractual boundaries.  
Otherwise, each supplier models his own system in his own way and declares success. 
o Use mature tools on programs.  Do not develop tools while developing the avionics 
systems. 
x Primes must allocate time and resources to analyze cascading partial failures.  Suppliers cannot 
because they do not have the systems info. 
x (There were no recommendations for maintaining systems expertise in the primes.) 
3 Interview Excerpts 
These are interesting comments made by interviewees that expand on the themes above. 
Lead system engineer interview: 
x The FAA was concerned about work being sent to overseas vendors where FAA has no 
jurisdiction for oversight.  At the same time, OEM and 1st tier supplier management did not want 
limits on who they can use for development.  Written corporate plans for supplier assessment 
and oversight have helped the issue. 
x Contractor guidelines for oversight have worked well.  Managing oversight through PSAC has 
not worked as well (primes still dump details in them). 
x Don’t put oversight details into a PSAC – this adds hard constraints on the software 
development.  However, authors are tempted to do it, and at least one big OEM does it to get 
more contractual control over suppliers. 
x Biggest issue for avionics suppliers:  they do not understand how pieces of avionics support the 
system behavior.  Suppliers need someone with system knowledge because it cannot all be 
written down in a PSAC. 
x Rate suppliers by having them do verification or analysis (start easy at first), and comparing their 
results with the results from an experienced team.  Use the rating to decide the oversight 
required. 
Appendix B – Risks and Recommendations from Industry  B-3 
 
 x Supplier engineers need interaction on the intent of a function / system.  Hold weekly meetings 
with suppliers. 
x The most common issue with requirements and system behavior is engineers given a problem 
with no interaction on the intent of a function / subsystem.  He had multiple examples of failed 
requirements handoffs to suppliers without continuing support, and no examples of a successful 
handoff without continuing support. 
x Overseas suppliers need to be trained to ask questions and take initiative in looking for 
functional and safety issues. 
x European airlines want different comms protocols than US, so suppliers have to double their 
code and verify both. 
x DO-178B originally written as a guideline promoting system testing on benches with interfaces 
between modules.  Process focused individuals and organizations within corporations since then 
have pushed coverage testing, which is not addressing where the functional problems occur. 
x Coverage testing drives desktop test tools, not system bench tests as 178B intended. 
x Some cert authorities require that unused code be removed in the middle of certification.  
Changing code at that point is senseless because it has not effect on safety, but adds risk by 
changing baselines. 
x Have a competent experienced team. 
x There are already plenty of scripted repeatable tests done under 178B.  Add “break it test 
teams” of experienced engineers for each function.  Start with a list of test outlines.  Set up and 
run tests manually that are likely to break the system.  Do not enforce repeatability because 
they have a “no excuses” standard.  Make escapes personal – “you missed it”. 
x Different protocols between EU and America is increasing the number of versions of code. 
x If using MBD, it is harder for functions like FMS where pilot interaction is involved. 
x The original intent of 178B has been dropped, and it is now used to push more unit testing 
instead of integrated bench testing. 
x Cert authorities should not require that unused code be removed while in the middle of 
certification tests.  Removing unused code has no affect on safety, but adds time and cost by 
changing baselines. 
x Train suppliers by bringing them onsite with the primes.  Then the suppliers understand the 
system better. 
x Have a systems cert document. 
x A good system certification plan is more valuable to a supplier than oversight – oversight cannot 
replace tester knowledge. 
General aviation director interview: 
x Had failures with 2nd tier suppliers that did not know how to execute to 178B.  Had to “teach 
them”. 
x Extra process is being added with intent of being more robust, but not helping – increasing cost. 
x Factors that indicate if a sub will work or not:  weekly reviews and milestones. 
x The pool of experienced suppliers is small. 
x FAA guidelines do not emphasize system testing as they should. 
x Biggest issue for avionics is getting requirements nailed down early.  Avionics is often last to get 
attention behind fuselage and engines.  It also gets a lot of TBD’s. 
x TBD’s in requirements is the biggest schedule and cost driver.  Put conditions in contracts so 
that missed deadlines for TBD’s give schedule and cost relief to the supplier. 
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 Scientist interview: 
x Unstated assumptions from primes to suppliers are the biggest problem in requirements 
validation and verification.  This is especially true of overseas suppliers that do not know the 
assumptions around partitioning, realtime performance, or system behavior. 
x Requirements and complexity are increasing exponentially because of interactions between 
systems – lots of interactions to specify when every system can talk to every other system on 
open busses. 
x ARP-4754A is incomplete for defining systems documentation. 
x Want supporting facts and analysis that the biggest avionics cost driver is big jumps in 
complexity (5x increase in software requirements over the last 5 years). 
x IMA is more complicated, compared to federated systems, for V&V because it adds partitioning 
and interaction issues. 
x Many suppliers do not understand the design constraints of safety (deterministic execution, 
hard real time, etc.). 
x Suppliers do module testing, but not much system testing.  Suppliers should run the tests from 
which their system or subsystem is derived. 
x Generic checklists on supplier experience will not help as much as addressing actual program 
failures. 
x MBD helps system understanding, and reduces requirements confusion.  In turn, overall cost 
and schedule should go down. 
Software engineer interview: 
x Process steps (docs, reviews, oversight) are given a higher priority in suppliers than a robust 
design, making the system less safe.  This issue is compounded when a supplier has tight budget 
constraints – design time is cut before the “mandatory” process time. 
x Reviews are not effective at finding boundary condition problems. 
x His subjective opinion is that programs requiring 178B compliance are 5x to 10x more expensive 
than non-178B (based on personal comparison of commercial to miliary). 
x Suppliers will deliberately underbid engineering efforts by as much as half to win programs, then 
deal with overruns as they occur.  This leads to insufficient design time. 
Director for high-integrity systems interview: 
x Suppliers lack knowledge or experience with safety and compliance around complex aircraft – 
how their components interact with the rest of the aircraft.  Gave a specific program and 3 
vendors (hardware and software), where none were “successful according to the prime’s 
expectations at the start”. 
x Some 1st tier suppliers write inadequate contracts for 2nd tier suppliers – responsibilities are not 
well defined and 2nd tier suppliers cannot afford “add-on tasks”.  These same 1st tier suppliers 
also underestimate the time and funding to manage subs and provide continuing systems 
support. 
x Some primes and suppliers try to outsource all development to dump all risk on subs.  Does not 
work when subs do not perform. 
x 2nd tier suppliers were required to follow 1st tier supplier processes, it did not help when the 2nd 
tier suppliers did not know what the system should do. 
x Overseas suppliers gave mixed results – some did a good job of developing, others would not 
ask questions, others would demand all information be provided before starting work (no 
prototypes). 
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 x Do not assume that two groups in the same company have the same skills and experience. 
x Do not develop tools (MBD) in parallel. 
x Primes must draw boundaries (in contracts) around system pieces and integration. 
x Primes have as much trouble coordinating their own teams as coordinating suppliers. 
x MBD saved many thousands of hours on flight controls.  One secret to using models is drawing 
the boundary around responsibility for functions. 
x Use mature tools on programs.  Do not develop tools while developing the avionics systems. 
x Properly written contracts are as important as technical integration, and have a big impact on 
cost and schedule. 
DER interview: 
x Testing for “unintended function” (funding and time) is starved by testing requirements that are 
not safety related. 
x Requirements-based testing does not look at behavior other than what is required, so abnormal 
scenarios are not considered.  Gave a program-specific anecdote. 
x Unnecessary safety requirements increase the cost of planes and plane tickets.  Cited a couple 
of government studies that concluded a $10 increase in plane tickets cause more car-related 
deaths.  Keep this in mind when gauging the value of additional safety costs. 
x When an OEM does the PSSA, they should spend a lot of time with suppliers to define the 
architecture and allocate severity levels.  Then suppliers understand better, and quote better. 
x OEMs should be proactive about covering problems with suppliers meeting their safety 
allocations.  Less costly to address earlier in design than waiting until testing. 
x Trade testing on requirements that are not safety related for testing “unintended functions”.  
This implies testers should be more selective in how they test and document each requirement.  
A lot of time and cost is being added for testing detailed requirements when system behavior 
problems are hidden in corner cases. 
Lead system engineer interviews: 
x Hard to quantify criticality in chains of partial failures. 
x Did propose and use a process for analyzing chains of partial failures. 
x Primes must allocate time and resources to analyze cascading partial failures.  Suppliers cannot 
because they do not have the systems info. 
x Certifications in one country are not accepted in another (e.g., US / China).  This multiplies the 
cost and time for each country that a system will fly in. 
x Cost of development is multiplied by the number of countries the aircraft type will fly in – 
standards and certs vary from country to country. 
x Knowledge of how to deal with hazard levels is very tribal.  Only a few special people know it. 
x 254 is generally frivolous.  It can be helpful if developers are worried about counterfeit parts. 
x Suppliers hurt themselves in schedule and cost by testing beyond what the standards 
(particularly 178B) require. 
x Testing every software module becomes overly expensive to set up a test environment and 
document. 
x Subs and primes often protect their designs from each other for competition.  This makes 
sharing of information for integration and test much harder.  This issue will not go away. 
x Most common cause for integration problems and budget and schedule overruns is missed 
expectations for new components. 
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 x Once a program runs long, resources don’t become available at the right time and the schedule 
problem is aggravated. 
x Every aircraft certification is custom.  Try to use a previous certification to start with, then tailor 
it to what has changed in the aircraft. 
x Suppliers try to use previously certified systems.  This is generally accepted until the supplier 
“opens the system” or changes a function’s contents. 
x Getting approvals for revised cert plans to change a function is not too hard to do. 
x Very helpful to suppliers if they can re-host software onto new processors without doing full 
Level A cert. 
x Suppliers hurt themselves when they test beyond what the standards require (particularly 
178B).   
x The least costly approach to testing is to iterate on “system level tests”.  Test the requirements 
at a system level.  Then add detailed tests for modules not touched by the system tests. 
x The time and cost to define, build the test environment, and document tests for every software 
module is expensive. 
x If requirements tracing and design are done properly, then suppliers do not need to allocate the 
same amount of time for testing as they do for design. 
x TSOA’s are important for suppliers to deliver spares directly to airlines (instead of the OEMs).  
The value of TSO’s to the OEMs are mixed – valuable to “small airplane” OEMs, but not so much 
for transport airplane OEMs. 
x For MBD to be effective, models must stretch across contractual boundaries.  Otherwise, each 
supplier models his own system in his own way and declares success. 
Program manager interview: 
x Scope creep is the biggest problem in development programs. 
x “Evidence” docs required by safety processes are important to have once the development 
team is gone. 
System and safety engineer interview: 
x Directives and processes are ultimately only as good as the people / groups that execute them.  
Therefore, spend more time training and mentoring rather than adding more processes.  Cited a 
prime. 
x A few OEMs have large directives that are enforced on 1st tier suppliers.  It adds to cost without 
helping safety. 
x OEMs get involved in 1st tier to 2nd tier efforts when there is a problem with schedule or cost. 
x Time and funding is wasted when formal V&V is a big paper exercise by a separate test group 
that does not understand the system – they do not know what to test for.  Then performance 
problems are found by the OEMs at integration time. 
x There is risk in suppliers making last minute changes that break other functions. 
x The biggest issues for verification and compliance is time and cost. 
x Engineers working for suppliers are becoming just software coders – they do not understand 
how software is supposed to meet an intended function or safety.  
x Mature systems do not suffer as much requirements confusion and TBD’s. 
DER interview: 
x Testing individual software modules has some value, but not great value.  The problem is that 
high levels of abstraction in software force the question:  where else does an object have an 
effect? 
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Director of certification and chief engineer interview: 
x New and novel technology / products are always a problem with subs because everyone is trying 
to agree on and understand the requirements.  Primes have been burned by suppliers bringing 
tech that does not meet expectations, but suppliers must propose it early to get on the next 
aircraft type.  Gave examples of suppliers for cockpit displays. 
x FAA has a strict regulation that says to “stop ship” of a TSOA product that is non-compliant, 
even if the non-compliance is not safety related. 
x Business people like to outsource work, looking to reduce internal overhead.  However, they get 
burned by using subs who claim to have expertise when they do not.  They then try to add 
oversight, which does not work and just adds more cost. 
x More layers of suppliers means more opportunities to misinterpret requirements flow down. 
x Must train overseas suppliers. 
x ACO’s within the FAA are not consistent – ACO’s sometimes drop handoffs of TSO articles 
between each other because their responsibilities are not clear, ACO’s sometimes disagree on 
cert requirements for systems.  
x FAA is not taking a more active role in committees with other regulatory bodies (EASA, etc. This 
causes two big problems.  First, other regulatory bodies are adding process that is not necessary 
but FAA accepts it anyway.  Second, requirements for TSO’s and airworthiness certifications are 
diverging between the FAA and other bodies.  Suppliers are reaching the point where they must 
choose what airspace to support. 
x Suppliers are not pursuing TSO’s as often.  There are too many regulatory bodies with different 
requirements, so suppliers just get their system certified with an OEM’s aircraft. 
x Requests in the EU for more documentation does not mean more safety. 
Chief engineer for avionics interview: 
x Suppliers are not rigorous enough about defining interfaces within their own groups. 
x Primes should be more meticulous with interface definitions. 
x Cited the ongoing argument about how to deal with inadequate requirements.  Opposes using 
dissimilar systems – focus on getting correct requirements instead of battling complexity. 
x Some OEMs want more integration done by suppliers.  This must be clearly captured in quotes 
and contracts.  Primes have had problems with outsourcing integration without clear 
assignments. 
x ARP-4754A gives options, but no guidance (best practices).  Should be updated with industry 
lessons. 
x Subs do not look for cascading failures because they do not know all of the aircraft systems.  The 
OEMs must do it. 
Hardware designer interview: 
x Their biggest schedule delays came from trying new technology for processing or networking. 
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 1 Purpose 
The purpose of this short paper is to assess ARP4754A and DO-331 for their guidance in the use of 
Model Based Design (MBD) as an acceptable means to system development.  The question posed is; do 
ARP4754A and DO-331 enable effective use of MBD methodologies as system development methods or 
do they undervalue systems level MBD application and default to traditional development methods 
controlled by individual disciplines. 
This is a critical topic in that MBD seems to hold the primary promise for managing the growing 
complexity of the systems and managing multitier supplier networks.  Improper perspectives on MBD 
could defeat its potential values. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Background 
Definitions of MBD: 
x Model-Based Design (MBD) is a mathematical and visual method of addressing problems 
associated with designing complex control, signal processing and communication systems.  
Rather than relying on physical prototypes and textual specifications, model based design uses a 
system model as an analyzable specification throughout development.  It supports system- and 
component-level design and simulation, automatic code generation, and continuous test and 
verification.  In Model-Based Design, a system model is at the center of the development 
process, from requirements development, through design, implementation, and testing. 
x It is not a software development methodology which focuses on creating and exploiting domain 
models (that is, abstract representations of the knowledge and activities that govern a particular 
application domain), rather than on the computing (e.g., algorithmic) concepts.   That is Model-
Driven Engineering (MDE). 
MBD avionics designs have been developed through certification prior to the release of DO-331 and 
prior to the recognition of ARP4754 as an acceptable means of demonstrating compliance.  One of the 
major realized benefits has been the literal elimination of requirements translation, software design, 
detailed software design, software verification, and software quality assurance efforts, illustrated in 
below.  This does not mean verification was eliminated but was conducted at a higher level.  Where a 
function is defined through the use of a model at the system requirements and analysis/modeling level 
the traditional efforts associated with software life-cycle requirements analysis, design and coding 
should no longer be necessary.  Traditional software development processes remain, however, for those 
There is a concern from its content that ARP4754A does not establish MBD as a systems 
methodology but rather defers to the approaches defined in DO-331.  Then there is a concern from 
its structure, content, and focus that DO-331 is not a true MBD guideline but rather a DO-178C 
extension of traditional software management processes over MBD activities that limit the objectives 
and effectiveness of MBD. 
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items not defined through a modeling process.  Functional verification activities are raised to the system 
modeling level and are performed earlier in the development cycle. 
 
Figure 1. MBD Impact on Development 
MBD as a means to develop systems fits as the next step in the progression of methodologies:  
x machine code,  
o assemblers,  
 high-order language compilers,  
x graphical language compilers,  
o MBD   
Along with each progressive step come the applicable processes, the supporting toolsets, and the 
verification methods.  It is both hard for the regulators and industry to let go of the previously held 
methodologies and hard to define what equivalent process and toolsets will give the desired safety and 
productivity at the next step in the progression. 
How the guidelines address the step into MBD is the question being raised. 
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 3 ARP 4754A Content Assessment 
How ARP4754A views MBD and how and where it delegates activities are of primary concern to the 
industry as it will shape the focus and work for years to come.  There are two possible positions that 
emerge from an assessment of ARP4754A relative to the applicability of DO-178 to Model Based Design.  
Unfortunately the guideline is not sufficiently clear as to the writer’s intent and there may, at first blush, 
appear to be a conflict within the guideline.  However, when put in full context of ARP4754A one of the 
possible interpretations of the intended use of DO-178 relative to MBD appears to be consistent.  The 
two interpretations are: 
1. For any model that automatically generates code all the processes of DO-178 take over and all 
aspects of DO-178 in terms of software standard processes must be adhered to. 
2. The intent and purposes of verification for certification credit as outlined in DO-178 must be 
accomplished; however, the other standard software processes and artifacts described in DO-
178 do not apply to functions generated through MBD. 
The inconsistencies stemming from interpretation #1 lie in the ARP4754A limitation of DO-178 to the 
item development part of the life-cycle which would eliminate its guidance through the aircraft to 
system, and system to subsystem modeling.  The conflict comes later with the statement that “Models 
used to capture requirements and then directly used to produce embedded code (Software or HDL) 
come within the scope of DO-178B/ED-12B and DO-254/ED-80, from the time that certification credit is 
to be taken until the software or hardware is returned to the system processes for system verification”.  
Placing the model in the scope of DO-178 from the time that certification credit is to be taken until the 
software is returned to systems verification is a puzzling statement if taken under the view that DO-178 
controls all aspects of modeling activities that generate code. 
On the other hand it is completely consistent with interpretation #2 that the verification guidelines of 
proof of: intended function, de-activated code, MCDC, and etc as identified under DO-178 fit under the 
interpretation that the intention of the statement within ARP4754A submitting to DO-178 for 
certification phase is that certification proofs outlined in the software guidelines must be accomplished 
for models that generate embedded code.  We would take the side of this interpretation. 
3.1 Inadequacy of DO-178C/DO-254 as a means to develop aircraft/systems 
ARP4754 acknowledges DO-178C and DO-254 as a means to implement development assurance rigor for 
software and electronic hardware items but denies their adequacy for mitigation of aircraft/system 
errors.  See ARP4754A pg. 22 last para:  “In this context, this ARP4754A/ED-79A regards the activities of 
DO-178B/ED-12B and DO-254/ED-80 as a means to implement the development assurance rigor for the 
software and electronic hardware items. These software and electronic hardware related processes are 
no longer considered to be adequate to mitigate aircraft/system errors without a development 
assurance process from aircraft level down to item level, as shown in Figure 5.” [Figure 5 in ARP4754A] 
By implication from this statement DO-178C and DO-254 do not address the system requirements 
development, application utility, clarity in functional decomposition, requirements translation, 
modeling, and system functional verification and validation performed outside of the item development.  
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 This view is consistent with the Item design life-cycle assignment for software processes of ARP-4754A 
section 3.2. 
By implication then ARP4754A does not accept DO-178C and DO-254 for Model Based Design efforts 
leading up to software and hardware item development activities. 
These implications are further strengthened by the statement on pg. 23 first para: “The objectives for 
accomplishment of each IDAL are per DO-178B/ED-12B and DO-254/ED-80 for software and electronic 
hardware items, respectively.”  The Functional Development Assurance Level assignments fall under 
ARP4754A Section 5.2 whereas the Item Development Assurance Level assignments fall under DO-178C 
and DO-254.      
The implication is that DO-178() and DO-331 do not apply to system model based design activities at the 
functional levels even for those that generate code automatically from the functional model.  The 
Aircraft System Model based development is sufficiently different and generally accomplished at a level 
above DO-178C authority indicating that an FDAL approach seems to be the only valid method for 
functional MBD.  IDAL per DO-178C is too low a level for MBD. 
3.2 Life-cycle applicability 
The life-cycle V-diagram, Figure 2, and the definitions in ARP4754A following the [the ARP4754A source 
Figure 5] in ARP4754A place the applicability of DO-178/331 in the bottom center of the V-diagram.  In 
terms of MBD then it should be clear that DO-178()/331 do not apply to MBD activities outside of the 
implementation part of the life-cycle.  It is at the system implementation stage that DO-178() and DO-
331 become applicable, see page 25: “The System Implementation stage of the process model interfaces 
the system process model described in this document and the DO-178B/ED-12B software and DO-
254/ED-80 electronic hardware development process life-cycle guidance documents.” 
In a traditional approach where requirements are developed, decomposed and allocated to hardware 
and/or software ARP4754A transitions guidance to DO-178B/DO-254, see pg. 29: “The point where 
requirements are allocated to hardware and software items is also the point where the guidelines of this 
document transition to the guidance of DO-178B/ED-12B (for software), DO-254/ED-80 (for electronic 
hardware), and other existing industry guidelines.”  However the implications for MBD are left open as 
MBD paradigms are not addressed by ARP4754A in this context.  Does it mean then that in the case of 
MBD where there is no allocation of functional requirements to software as the requirements are kept 
in a system model that the guidance of DO-178 is not invoked? 
On page 39 where FDAL and IDAL are defined and guideline assignments made ARP-4754A is not 
completely clear on applicability.  It could be interpreted that MBD falls under the FDAL as all behaviors, 
rules, performance, and requirements are developed in a model format and are validated in a model 
format.  Its output is compiled directly to embedded code and therefore does not invoke an IDAL 
development phase. 
The use of models for requirements capture on pg. 52 of ARP-4754A seems to take a conflicting view of 
MBD and DO-178() and DO-331 authority.  “ Models used to capture requirements and then directly 
used to produce embedded code (Software or HDL) come within the scope of DO-178B/ED-12B and DO-
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 254/ED-80, from the time that certification credit is to be taken until the software or hardware is 
returned to the system processes for system verification.”  Utilizing models to capture requirements is 
acknowledged, however, there are two implications: 
x If the model does not generate embedded code directly then the model is not under the 
purview of DO-178 
x However if the model generates embedded code directly then the model falls under the scope 
of DO-178. 
This is inconsistent with earlier descriptions of life cycle scope of DO-178 being limited to item 
development.  The purpose of the period of time between certification credit until the item is returned 
for system verification is unclear in this last statement. 
3.3 Requirements Development 
ARP4754A does not invoke some of the major benefits of MBD for early verification of models and 
“requirements” Pg 55:  “Ideally, requirements should be validated before the design implementation 
commences. However, in practice, particularly for complex and integrated systems, the validation of 
requirements may not be possible until the system implementation is available and can be tested in its 
operational context.”  ARP4754A does not acknowledge the benefits of MBD bringing early functional 
verification and validation to the requirements capture phase from the traditional V-diagram verification 
stages. 
ARP4754A also does not reflect differences in MBD activities that would result in a different set of 
correctness checks, see pg 59.  One would expect a significantly different set of correctness checks. 
Requirements traceability as described on pg 62 is from a traditional development sense and so does 
not take into account the paradigm shift from the usage of MBD.  Model based designs naturally 
incorporate traceability through the nature of the model as sub-functions, or blocks as elements of the 
higher tier model.  No additional traceability effort should be required.  This changes the mindset of the 
developer and the regulator from an abstract aloof mechanical process of requirements tracing to 
requiring a functional and application understanding for proper evaluation.  Requirements tracing 
efforts are traded for functional analysis and understanding. 
ARP4754A still contains a mindset of traditional processes supplemented by MBD rather than a 
fundamental core of MBD supplemented by traditional processes.  Pg. 62:  c. Modeling:  “Models of 
systems/items may be used to validate the requirements.”  It needs to be acknowledged that a model 
may be a complete design and/or the requirements may be in the form of a model. 
ARP4754A does recognize modeling as an approved verification method, pg. 68 5.5.5.3 Modeling   
“Modeling of complex systems typically consists of a combination of computation and test; however, 
modeling deterministic systems behavior may also be entirely computational. Modeling may be used for 
system parameter evaluation, to provide early system information, or other purposes.” 
It is clear that ARP4754 excludes most of the system life-cycle activities from under the guidance of DO-
178C/DO-331 as illustrated in Figure 2 below.  DO-178C and DO-331 fall into the Item Design portion of 
the system development life-cycle.  However, that brings attention to an apparent missing system MBD 
Appendix C - Avionics Trends Impacting Guidelines  C-5 
 
guideline.  ARP4754A itself is weak in incorporation of MBD activities throughout. For example sections 
4 does not address the impact of utilizing MBD methodologies. 
 
 
Figure 2. System Development Life-Cycle 
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 4 DO-331 Content and Focus Assessment 
As a supplement to DO-178C, DO-331 is espoused as the guideline addressing MBD activities.  If it is an 
MBD guideline then it must address the issues associated with model development, model verification, 
and should be focused on modeling.  It may be that DO-331 is actually limited to a Model Driven 
Engineering paradigm at the software level and was never intended to address system level modeling 
activities including those that generate code from the models. 
DO-331 structure and content comes under scrutiny as not truly being an MBD guideline but rather a 
software guideline maintaining traditional software processes over MBD activities.  One must ask: 
x Why does the table of contents, see Figure 3 below, read like DO-178C?  It is all about software 
life cycle, software planning process, software development process, software verification 
process, software configuration management process, software quality assurance process, 
software life cycle data 
o Should it not be: model life cycle, model development planning process, model 
verification process, model configuration control, and model life cycle data? 
 
 
Figure 3. DO-331 Contents Outline 
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 x Why does DO-331 refer to “user-modifiable software”, “COTS SW”, “option-selectable 
software”, etc. in a MBD document?  If this is MBD then the term “software” should disappear 
from these discussions 
o Should it not be “legacy models”, Option-selectable model functions”, reference 
models, library models, etc.  
x Why does DO-331 Figure MB.2-1 not reflect the elimination of traditional software development 
tasks through the use of MBD activities in comparison with DO-178C Fig 2-1?  Some model items 
are added (see highlighted items in Figure 4 below) but all the DO-178C processes remain.  One 
would expect that MBD would modify software activities and in some cases completely 
eliminate them.  One would expect significant additions of MBD related activities. 
Figure 4 illustrates the differences between DO-331 Figure MB.2-1 and DO-178C Fig 2-1.  The figures are 
identical except for the red highlighted items.  The implication is that all the detailed software process 
(planning, requirements development, design, coding, and integration) required by DO-178C for 
manually generated code remains as process requirements for models and code generated from those 
models. 
Figure 5 below provides a notional diagram that more correctly represents the impact of MBD on the 
software development process.  Functions which are modeled at the system level do not fall under the 
traditional software development processes.  There are, however, functions which are not captured 
through modeling, such as wrappers and board support software, which do fall under the traditional 
software processes.  
One might conclude that low level software modeling is appropriately covered by DO-331 as fragmented 
instances of particular low level components of a function.  However, DO-331 does not address the 
system high level modeling of operations and their decomposition down to functional details that 
generate autocoded systems.   
DO-331 contains paragraph after paragraph regarding standard DO-178C software processes that have 
nothing to do with MBD.   
The DO-331 process graphic MB.2-1 with a few model related bullets is just DO-178C regurgitated and 
does not reflect MBD process reality.  At best DO-331 describes a low level application of models within 
the software discipline silo where models are not passed to software but are developed by software 
within the silo from textual requirements. 
DO-331 clearly does not support requirements development and flow down through modeling 
mechanisms and the benefits that could be realized from translation layer reduction.  It therefore not 
only does not add value to managing multitier technical accuracy but restricts good practices that would 
enable multitier and complex system developments through application understanding, removal of 
translation layers, early verification of concepts and designs, clarity of complex designs, and error 
removal through modeling and simulation 
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Total impact of MBD
According to DO-331
 
Figure 4. DO-331 MB.2-1 
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Figure 5. Correct MBD Modeling Process Replacement for MB.2-1 
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 5 Recommendation 
DO-331 is nothing more than a DO-178C extension of control to an apparent “Software Model Driven 
Engineering” process.  We conclude DO-331 should not be applied to “Model Based Designs”.  In its 
place a Model Based Design guideline with a systems approach needs to be developed under the 
authority of ARP4754A as a system based modeling guideline. ARP4754A already provides life-cycle 
distinctions reflecting item development application of DO-178C and DO-331; however, there should be 
specific descriptions of the boundaries. 
Figure 5 provides a notional process that should be supported by a Systems Model Based Design 
Guideline.  The guideline should provide all the model development and management infrastructure 
processes necessary to effectively conduct system development across tiers in support of this process.  
All activities are couched under the prime objective of application of MBD principles across all system 
functional attributes and the processes necessary to develop them.  A systems approach to MBD is a 
mindset guiding all developmental activities.  Elimination of non-value added steps, translations, and 
tasks replaced by MBD activities are key performance goals supporting the prime objective of MBD 
application across the board. 
Figure 6 below describes the mechanisms for flowing down a model based requirement for a 
“Configuration Item-B” (CI-B) to a lower tier developer.  At the prime contractor level a complete model 
of the overall system is realized containing the environmental interactions and aircraft model, aircraft 
sensors and effectors, and in this example three interacting “Configuration Items”.  A “Configuration 
Item” is an abstract identification of a function or product such as an Autopilot, and FMS, and/or 
Navigation system, etc.  As part of the requirements provided to the lower tier developer robust 
Interface Models are wrung out at the prime contractor for high integrity and accuracy as they define 
and parameterize the interfaces between all the elements of the final system and of the current 
Operational Model.  The lower tier developer receives the appropriate interface models and a low 
fidelity model from the prime contractor as the requirements for the configuration item he is to 
develop.  The low fidelity model’s primary purpose is to provide behavioral and performance 
parameters that the configuration item is to comply with e.g. (resulting roll rate per deg of aileron 
deflection, handling qualities, navigation accuracies). 
The developer modifies and iterates the CI-B Specification Model into a high fidelity Design Model and 
returns these iterations to the prime contractor for concurrence.  When the model reflects the 
performance objectives it is run through formal verification testing.  The formal verification testing must 
address all the aspects of intended function, conditions, decisions, deactivated functions, and test 
coverage. 
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 Figure 6. Expected MBD Activities and Capabilities 
It is a mistake for industry to attempt to fit system MBD under the current DO-331 software umbrella. 
 
 
It is clear that as DO-331 cannot address system MBD approaches both from ARP4754A life-cycle 
description and from DO-331 software process focus that there is a need for a System Model Based 
Design guideline. 
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1 Purpose 
The purpose of this short paper is to assess avionics trends and development methods that have had 
and will have an impact to regulatory guidelines. 
 
2 Avionics historical trends 
A look back at the history of avionics implementations, development methods, and regulatory guideline 
changes is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Historical Trends in Avionics 
Equipment bay picture:  Interestingly the functional partitioning within the equipment bay has hardly 
changed over the last 50 yrs.  Individual computers of a major function such as an autopilot were 
merged into an overall autopilot function in the switch to digital computing.  However, the advent of 
IMA technology did nothing more than provide temporal and space partitioning so that the individual 
functions could share the same processing resources.  So, functionally the equipment bay remains much 
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 the same in terms of separation of function by purpose as it was 50 yrs ago.  There has been little 
merging of functions one would have expected from IMA architectures. 
The direction over the years has been to co-locate and share resources.  However, this trend looks like it 
may reverse.  The comparatively low cost and increasing capability of microcontrollers is in competition 
with the expensive partitioned systems and expensive safety partitioning necessities.  With the 
application of high integrity, high speed and range of bus networks the equipment bay contents will 
likely change as functions become more distributed throughout the aircraft. 
Redundancy approaches:  Redundancy approaches have remained constant within the variations of 
simplex, dual, triplex, quad systems that use equalization or state variable transfer to synchronize 
computations.  Voting techniques and fault identification remain largely the same although processing 
lock step pairs added some variation demanded by the integrity needs of partitioned resource sharing.  
IMA demands on temporal separation influenced the emergence of ARNC-653 compliant backplanes.  
The expected changes coming are in the use of long range high speed buses that span the aircraft 
lengths.  Assurance of integrity on these busses will be critical to a distributed avionics system. 
Technology: The major shift in technology application came with the switch from analog to digital 
processing.  Thereafter changes have been capacity and performance enhancements to the digital 
processing elements.  The immediate future shift is likely to go with the high capacity low cost 
microcontroller replacing the larger resource shared central processing schemes.  Further in the future 
some areas of avionics will look to parallel processing techniques that mimic the human cortex. 
In terms of development methodologies software development has moved from machine code to 
assembly code to textual compilations, and is currently moving more and more towards graphical 
compilations.  MBD will become the overall trend towards conceiving and developing systems because 
of the significant cost savings and error management. 
Guidelines:  Guideline source material has shifted from military standards to commercial standards as 
the investment funding for technology in common avionics has shifted to commercial ventures.  At the 
moment there are two sources of guidelines, EASA and FAA, which are in some form of competition.  
Current separation of disciplines will become more blurred as MBD takes over the development process 
from a systems perspective.  With the direction towards systems guidelines themselves will need to be 
developed according to a systems perspective applying systems methodologies to the guideline design. 
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 3 Operational trends that will impact avionics 
Expected operational trends and issues that will impact avionics are: 
Connected aircraft 
functions 
Turning an aircraft into a network node 
Data for functions coming from other platforms while in-flight (e.g., weather) 
Introduces issues with timeliness of data, security (trusted sources, hacking), 
bandwidth 
Security issues 
Aircraft operators and manufacturers have identified many potential 
economic and safety benefits using e-Enabled technology and software 
applications 
There are many applications that will require increased aircraft connectivity 
to non-governmental service providers such as the internet, portable 
electronic devices, and commercial-off-the-shelf technologies that have not 
been certified and accredited for secure operations by a government 
authority 
Prior to the availability of e-Enabled technologies, legacy aircraft used 
federated architectures with limited wired or wireless connectivity to non-
governmental service providers 
Legacy aircraft are now being modified to add Wi-Fi, Electronic Flight Bags, 
wireless Field Loadable Software, real-time aircraft health monitoring and 
reporting and Passenger Information and Entertainment Systems.   
These designs can introduce cyber security vulnerabilities beyond the scope 
of current airworthiness regulations and traditional systems safety 
assessment methods typically used to show compliance with the 
airworthiness requirements located in Title 14 CFR 
UAVs in NAS - maintaining separation, collision avoidance, cooperative flight 
Overhaul of air traffic control systems – using digital messaging instead of 
voice 
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 4 Implementation technology trends 
Expected implementation trends and issues that will impact avionics are: 
Continuing increase in 
functional complexity 
Evidenced in software lines of code 
x B777: 4.0 x 106 
x B787: 6.5 x 106 
x F35:    5.7 x 106 
Functions will become more interconnected 
No big initiatives by customers and OEMs to reduce functionality and 
complexity – keep adding features 
CPU and memory 
physical limits 
The Von Neumann bottleneck is continually getting worse 
• Memory latency relative to CPU speed is now 56,000 times slower than in 
1985 
• CPU “Hubble Radius” (physical size reachable in one CPU clock tick, round 
trip) 
– Is just 1.5” at today’s typical 2 GHz CPU clock speed 
– Even with infinitely fast logic, a processor larger than that will incur 
wait states 
– Memory (including cache) latency now consuming half of processor 
throughput 
Caches can help, but don’t improve worst case 
Multiple cores make the problem worse 
Execution time 
prediction is difficult 
CPU manufacturers can no longer offer cycle-accurate models of their 
products 
DRAM controllers now do out-of-order memory accesses (to optimize page 
operations) 
Communication trends 
Higher data rates 
• Need shorter media lengths for higher bit rates (e.g. 15m @ 1GB) or 
multiple media in a cable 
• Need more tightly controlled parameters (e.g., receiver thresholds, path 
impedances, …) 
Serial links provide (low pin count, no clock), even at card level (e.g., Serial 
RapidIO and PCI Express) 
N type links between cards in a box (e.g., Ethernet) 
More use of adapted COTS standards, versus avionics unique networks 
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 5 Architectural impacts 
Three aspects; behavioral, physical, and logical play against each other in the design of any system as 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
Three Orthogonal
Aspects of Design
Physical
LogicalBehavioral
Processors
ALUs, Memory
Logic Functions, Bit Storage
Transistor Areas
Systems
Algorithms
Register Transfer Level (RTL)
Electronic Device Transfer Functions
IC Mask Rectangles
Cells, Gates
Boards, Backplanes
Boxes, Cables
Capacitors, ICs, Resisters
Application Functions
Protocols
Toward the
center is
lower level 
 
Figure 2. Three Orthogonal Aspects of Design 
 
Trends in any of the outer to inner areas will impact the overall design trends in aircraft avionics. 
Expected architectural trends and issues that will impact avionics are: 
Near term trends 
Higher degree of Behavioral integration 
Somewhat lower degree of Logical integration (e.g., multicore vs 
multitasking) 
Degree of Physical integration is mixed 
• Serial links provide looser coupling 
• Trend toward cards from different suppliers in the same box increases 
physical integration 
Far term trends 
Higher degree of Behavioral integration 
Much lower degree of Logical integration 
• One partition per SoC having a simple CPU, all the memory that the 
partition needs, and serial connections to other processors 
– Solution to the von Neumann bottleneck 
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 – Solves the problem of a low criticality partition executing a halt-and-
catch fire instruction (e.g., the Intel F00F bug) that stops the 
execution of higher criticality partitions 
– Simple CPU makes accurate worst-case execution time predictions 
feasible 
• No pipeline stalls or bubbles, removes many hidden caches 
(e.g., branch target cache, virtual registers) 
– Provides protection for software intellectual property 
Lower degree of Physical 
integration 
(physical distribution) 
Solves the heat density problem e.g., multicore processors are at the limit of 
conduction cooling, can’t crowd 
Solves the “Porcupine Problem” (electronics shrink to the point where 
there’s not enough accessible surface area for all the electrical power, 
signaling,  and cooling connections) 
Makes better use of available space throughout the aircraft 
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 6 Design and verification tool trends 
Expected design and verification tool trends and issues that will impact avionics are: 
Increasing use and 
confidence in MBD 
Avionics formal methods modeling tools lag behind other modeling methods 
Increasing sophistication of modeling tools 
Increasing computational power allows for more complicated models 
Increasing need to integrate models from different disciplines 
x Electrical, mechanical, software, thermal,… 
Some models need to be increasingly accurate 
(e.g., electrical signal path impedance modeling for high-speed signals) 
As integrated circuit design tools become more sophisticated, it may become 
less costly to design (semi-)custom integrated circuits 
With the increase in the number of disciplines doing modeling, the 
integration of models between disciplines, and the number of suppliers, one 
can expect a heavy burden of housekeeping that could  use the help of an 
integration framework . 
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 7 Impact on multi-tier regulations and verification 
Potential guideline impact on multi-tier regulations and verification: 
Impact on regulations 
Off-board interactions and security will complicate every function – a lot.  
Not only will there be new requirements to protect the system from external 
security threats, there may need to be security requirements to protect the 
intellectual property of one supplier from another (e.g., software and data). 
Regulations will need to address systems more comprehensively and  
precisely – data sources, network and bus performance, timing, verification 
of data sources, distributed functions 
Verification 
More complex and precise descriptions of the interface between the 
multitier suppliers will need to be verified.   In some scenarios, such as the 
near-term plan by some aircraft companies to have multiple cards from 
different suppliers in the same box, will create failure coupling paths 
between products of different suppliers that do not exist in federated 
systems or in a single-supplier IMA.  For example, a card supplier may have 
to worry about heat, EMI, and even exploding components coming from 
another supplier’s card. 
Suppliers will need to share their models and/or data.  This can be a simple 
single-discipline sharing, such as requiring all suppliers that have equipment 
through which a signal passes to provide the input-to-output delay, in order 
to calculate end-to-end latency; or, it can be a complex interdisciplinary 
sharing, such as ensuring that heat propagation and power supply voltage 
fluctuations don’t cause a processor to slow down to the point where it’s 
software misses deadlines.  This may cause proprietary data concerns. 
Compliance to COTS high-speed data network physical layer standards may 
need to be more stringently enforced than the COTS bodies do themselves.  
COTS interoperability needs only to be good enough to be economically 
viable.  Whereas, in avionics, strict compliance may be safety critical.  Given 
that an excessive error rate may be safety critical and can be caused by any 
combination of marginal driver strength, the summation of all impedance 
reflections along the signal path, or marginal receiver threshold, all the 
parameters must be precisely tested to be well away from their error 
threshold by all suppliers whose equipment can affect these parameters.  
This can be difficult when a signal is allowed to be as small as 200mV high 
and 0.32 ns wide (1000BASE-CX Ethernet).  Similarly, it cannot be assumed 
that the Bit Error Ratio (BER) requirement stated in a standard is the actual 
BER that a COTS device will deliver; it must be tested 
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 A disturbing trend is the number of “counterfeit” parts that make it into 
legitimate testing “sold out the back door”.  Combating this may require 
strict provenances or acceptance testing at handoff points in a multitier 
supplier hierarchy. 
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 1 Purpose 
This part of the study outlined how the airworthiness certification process is really implemented by 
industry, and pays attention to contractor and supplier interactions.  It gives a context for when the 
regulatory documents apply.  
 
 
2 Caveats 
This is NOT PRECISE – each project establishes its own objectives and parameters (one process does not 
fit all).  This means no project will go through safety and certification the same way, nor will OEMs be 
the same (each has own process and names for analyses done by suppliers). 
We stopped at Type Inspection Authorization because the rest of the TC process is directed by FAA, and 
OEM and suppliers should be “done”.  This means the diagram skips certification flight tests, continued 
airworthiness, Final TCBM, production certification, and airworthiness certification. 
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 4 Descriptions of the Steps in Certification Process 
PSP – Partnership for Safety Plan 
x Draft, agree, and sign a PSP. 
x PSP = signed agreement how the FAA and Applicant will conduct product cert, set expectations 
and deliverables, set methodology for exchanging information. 
x PSP is an umbrella for the OEM, under which there are project specific cert plans (PSCP’s). 
x Defines Training and meetings required by FAA.  Identify FARs, policies, and procedures that will 
normally apply to the OEM (how will the OEM talk with the FAA). 
OEM defines new aircraft “type” 
x Define the mission / concept of operations.  Include the operation sequence:  steps for airline 
ops, pre-flight, pilots and aircraft, maintenance. 
x Define operational requirements:  range, speed, ceiling, fuel economy, cargo, number of 
passengers, number of pilots, etc. 
– This defines the aircraft type. 
– Describe the operational environment (NAS, European airspace, …). 
x Hold workshops with subs for ideas.  Consider functions, size/weight/power, safety, new 
technologies, …. 
x Define the system block diagram for the aircraft. 
– Define prelim system boundaries.  These boundaries will match the OEM’s internal 
teams. 
– Make a preliminary list of TSO’s wanted in the systems. 
x Define function list for aircraft – taxi, navigate, altitude hold, … 
x Define Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) from operation sequence, system diagram, and function 
list.  Most of this will come from experience. 
x If OEM has enough info from re-using existing components, he may define aircraft-level safety 
reqts (eg., redundancy). 
x Airbus calls this the “platform phase”. 
Suppliers invest in products for primes. 
x Usually marketing products with primes for the next major aircraft sale. 
– Suppliers have very few upcoming programs on which to compete.  Means suppliers 
have to invest a lot of money to get on aircraft. 
– Primes like to keep a few suppliers around for price competition. 
x Suppliers develop technology and processes to improve performance, safety, or reduce cost of 
certification. 
x Suppliers pursue TSO’s and TSOA’s for some key products. 
– TSO’s are good for clearly defined, re-usable products – TCAS, EGI, GPS, …. 
– Suppliers like to sell products with Technical Standard Order Authorizations (TSOA’s) 
because a supplier can make minor changes with less re-certification cost.  Hopefully, 
they sell the same product to multiple primes without multiple verifications. 
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 – Primes are often interested in products with TSOA’s because it means some verification 
has already been done, and it will save some certification costs at the aircraft level. 
TSO notes. 
x Technical Standard Order = minimum operating performance standard (MOPS) for a system, 
material, or part.  Written and approved by FAA, usually with RTCA committees drafting the 
requirements.  Usually includes requirements for reliability (supporting fault severity levels). 
x TSO Authorization (TSOA) = approval by the FAA that a system or component meets a TSO. 
x Reasons for TSO’s: 
– Good way to compartmentalize (and do once) safety and verification. 
– Reduces costs on primes (less verification).  More potential sales for suppliers.  In 
theory, TSO’s help interoperability. 
– Smaller airplane OEMs (smaller than regional airliners) ask for TSOA systems which they 
can drop into an aircraft.  Big airplane OEMs ask for TSO functions more than TSOA 
boxes. 
x Risks around TSO’s: 
– Suppliers are “self regulating” when evaluating if a product change is within the TSO 
scope. 
– A TSOA does not mean an installation is approved – the OEM / consumer must install 
the system properly. 
x Suppliers apply for TSOA’s at the beginning of an OEM aircraft development because the 
product must be certified as part of an aircraft (use the test results for the TSOA).  Primes charge 
suppliers a fee for using the primes’ test results in the suppliers’ TSOA’s. 
OEM familiarization briefings with FAA. 
x “Ice breaker” for the concept aircraft.  Big suppliers may be invited if new systems or technology 
is involved. 
x Review operational requirements, system block diagram, function list, preliminary hazard list 
(PHL), aircraft safety requirements if any from legacy systems, high level schedule, major 
suppliers. 
x If there is any new technology or new functions, show it now to the FAA (eg., 3D displays, 1 
pilot, …).  Give the FAA time to think about how to cert. 
x FAA gives informal guidance:  points to watch, position papers to read, features it thinks are 
good, …  OEM gets an informal action item list to make updates. 
OEM drafts CP (Certification Plan). 
x At application time, complete CP expected for simple projects; partial CP for complex projects.  
Need to have enough info for FAA to determine OEM’s knowledge and capability. 
x CP includes: 
– Description of the design with sketches, schematics, CFR parts, components with TSO’s. 
– Proposed certification basis (regulation paragraphs, exemptions, special conditions, 
equivalent level of safety findings), description of how compliance will be shown 
(analyses, ground test, flight test, …), list of docs that will be submitted to show 
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 compliance and a compliance checklist, list of test articles for generating compliance 
data. 
– Project schedule, identification of DERs and their authority. 
x Keep the CP current throughout the project. 
x If the CP does not assure FAA of applicant’s understanding, then FAA rejects the TC application. 
OEM TC (Type Certification) and PC (Production Certification) application. 
x This is the official start of the certification process.  OEM provides an application package which 
includes the CP. 
x Most OEMs apply for PC (from MIDO) at the same time as the TC (from FAA).  PC cannot be 
approved until after the TC. 
x FAA issues a Certification Project Notification (CPN), identifies the cert team, schedules the 
Prelim Type Cert Board Mtg (PTCBM). 
TCBM’s (Type Certification Board Meetings). 
x One or more meetings triggered by the TC application. 
x Review the application, review the certification basis, review and refine the CP. 
Issue papers. 
x FAA may write Issue Papers for difficult issues, like how to use model-based design in a project, 
or how to verify a new technology. 
x FAA and OEM negotiate how to answer the issue papers.  Normally, modifications to the CP and 
PSCP are results of issue papers. 
x Issue papers can be written all the way up through PSSA’s and the PSCP draft.  They need to be 
resolved before approving the PSCP. 
OEM drafts Aircraft FHA (Fault Hazard Analysis). 
x Complete/update the PHL, and assign severity levels to the hazards in PHL. 
x Identify the block and function failure conditions that can cause the hazards in PHL – use the 
aircraft block diagram and function list.  Pay attention to new blocks and functions.  This is 
normally done by systems or safety engineers. 
x Assign severity levels to the failure conditions. 
x Initial Common Cause Analysis (CCA) of faults in FHA. 
x Look for integrated system hazards if know enough about the architecture - combinations of 
non-catastrophic failure conditions that can be catastrophic. 
FAA review and approve Aircraft FHA. 
x FAA does an analysis and formal review, providing action items.  For major items, FAA can add 
issue papers. 
x Once approved, the Aircraft FHA is a control point.  Up to this point, the OEM has had some 
leeway on the level of analysis.  Once Aircraft FHA approved, the aircraft definition and 
“negotiation” for certification requirements is done.  It won’t change much unless a mistake is 
discovered later.  The Aircraft FHA drives safety requirements to all the subsys and suppliers. 
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 OEM drafts PASA (Preliminary Aircraft Safety Assessment). 
x Outlines a plan for the critical issues in the Aircraft FHA.  Include issue papers, unacceptable 
risks, mitigations of the risks. 
FAA approves cert basis. 
x And also the CP? 
x 8110.4c Fig 2-1 shows TCBM for CP coincident with PSCP gateway. 
x Done at a TCBM.  OEM officially tracking critical issues. 
OEM starts defining architecture. 
x Adding detail to the aircraft block diagram and function list. 
OEM does PSSA’s (Preliminary System Safety Assessments). 
x Draw a fault tree for each hazard in Aircraft FHA. 
x Define systems contributing to fault trees.  Allocate severity numbers, integrity budget, and 
availability budget to each system. 
x Review and negotiate fault trees and allocations with suppliers. 
x Suppliers usually recommend mitigations at this point.  Mitigations noted in PSSA and added as 
safety requirements on systems, like redundancy and separation. 
FAA comments on PSSA’s. 
x May write issue papers. 
OEM drafts PSCP (Project Specific Certification Plan). 
x “Plans generated by one contractor are rarely efficient or effective for another. Each plan is 
unique to the corporate personality and management system.”  SSH Ch5. 
x PSCP includes: 
– CP and FAA’s Certification Project Plan (CPP). 
– Systems overview (hardware and software), TSO’s. 
– Plan for qualification of systems, plans to answer issue papers, OEM’s integration plan, 
flight test plan, certification compliance matrix. 
– Schedule of milestones, delegation of responsibilities to representatives 
x OEM will ask selected suppliers to provide information for the PSCP.  The suppliers help on the 
hope of getting the development and production work – ties into RFP. 
FAA approves PSCP. 
x Done at a TCBM.  This is a control point.  It specifies what the OEM and suppliers must do during 
design, integration, and test for certification. 
x The OEM now knows what the suppliers must provide, and can start releasing RFP’s to suppliers. 
OEM releases RFP’s to suppliers. 
x In practice, an OEM will be selecting suppliers from the beginning of the effort.  This is the latest 
point at which they will select suppliers, usually for a competitive item. 
x Important that prime plan time and resources for himself to cover detailed management of 
suppliers.  Define how the sub will be managed (risk and opportunity logs, etc.) 
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 x Important for supplier to note any subs the suppliers will use (affected by DO-178C). 
x Important to include details in contract for responsibilities and handling of changes.  Include 
who is responsible for integration. 
x The system boundaries that the OEM picks will match his own organization, and forces suppliers 
to propose similar scope (not mixing functions). 
x Flow down for system:  operational requirements, PSSA and associated mitigation requirements, 
safety requirements, TSO’s, pieces of PSCP that apply to the supplier (required standards and 
processes). 
Suppliers submit quotes. 
x Suppliers will run trade studies beforehand to have improved technology or product to quote.  
Usually done on the suppliers’ funding. 
x Suppliers will be getting bids from their subs.  The level of oversight the suppliers enforce on 
subs is a function of how they assess the subs’ capabilities.  Interviewees commented that 
suppliers have problems with assessing subs: 
– Suppliers often overestimate subs’ capabilities; suppliers are in a hurry to pick subs 
because the suppliers have a time limit on quoting; does the supplier have an available 
evaluator qualified to assess? (experts are often busy). 
– Can an evaluator assess a sub’s culture and attitude as well as capability? 
OEM puts suppliers on contract. 
x This may be spread out earlier in the process based on the OEM’s need for information or a 
requested lead time. 
Periodic reviews and TIMs (technical information meetings). 
x In parallel to the rest of the suppliers’ work. 
x OEM does much of his oversight during reviews of suppliers.  Likewise for suppliers to their subs. 
– Reviews are often tilted toward admin and functions instead of safety and human 
factors. 
– OEM does reviews with one supplier at a time – don’t mix supplier meetings to protect 
intellectual property. 
x OEM does reviews with FAA separately.  May have a supplier available to answer questions. 
Supplier does System FHA’s. 
x Fault tree analysis of system, then select mitigations of risks and set safety requirements.  Used 
to justify design assurance level, and used in PHAC and PSAC. 
x Allocate integrity and availability budgets for the system down to subsystems. 
x Common Cause Analysis (CCA) of faults within the system, and look for integrated subsystem 
hazards. 
Supplier writes PHAC (Plan for Hardware Aspects of Certification) and PSAC (Plan for Software Aspects of 
Certification). 
x Done in parallel with System FHA’s, but includes risk mitigations and safety requirements from 
the System FHA’s. 
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 x Include proof of compliance with requirements from the OEM’s PSCP.  Specifies what artifacts 
are needed for certification. 
x Sometimes a supplier will write his own PSCP that references the PHAC and PSAC.  In practice, 
system aspects of certification are in the supplier’s PSCP. 
Define and approve plans. 
x Given the supplier PSCP, suppliers write plans for:  software devp’t, hardware devp’t, 
verification, quality assurance, and configuration mgt.  Approved by OEM. 
SOI (Stages of Involvement) audits. 
x FAA auditing the first tier suppliers (normally do not look at the subs to suppliers). 
x 1st audit – FAA audits the plans of suppliers. 
x 2nd audit – FAA looking for evidence that supplier followed plans (reviews, …).  Implies the 
suppliers is developing designs and has sufficient evidence (~50% done). 
x 3rd audit – latter half of verification, FAA looking for evidence that the supplier has complied 
with his verification plan. 
x 4th audit – after experimental flight tests, FAA doing a wrap-up / close-out of action items from 
previous SOI’s. 
Supplier defines preliminary design. 
x Systems and safety engineers flow down functional and safety requirements to hardware and 
software. 
x Write Design Requirement Specs for subsystems / components, which capture the functional 
and safety requirements. 
x Create compliance matrix (or plan) that says how each requirement will be verified, eg., 
inspection, analysis, lab test, …. 
– Certification requirements – 14CFR regs, airworthiness orders and guidelines (4754, 254, 
178C), TSO’s. 
– Functional requirements – must demonstrate traceability from system requirements to 
modules to verification test. 
x Write system integration and test plan that defines the tests in the verification matrix, includes:  
function tests, environments to test in, reliability tests (long-term tests). 
x Define software architecture, functions, state flow, sequence diagrams, …. 
x Define hardware components and draft the schematics. 
x Human factors assessments as applicable. 
PDR. 
x OEM holds PDR with each supplier separately to protect intellectual property.  Main purpose is 
to keep OEM confident that suppliers know what they are doing. 
– Most OEM’s audit a few functions or systems (conformity inspections), and deep dive to 
check that suppliers are being thorough. 
x OEM holds its PDR with invitation to FAA.  Main purpose is to maintain FAA confidence that the 
aircraft will be safe. 
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 x Typical content of a PDR: 
– Review functional flow, storage, control and timing, software structures, security, 
development tools, test tools, documentation, resources. 
– For each configuration item, assess if meeting requirements (function, performance, 
safety), risk, compatibility with interfaces (and HF), reliability, manufacturability, 
maintenance. 
x After review, hardware engineers add tests to test plan for hardware items not covered by the 
system tests.  Same for software. 
– OEM test plan usually refers to the supplier test plans. 
x Supplier starts developing test equipment (want it earlier for testing hardware and software as 
it is finished).  Should know enough about interfaces (e.g., busses) to start picking COTS 
equipment. 
CDR. 
x For big programs, CDR may be broken into incremental meetings. 
x OEM holds CDR with each supplier separately (protect intellectual property). 
– By CDR, suppliers have completed their subsystem hazard assessments (SSHA’s). 
– By CDR, each supplier should know that his design will meet the severity levels. 
x OEM updates PSSA’s given supplier data. 
x OEM holds its CDR with invitation to FAA. 
– Review allocated design assurance levels to components. 
– For each configuration item, determine that detailed design satisfies requirements 
(function, performance, safety), is compatible with other configuration items, assess risk 
(technical, cost, schedule), assess producibility and maintenance. 
Supplier builds and tests system. 
x Level of oversight requested by FAA done back at OEM’s PSCP.  If the OEM has any additional 
oversight, it will be specified in the supplier’s PSCP/PHAC/PSAC.  Supplier chooses oversight of 
his subs. 
x Finish test equipment and qualify if necessary. 
x Define test procedures as hardware is built and code is written. 
x Integrate and test system. 
x Run functional tests in the system test plan, and check off the compliance matrix.  Usually have 
witnesses from the prime, maybe even the FAA.  Write test reports. 
x (In parallel for a long time, but done before certification) Run environmental and reliability tests.  
Write test reports. 
Supplier FCA (Functional Configuration Audit) and PCA (Physical Configuration Audit). 
x Supplier’s internal “official” review of the test data.  Necessary to get permission to put a system 
on OEM test bench or in a grounded airplane. 
x Final resolution of action items. 
Supplier-to-OEM System FAI (First Article Inspection). 
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 x OEM reviews supplier’s FCA, PCA.  Includes reviewing supplier’s test results.  OEM may give a 
waiver for non-critical action items to move into flight test. 
x OEM blesses the system, and accepts delivery of 1st prototype.  Expects to use it in flight test. 
OEM integrates systems. 
x Follow integration test plan.  Often use sims first, SIL’s second, iron bird third.  OEM’s QA will be 
internal oversight. 
x If the OEM wants to take credit for compliance testing during integration, they invite FAA 
oversight (eg., conformity inspection of test facility or SIL or …).  OEM may request supplier 
support. 
OEM configuration audit. 
x “Official” review of the compliance matrices and test data, and official list of all the part 
numbers going into flight tests.  FAA or a DER will be present. 
x Final resolution of action items, or get waivers. 
x OEM reviews the system safety assessment (SSA) output. 
x Draft TSO compliance matrices – contain the requirements in the TSO’s and MOP’s and point to 
where the requirements were verified.  Asserts that systems are verified. 
x Supplier’s provide SAS (software accomplishments summary) and HAS (hardware 
accomplishments summary) – summary of what has been done for verification and lists problem 
reports. 
x Complete compliance matrices for the CFRs and cert basis. 
OEM boundary and statistical sim tests. 
x Run sim tests in lieu of on-aircraft tests that are too expensive or dangerous to fly.  Example, 
10,000 monte carlo simulation runs for autolanding used for cert credit. 
x Parallel to the experimental flight tests.  Normally use a SIL which has been inspected for 
conformity.  May also use a collection of simulation tools from earlier. 
Experimental A/W (airworthiness) cert. 
x OEM applies for cert.  Review flight test plan (in PSCP) with FAA.  If FAA is content, grants 
experimental cert. 
OEM experimental flight tests. 
x Fly tests with 1st prototype aircraft and test pilots.  Lots of data collection.  FAA pilots invited to 
participate at the end of the flight tests. 
x Write and deliver flight test report to FAA.  Used for certification credit. 
x The aircraft is complete enough to fly, but is probably lacking interior finishing. 
OEM complete aircraft. 
x Finish interior.  Test lighting, oxygen, seats, … 
x OEM has started setting up production lines  to build the interior. 
x Must close all non-compliances before applying for TIA. 
TCBM for TIA (Type Inspection Authorization). 
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 x “Preflight TCBM”.  FAA reviews the results of the OEM’s flight tests, OEM’s compliance reports, 
reliability test results (from OEM and suppliers). 
x If FAA is satisfied, they authorize type inspection flight tests. 
Supplier applies for TSOA. 
x After FAA has completed their flight tests, supplier uses test results to get box “stamped”.3 
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